Ellen Ash Peters

The case involved the defendant's appeal from convictions for murder, attempted murder, and first-degree assault stemming from a 1988 shooting outside a Hartford club that killed one victim and injured another, whom the defendant blamed for interfering in his prior relationship. The defendant claimed error in the exclusion of a third party's alleged statement exculpating him as a declaration against penal interest, arguing the witness was unavailable, and in the admission of his own post-shooting threats to the victim's family as party admissions. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment, ruling that the defendant failed to prove the declarant's unavailability through due diligence and that the threats were relevant and admissible in light of prior statements and identification evidence.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Alvarez, the defendant was convicted by a jury of murder under General Statutes § 53a-54a and sentenced to life imprisonment after shooting the victim during an altercation outside a club in New Haven. On appeal, he challenged four evidentiary rulings by the trial court, including the exclusion of a hearsay statement by witness Kenneth Hazard suggesting a third party named Rasheem committed the shooting, as well as the admission of a conversation with Melvin Poindexter, prior statements by Pamela McCrea, and testimony from Janette Lawrence. The court determined that the hearsay statement did not qualify for any recognized exception to the hearsay rule and was properly excluded, even though it was relevant to showing a third party's culpability, and found no abuse of discretion in the other evidentiary decisions. The appellate court therefore affirmed the conviction and sentence.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute over underinsured motorist insurance coverage following a fatal motorcycle accident, where the parties stipulated to arbitration and agreed that the arbitrator would seek binding advice from the Superior Court under General Statutes § 52-415 on two legal questions regarding policy coverage and set-offs. The Superior Court ruled that the Foremost policy must include underinsured coverage by statute and that the insurers were entitled to a pro-rata share of a $25,000 credit from a prior liability payment. Both insurers appealed the court's advisory judgment directly, but the Connecticut Supreme Court dismissed the appeals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that the judgment was interlocutory and not a final judgment under General Statutes § 52-263, as the final judgment in arbitration occurs after the award is confirmed or modified, and the advice did not terminate a separate proceeding or conclude the parties' rights under the test from State v. Curcio.

procedure

This case concerned a motion to modify a time-limited alimony award in a divorce judgment. The trial court had originally ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendant $75 per week for three years; after finding a substantial unforeseen increase in the plaintiff's earnings, it raised the amount to $115 per week until the original termination date and $50 per week thereafter. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that increased earnings alone could not justify modification of a fixed-term award and that the court should not reconsider the recipient's ongoing needs. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a substantial change in circumstances not contemplated at the time of the original decree permits modification of periodic alimony and that the trial court could properly consider the defendant's needs in fashioning the new order. The portion of the appeal challenging extension of alimony beyond the original end date became moot when the defendant died.

family law

The case concerned whether a plaintiff could sue for tortious interference with business relations based solely on the defendant's filing and settlement of a prior lawsuit against the plaintiff's company for a broker's commission, which the plaintiff alleged was fraudulent and groundless. The trial court granted a motion to strike the complaint, finding insufficient allegations of wrongful conduct and noting a lack of privity between the parties. On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that privity is not required for intentional interference claims but affirmed the dismissal because pursuing litigation to a negotiated settlement does not constitute improper interference under the factors in the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 766-767, particularly where the suit was not shown to be baseless in a way that meets the standard for tortious conduct. The court reasoned that litigation, even if aggressive, is not actionable as interference absent specific improper motives or lack of good faith belief in its merits.

torts & liabilityprocedurebusiness & regulatory

This case arose from a divorce action in which the parties contested custody of their three minor children and certain property issues. The defendant father challenged the trial court's admission of testimony and a report from a psychiatrist who had been engaged, initially by the defendant and later by court order, to conduct a custody evaluation. The court held that the psychiatrist-patient privilege did not apply to any communications or contacts because the defendant had not established a psychiatrist-patient relationship for purposes of his own diagnosis or treatment, as required by the governing statute. Instead, the psychiatrist had been retained to evaluate the children, and the defendant never met privately with the psychiatrist for his own care. As a result, the trial court's admission of the evidence, even after excising certain pre-order communications, was not error.

