Alva P. Loiselle

The plaintiff sued the defendant corporation to compel registration of a 1935 stock transfer on its books and issuance of certificates reflecting subsequent stock splits and dividends. The plaintiff had acquired title to the original two shares when the prior owner endorsed and delivered the certificate to him in payment for legal services, though he delayed requesting a transfer because he believed the shares had little value. The court reasoned that the corporation's issuance of new certificates for an eight-for-one stock split without requiring surrender of the original certificate exposed it to the plaintiff's claim as title owner under the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, but stock dividends accruing to the record owner required separate analysis. The opinion addresses the corporation's obligations when issuing replacement shares claimed to be lost and the remedies available to a transferee who presents the original certificate years later.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case concerns eminent domain proceedings in which the state Commissioner of Transportation took 0.38 acres of Laurel, Inc.'s 9.7-acre property in Fairfield for highway ramp construction in 1974, prompting claims that the taking destroyed access and rendered the remaining land unusable for a planned condominium project. After earlier litigation resolved jurisdictional and inverse condemnation issues, the Superior Court awarded Laurel $2,576,300 in damages for the taking and related impacts on development plans, permits, and improvements already made. Both parties appealed that award to the Supreme Court, which reviewed the trial court's findings on the property's pre-taking condition, zoning restrictions, project expenditures, and the effect of losing the access strip. The core reasoning focuses on applying statutory condemnation procedures under General Statutes §13a-76 and related provisions to calculate just compensation based on the evidence presented.

propertyprocedure

In Wakeman v. Commissioner of Transportation, the plaintiffs, owners of a nursery business on residentially zoned land, challenged the state's assessment of damages after the Commissioner condemned 3.9 acres including most of their Main Street frontage and access for a transportation project. The trial court reassessed damages by determining the difference between the property's market value before and after the partial taking, factoring in the cost to cure lost parking, display areas, and access through proposed improvements like a service road. On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld the valuation method as consistent with General Statutes § 13a-76 and precedent on just compensation for partial takings but identified an arithmetic error in the award amount and ruled that the trial court's recommendation to widen the remaining accessway was purely advisory. The court therefore set aside the judgment and remanded for entry of a corrected award of $210,482 to the plaintiffs after crediting the initial deposit.

propertyprocedure

This case is an appeal by the plaintiff mother challenging a Superior Court order that granted the defendant father's motion to modify custody of their two minor children, transferring it from the mother to the father. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision, finding no error in its factual findings, evidentiary rulings, or conclusion that a material change in circumstances warranted the modification based on the children's best interests. The court noted that the trial judge had the advantage of observing witnesses and parties, received reports from a family relations officer and the children's attorney both recommending custody with the father, and acted within its broad discretion; the mother's claims regarding omitted findings, expert testimony, and pre-divorce evidence were rejected as either within the court's discretion or unsupported by the record. The opinion emphasizes that appellate intervention requires a clear abuse of discretion, which was not shown here.

family law

The case involved a lawsuit by Diane Comba and her father against the Town of Ridgefield and the state commissioner of transportation for injuries sustained when a rotten tree limb fell onto their vehicle while traveling on a public highway. The plaintiffs alleged liability under General Statutes §§ 13a-149 and 13a-144, which impose responsibility on municipalities and the state for injuries caused by defective roads, and also claimed negligence by the state. The trial court sustained demurrers to the complaint, and the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed, holding that an overhanging rotten limb does not qualify as a road defect under the statutes because it does not obstruct or hinder travel on the highway and could cause injury even to non-travelers, as explained in precedents such as Hewison v. New Haven and Dyer v. Danbury. The court also upheld the state's sovereign immunity on the negligence counts, ruling that only the legislature may waive such immunity through statute.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case concerned whether evidence from wiretaps should be suppressed in a prosecution for gambling offenses because the applications for the wiretap orders were merely acknowledged rather than submitted under oath by the state's attorney, as allegedly required by Connecticut statutes. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to suppress and dismissed the case with prejudice. On writ of error, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that General Statutes §§ 54-41b and 54-41c require the state's attorney applicant to submit the wiretap application under oath or affirmation, and that General Statutes § 54-41m mandates suppression of evidence obtained from orders based on noncompliant applications. The court reasoned from the statutory text that only the state's attorney is authorized to apply, that supporting affidavits from others do not substitute for the applicant's oath, and that the legislature intended strict limits on wiretap procedures distinct from federal law.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned a plaintiff, who had been adjudicated incompetent with both a conservator and a guardian ad litem appointed, appealing a probate court order approving a preliminary account in the administration of her deceased mother's estate. The defendants filed a plea in abatement arguing she lacked capacity to appeal in her own name, the trial court overruled her demurrer to the plea and rendered judgment for the defendants, and she appealed that ruling. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed, holding that an adjudicated incompetent person may not bring suit or appeal in her own behalf while the appointments remain in effect. The court reasoned that such appointments reflect a determination of incapacity to manage affairs or represent one's interests, older precedents allowing an incompetent to allege her own disability were overruled to the extent they suggested otherwise, and the law instead channels representation through guardians or a next friend to ensure interests are protected without denying court access.

procedurefamily law

In Velsmid v. Nelson, the plaintiffs sued the defendant in trespass for damages and an injunction to remove a garage allegedly located on their land in Westbrook, Connecticut; the defendant denied the encroachment and raised a special defense of adverse possession. The trial court ruled for the defendant without addressing adverse possession, finding that the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proving the location of the disputed boundary line. On appeal, the court held that the trial court's conclusion rested on erroneous principles of law, including improper reliance on testimony that did not establish facts about survey errors or title, and on matters not properly supported by the record or exhibits. The appellate court determined that the plaintiffs' expert survey evidence was not adequately discredited and that title could not be adjudicated based solely on the weakness of an opponent's claim. It therefore set aside the judgment and ordered a new trial.

