Cites Loucks v. . Standard Oil Co. — Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 172 App. Div. 227, reversed.
State v. Rivera
Supreme Court of Connecticut · 1991-11-19 · cited 11×
The case involved the defendant's appeal from convictions for murder, attempted murder, and first-degree assault stemming from a 1988 shooting outside a Hartford club that killed one victim and injured another, whom the defendant blamed for interfering in his prior relationship. The defendant claimed error in the exclusion of a third party's alleged statement exculpating him as a declaration against penal interest, arguing the witness was unavailable, and in the admission of his own post-shooting threats to the victim's family as party admissions. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment, ruling that the defendant failed to prove the declarant's unavailability through due diligence and that the threats were relevant and admissible in light of prior statements and identification evidence.
criminal lawprocedure
State v. Alvarez
Supreme Court of Connecticut · 1990-08-21 · cited 95×
In State v. Alvarez, the defendant was convicted by a jury of murder under General Statutes § 53a-54a and sentenced to life imprisonment after shooting the victim during an altercation outside a club in New Haven. On appeal, he challenged four evidentiary rulings by the trial court, including the exclusion of a hearsay statement by witness Kenneth Hazard suggesting a third party named Rasheem committed the shooting, as well as the admission of a conversation with Melvin Poindexter, prior statements by Pamela McCrea, and testimony from Janette Lawrence. The court determined that the hearsay statement did not qualify for any recognized exception to the hearsay rule and was properly excluded, even though it was relevant to showing a third party's culpability, and found no abuse of discretion in the other evidentiary decisions. The appellate court therefore affirmed the conviction and sentence.
criminal lawprocedure
Daginella v. Foremost Insurance
Supreme Court of Connecticut · 1985-07-23 · cited 24×
The case involved a dispute over underinsured motorist insurance coverage following a fatal motorcycle accident, where the parties stipulated to arbitration and agreed that the arbitrator would seek binding advice from the Superior Court under General Statutes § 52-415 on two legal questions regarding policy coverage and set-offs. The Superior Court ruled that the Foremost policy must include underinsured coverage by statute and that the insurers were entitled to a pro-rata share of a $25,000 credit from a prior liability payment. Both insurers appealed the court's advisory judgment directly, but the Connecticut Supreme Court dismissed the appeals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that the judgment was interlocutory and not a final judgment under General Statutes § 52-263, as the final judgment in arbitration occurs after the award is confirmed or modified, and the advice did not terminate a separate proceeding or conclude the parties' rights under the test from State v. Curcio.
procedure
McCann v. McCann
Supreme Court of Connecticut · 1983-09-13 · cited 32×
This case concerned a motion to modify a time-limited alimony award in a divorce judgment. The trial court had originally ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendant $75 per week for three years; after finding a substantial unforeseen increase in the plaintiff's earnings, it raised the amount to $115 per week until the original termination date and $50 per week thereafter. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that increased earnings alone could not justify modification of a fixed-term award and that the court should not reconsider the recipient's ongoing needs. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a substantial change in circumstances not contemplated at the time of the original decree permits modification of periodic alimony and that the trial court could properly consider the defendant's needs in fashioning the new order. The portion of the appeal challenging extension of alimony beyond the original end date became moot when the defendant died.
family law
Blake v. Levy
Supreme Court of Connecticut · 1983-08-30 · cited 247×
The case concerned whether a plaintiff could sue for tortious interference with business relations based solely on the defendant's filing and settlement of a prior lawsuit against the plaintiff's company for a broker's commission, which the plaintiff alleged was fraudulent and groundless. The trial court granted a motion to strike the complaint, finding insufficient allegations of wrongful conduct and noting a lack of privity between the parties. On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that privity is not required for intentional interference claims but affirmed the dismissal because pursuing litigation to a negotiated settlement does not constitute improper interference under the factors in the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 766-767, particularly where the suit was not shown to be baseless in a way that meets the standard for tortious conduct. The court reasoned that litigation, even if aggressive, is not actionable as interference absent specific improper motives or lack of good faith belief in its merits.
torts & liabilityprocedurebusiness & regulatory
Bieluch v. Bieluch
Supreme Court of Connecticut · 1983-08-02 · cited 24×
This case arose from a divorce action in which the parties contested custody of their three minor children and certain property issues. The defendant father challenged the trial court's admission of testimony and a report from a psychiatrist who had been engaged, initially by the defendant and later by court order, to conduct a custody evaluation. The court held that the psychiatrist-patient privilege did not apply to any communications or contacts because the defendant had not established a psychiatrist-patient relationship for purposes of his own diagnosis or treatment, as required by the governing statute. Instead, the psychiatrist had been retained to evaluate the children, and the defendant never met privately with the psychiatrist for his own care. As a result, the trial court's admission of the evidence, even after excising certain pre-order communications, was not error.
family lawprocedure