family lawprocedure

The case concerned whether the Connecticut Commissioner of Consumer Protection could issue and enforce an investigative demand under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) against a law clinic suspected of deceptive advertising regarding fees and use of the term "clinic." The defendant refused compliance, arguing that attorney regulation falls exclusively under judicial authority and that CUTPA application would violate separation of powers; the trial court dismissed the commissioner's enforcement petition on that ground. The Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed, ruling that the commissioner may investigate suspected unfair trade practices by attorneys because the statute authorizes such demands and the inquiry does not improperly invade core judicial functions at the preliminary stage, and remanded for further proceedings on enforcement.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned whether clients could bring counterclaims under Connecticut’s Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) against a law firm that sued to recover unpaid legal fees, including interest at 1% per month and an allegedly inflated amount for one client. The trial court struck the CUTPA counterclaims and special defense on constitutional grounds. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the result, holding that CUTPA does not provide a cause of action for the alleged conduct because the firm’s actions occurred exclusively in the course of litigation to collect fees and did not constitute unfair or deceptive acts in trade or commerce under the statute, even though CUTPA can apply to attorneys in other contexts.

business & regulatory

The case concerned the proper calculation of a pension under a West Haven home rule ordinance for Joseph C. Howell, retiring chief of the first taxation district's fire department after 31 years of service. The board of trustees awarded him 70 percent of his prior salary, citing discretion under the ordinance and factors such as his responsibilities and prior precedent, but taxpayer plaintiffs sued to enjoin the payment and sought a declaratory judgment. The trial court ruled the award invalid and enjoined payment, holding that the ordinance required a base pension of at least 50 percent after 25 years plus exactly 2 percent for each additional year up to a 70 percent cap, with no discretion to deviate. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed, finding no error in the trial court's construction of the ordinance's plain language and its legislative history, which did not authorize the board's approach. The board later recalculated the pension at 62 percent based on the statutory formula.

labor & employment

This case involved a dispute over an option contract for the purchase of approximately 73 acres of real property known as Snow’s Farm in Easton, Connecticut. The plaintiffs, a group of builders, sought specific performance of the option agreement after paying for the option and an extension, but the defendants argued it was unenforceable. The court ruled in favor of the defendants, declaring the option agreement null and void. The core reasoning was that the agreement's description of the property to be retained by the sellers—the homestead and about six acres—was too uncertain to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, and this indefiniteness could not be resolved by external evidence.

property

This case involved a breach of contract claim by plaintiff John Burr against the Daddona defendants for failing to honor an indemnity agreement related to a 1975 real estate purchase in Stamford. The agreement was intended to protect Burr from liabilities arising from the Lichtenheims' recorded right of first refusal on the property, which led to a 1976 lawsuit by the Lichtenheims that was resolved in Burr's favor in 1979. After summary judgment on liability, a jury awarded Burr $40,000 in damages (including lost profits), and the trial court added $6,000 in attorney's fees. On appeal, the court found no error in the denial of a new trial motion based on newly discovered evidence, in allowing the jury to consider and award lost profits, or in other damages issues, but held that the indemnity agreement did not cover attorney's fees incurred to enforce the indemnity itself. The judgment was modified to eliminate the $6,000 fee award.

propertyprocedure

This case involved a Connecticut corporation suing a New York securities dealer for losses from government securities trades arranged through an investment advisor, seeking to assert personal jurisdiction over the out-of-state defendant. The trial court dismissed the claims against the dealer for lack of personal jurisdiction, and the appellate court affirmed. The court first examined Connecticut's long-arm statute and found it inapplicable because the dealer had no office, agents, or substantial business activities in the state and did not transact business there in a manner triggering jurisdiction. It further held that the dealer's limited contacts, including a small percentage of trades with other Connecticut customers and indirect confirmations sent to the advisor, failed to satisfy due process requirements of minimum contacts and reasonable foreseeability of being sued in Connecticut under precedents like International Shoe and World-Wide Volkswagen.

procedure

The case concerned whether the town of West Hartford could enforce its zoning regulations to enjoin the defendants from operating rooming houses in an R-10 residential district. The trial court found the properties were never legal accessory or nonconforming uses, rejected the defendants' defenses of laches and estoppel, and issued a permanent injunction. On appeal, the court agreed that the uses did not qualify as legal nonconforming uses and that laches did not apply, but held that the trial court had not properly weighed the equitable factors for estoppel, including the town's prior licensing and opinions alongside the defendants' reliance and expenditures. The judgment was set aside and the case remanded for a new trial limited to that aspect of the estoppel defense.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case concerned the interpretation of Connecticut's Minority Representation Statute, General Statutes § 9-167a(d), specifically whether a vacancy on the Stratford Housing Authority had to be filled by a member of the same political party as the resigning member. The plaintiff, a Republican nominee, challenged the town council's appointment of a Democrat to the vacancy, arguing that subsection (d) required same-party substitution once minority representation rules applied. The trial court ruled for the defendants, finding the council's vote constituted an election rather than an appointment, so the subsection did not apply. On appeal, the court held that the council's action was an appointment but concluded that subsection (d) was inapplicable because the Authority's existing party composition did not trigger the minority representation provisions under subsection (a); therefore, no same-party requirement existed, and the judgment for the defendants was affirmed on this alternative ground.