propertyprocedure

The case concerned a police officer who became permanently disabled from work-related back injuries and received both a disability pension under the City of New Britain's charter and workers' compensation benefits under state law. The workers' compensation commissioner ruled that state statutes required crediting the compensation payments against the pension, resulting in the officer having received all due compensation. On appeal, the trial court reversed, finding the pension derived from the city charter rather than the state Municipal Employees' Retirement Act and was not subject to offset. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the charter pension provisions contained no offset requirement, the state statutes applied only to the state retirement fund, and the Workers' Compensation Act itself permitted additional benefits by agreement.

labor & employment

The case involved the Hartford Electric Light Company seeking an injunction to prevent the defendant from constructing a parking lot on an easement held by the company, as the easement agreement prohibited such activity without permission. The defendant counterclaimed for damages, claiming the company arbitrarily withheld permission. The court decided in favor of the plaintiff, granting the injunction and rejecting the counterclaim. The reasoning was that the easement's restrictive covenant could be enforced by injunction without showing harm, as long as it was not inequitable, and the company had not acted arbitrarily given the potential risks to power lines and service reliability.

propertybusiness & regulatory

This case involved a lawsuit by United Aircraft Corporation against union representatives seeking damages for losses from illegal strikes in 1960 at its Pratt & Whitney and Hamilton Standard plants, based on tortious acts that caused employees to be absent due to fear and coercion. On remand from a prior appeal that had affirmed liability and punitive damages, the trial court recalculated compensatory damages by determining total strike losses from excessive manufacturing costs and wasted overhead, then attributing only the portion proximately caused by on-premises tortious acts during the specified strike period (June 8 to August 8-9, 1960), resulting in awards of $979,200 and $444,811 respectively, plus interest. The defendants challenged the findings and calculations, but the appellate court made minor adjustments to the record and upheld the trial court's detailed determinations as supported by ledger evidence, payroll records, and expert testimony. The core reasoning focused on limiting damages strictly to involuntary absences from plant-premises conduct within the correct timeframe and properly accounting for overtime in overhead calculations.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

The case involved public utility companies appealing additional tax assessments by the state tax commissioner on 'transmission receipts' received for allowing other utilities to use their transmission facilities to supply power in noncontiguous areas. These receipts were cost-sharing payments, not sales of energy or rentals, and the utilities argued they were not part of taxable gross earnings under General Statutes § 12-264, which incorporates the uniform system of accounts. The trial court ruled for the utilities, finding the receipts were classified under operating expense account 739 rather than as operating revenues in accounts 601-615 or other enumerated categories. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the receipts were not taxable because they fell outside the statutory definitions of gross earnings and that collateral estoppel from a prior case on earlier tax years did not apply.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

The case involved a prisoner who had pleaded guilty in 1967 to charges under the Uniform State Narcotic Drug Act and larceny; he later petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that his plea was involuntary because his counsel provided ineffective assistance and the trial court failed to make an adequate on-the-record inquiry into voluntariness. The trial court denied the petition after a hearing, and the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed that judgment. The court found that the attorney's remarks attributing blame to the petitioner occurred in an unrelated case involving different codefendants, did not affect the petitioner's plea in this matter, and that the extensive questioning by the sentencing court established the plea was knowing and voluntary. It further held that Boykin v. Alabama did not apply retroactively to require additional inquiry for pre-Boykin pleas, and a review of the full record showed no prejudice at sentencing.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a defendant convicted after a bench trial of breaking and entering with criminal intent, larceny, and possession of burglar’s tools. The defendant challenged the admission of evidence including a bag, pliers, gloves, and coins found in his vehicle, arguing it resulted from an illegal search and seizure. The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the initial stop and subsequent arrest were supported by probable cause based on an officer’s observations of the defendant near a recently burglarized coin store and items visible in plain view, making the search valid as incident to a lawful arrest. The court further concluded that the evidence, including paint chips matching the crime scene on the pliers, was sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned a declaratory judgment action brought by a state police corporal challenging whether the commissioner of state police and the commissioner of personnel could legally allow patrolmen below the rank of corporal to take a promotional examination for sergeant. Departmental rules had required at least one year of service in the preceding rank for eligibility, but the commissioner amended the rules to permit exceptions when special conditions existed and scheduled a new exam. The Superior Court ruled for the defendants, and the plaintiff appealed. The appellate court dismissed the appeal, holding that the amendment superseded the prior rule, making any determination about the original rule moot with no practical relief possible.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case involved churches adjacent to a property in New Britain, Connecticut, challenging the issuance of a building permit to Friendly Ice Cream for constructing a restaurant in an OP (office-public buildings) zoning district. The trial court denied the requested injunctive relief, and the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the 1968 zoning amendments—which changed restaurant use from permitted to a special exception—were invalidly enacted. The core reasoning was that the amendments failed to comply with mandatory city charter procedures under §§ 3134 and 3135, including improper notice timing for the public hearing (exceeding the 15-day limit between the first advertisement and the hearing date) and the failure to publicly read the city plan commission's vote or incorporate its full report into the hearing records. Because the prior ordinance permitted the restaurant use, the building permit was properly granted.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involved an appeal by a property owner from a trial court judgment foreclosing a mechanic's lien filed by a demolition contractor for work on a parking lot project. The main dispute concerned whether a 1965 statute extending the time to obtain final judgment (from two to four years) applied retroactively to the pending action, which had taken over two years from filing to judgment under the prior law. The court determined that the statute was procedural rather than substantive and addressed related issues including proof of lien notice and a counterclaim for delay damages. It upheld the lien foreclosure on the merits but remanded to correct the form of the judgment regarding the counterclaim.

propertyprocedure