The case concerned whether the plaintiff was required to repay unemployment compensation benefits he received from June to November 1965 after the administrator determined he had been self-employed through expense payments from a company in which he was the principal owner and stockholder. The commissioner initially ruled for the plaintiff but later reopened the proceeding on the administrator's motion, considered new evidence, and affirmed the repayment order of $1272; the Superior Court sustained the plaintiff's appeal. The Supreme Court held that General Statutes § 31-273(b) governed recovery of improperly paid benefits rather than § 31-243, that the commissioner had authority to reopen a non-final decision to receive additional evidence, and that the one-year statute of limitations in § 31-273(b) required deduction of any benefits paid more than a year before the July 5, 1966 notice. The court therefore found error, set aside the judgment, and remanded for recalculation of the amount owed.
The case concerned property owners whose land in New London was taken by eminent domain by the Redevelopment Agency; they appealed the initial $50,000 compensation award as inadequate. A state referee revised the award to $63,300, but the trial court rejected that report as a final judgment and referred the matter to a second referee, who set compensation at $80,000. The agency later moved to revoke the second reference and revive the first report, but the court erased the motion because the agency had not filed a timely notice of appeal or objection after the June 1967 order, had participated in the second hearing, and showed no basis to open the judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court correctly accepted the second report and that claimed errors from the first proceeding were no longer reviewable.
The case involved an architect who contracted with developers to design an FHA-compliant apartment building in Meriden, Connecticut, in exchange for a fee not to exceed FHA limits. After the plaintiff delivered plans for a reinforced concrete structure, the defendants hired another engineer to modify them to steel construction without consulting the plaintiff or guaranteeing payment, then refused to compensate the architect for work already performed. The trial referee awarded the plaintiff $57,378.65 plus interest, finding full performance of the contract, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that the defendants' procedural challenges to evidence rulings and a proposed amendment to add a defense lacked merit because they were untimely or would prejudice the plaintiff. The court rejected claims that custom-and-usage testimony was improperly admitted and found no error in the judgment.
The case involved a utility company whose Church Street substation in New Britain was condemned by the redevelopment commission as part of a redevelopment plan, with the commission awarding $50,000 and a referee ultimately setting compensation at $68,000 for the land and building. The plaintiffs sought additional compensation of about $29,000 for costs to install new facilities, reroute underground lines, and replace street-lighting controls to maintain service to customers after the taking. The court held that the condemnation was limited to the substation real property alone and that the resulting costs to adapt the distribution system constituted noncompensable business losses or relocation expenses for personal property. It reasoned that the utilities held only a revocable license for cables in public streets, no statute required reimbursement for such expenses, and just compensation does not extend to restoring the overall system to its prior functional state.
This case involved a dispute over uninsured motorist coverage in two auto insurance policies with identical $20,000 limits. The decedent was killed by an uninsured driver while a passenger in another vehicle, and the administratrix received a proportional share of the $20,000 limit from the policy on that vehicle; she then sought to recover under the decedent's own policy. The court was asked whether the "other insurance" clause in the decedent's policy, which treated the coverage as excess and limited recovery based on other available insurance, barred any additional claim. The court held that the clause did not exclude coverage, ruling that the defendant could recover up to the $20,000 statutory minimum minus the amount already paid. It reasoned that state statutes and Insurance Commissioner regulations require full uninsured motorist protection up to the minimum limits and authorize reductions only in specified circumstances, rendering the conflicting portions of the policy clause void.
The case involved an appeal by abutting landowners from a town zoning commission's approval of a site plan for forty-six units of elderly housing on a 2.2-acre parcel in Bloomfield. The plaintiffs claimed the approval was invalid due to inadequate notice of the hearing, an improper prior zoning classification, failure to comply with subdivision regulations, and procedural unfairness from a consultant's involvement. The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the appeal, holding that the notice satisfied statutory requirements because site plans were not among the documents required to be filed with the town clerk, the 1968 zoning change could not be collaterally attacked after the fifteen-day appeal period, the project did not meet the statutory definition of a subdivision, and the consultant's role created no due-process violation. The commission's actions were found to be within its administrative authority and not arbitrary or illegal.