elections

This case concerns whether police officers and their employing town can be held liable for injuries to an innocent third party arising from a high-speed pursuit of a suspected stolen vehicle. After a jury awarded the plaintiff $59,000 in damages for injuries sustained when the fleeing car collided head-on with his lawfully driven vehicle, the defendants appealed, arguing that the pursued driver's negligence was the sole proximate cause and that emergency-vehicle statutes provided immunity. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding that more than one proximate cause may exist and that a negligent defendant is not relieved of liability when an intervening act falls within the foreseeable scope of the risk created by the police pursuit. The court noted that the jury could reasonably find the officers violated departmental policy by initiating and continuing the chase in a densely populated area without adequate safety precautions, making proximate cause a question of fact rather than law.

torts & liability

The case involved a British gambling club suing a Connecticut resident to enforce nine dishonored checks totaling 6350 pounds issued to obtain gambling chips in London, where gambling is legal. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant based on Connecticut's public policy against enforcing gambling debts under General Statutes § 52-553, despite the checks being valid where made. The appellate court affirmed, holding that this policy outweighed conflicts of law principles favoring enforcement of foreign contracts and that the Uniform Commercial Code did not override the illegality defense in direct dealings between the parties.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a dispute over whether defendants could operate and expand a slaughterhouse on property zoned for residential and farming use in Sherman, Connecticut. The zoning commission and intervenors sued to enjoin the commercial-scale operation, which had grown from limited personal use to a full-time business involving outside customers, equipment installation, and neighbor complaints about noise, traffic, and odors. The trial court granted partial relief by enjoining the expanded activity but allowing limited slaughtering at pre-1975 levels during specified hours without requiring equipment removal. On appeal, the court held that the defendants' claims failed because the activity did not qualify as ordinary farming under the zoning regulations and town officials' inspections and permits did not create estoppel due to lack of full knowledge and authority.

propertybusiness & regulatory

This case involved two ophthalmologists who entered into informal oral agreements to associate in their medical practice, with disputes arising over fee splits, shared office expenses, and payments due to each party after the arrangements ended. The trial court found in favor of Dr. Rahmati on the terms of the agreements and awarded him damages of $17,011.84. On appeal, the court upheld the trial court's factual findings regarding the existence and terms of the implied contracts, based on the parties' conduct and witness credibility, and rejected claims that liability could not attach to Dr. Mehri personally. However, the appellate court identified errors in the damage calculations, including overstatements of collections and insufficient credits for certain payments, leading to a reduction of the award by $7,609 and a remand to modify the judgment accordingly.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves a dispute over the paternity of a child born to a married woman during her husband's incarceration, arising in a dissolution action where both spouses denied the husband's paternity and the wife identified another man as the father. The trial court applied the presumption of legitimacy for children born during wedlock and adjudged the husband the father, ordering him to pay child support. On appeal, the court clarified that the presumption may be rebutted only by clear, convincing, and satisfactory proof of non-access, with the factfinder's credibility determinations controlling even if testimony of non-access was uncontradicted. Due to gaps in the record concerning possible prison visits and pregnancy details, the court remanded for further proceedings on whether the presumption was rebutted.

family lawprocedure

This case involved landowners abutting an unimproved section of East Hill Road in Southbury who sued the town after it discontinued the road under General Statutes § 13a-49, claiming the action constituted a constitutional taking of their access rights to the public highway system that required compensation under the state and federal constitutions. The trial court awarded damages to the plaintiffs, finding a substantial impairment of their access rights and deeming General Statutes § 13a-55 (which preserves a right of way over discontinued roads) of doubtful constitutionality. On appeal, the town argued that the statute provided adequate protection for the plaintiffs' rights, meaning no taking occurred and no damages were due, while some plaintiffs cross-appealed on issues including the measure and timing of damages. The court examined established principles of highway abandonment, the impact of the discontinuance on access, the constitutionality and effect of § 13a-55, and whether substantial impairment of remaining access rights could support a damages claim even without total destruction of access.

propertyprocedure