Elmer W. Ryan

The case concerned whether the plaintiff was required to repay unemployment compensation benefits he received from June to November 1965 after the administrator determined he had been self-employed through expense payments from a company in which he was the principal owner and stockholder. The commissioner initially ruled for the plaintiff but later reopened the proceeding on the administrator's motion, considered new evidence, and affirmed the repayment order of $1272; the Superior Court sustained the plaintiff's appeal. The Supreme Court held that General Statutes § 31-273(b) governed recovery of improperly paid benefits rather than § 31-243, that the commissioner had authority to reopen a non-final decision to receive additional evidence, and that the one-year statute of limitations in § 31-273(b) required deduction of any benefits paid more than a year before the July 5, 1966 notice. The court therefore found error, set aside the judgment, and remanded for recalculation of the amount owed.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case concerned property owners whose land in New London was taken by eminent domain by the Redevelopment Agency; they appealed the initial $50,000 compensation award as inadequate. A state referee revised the award to $63,300, but the trial court rejected that report as a final judgment and referred the matter to a second referee, who set compensation at $80,000. The agency later moved to revoke the second reference and revive the first report, but the court erased the motion because the agency had not filed a timely notice of appeal or objection after the June 1967 order, had participated in the second hearing, and showed no basis to open the judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court correctly accepted the second report and that claimed errors from the first proceeding were no longer reviewable.

propertyprocedure

The case involved an architect who contracted with developers to design an FHA-compliant apartment building in Meriden, Connecticut, in exchange for a fee not to exceed FHA limits. After the plaintiff delivered plans for a reinforced concrete structure, the defendants hired another engineer to modify them to steel construction without consulting the plaintiff or guaranteeing payment, then refused to compensate the architect for work already performed. The trial referee awarded the plaintiff $57,378.65 plus interest, finding full performance of the contract, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that the defendants' procedural challenges to evidence rulings and a proposed amendment to add a defense lacked merit because they were untimely or would prejudice the plaintiff. The court rejected claims that custom-and-usage testimony was improperly admitted and found no error in the judgment.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a utility company whose Church Street substation in New Britain was condemned by the redevelopment commission as part of a redevelopment plan, with the commission awarding $50,000 and a referee ultimately setting compensation at $68,000 for the land and building. The plaintiffs sought additional compensation of about $29,000 for costs to install new facilities, reroute underground lines, and replace street-lighting controls to maintain service to customers after the taking. The court held that the condemnation was limited to the substation real property alone and that the resulting costs to adapt the distribution system constituted noncompensable business losses or relocation expenses for personal property. It reasoned that the utilities held only a revocable license for cables in public streets, no statute required reimbursement for such expenses, and just compensation does not extend to restoring the overall system to its prior functional state.

property

This case involved a dispute over uninsured motorist coverage in two auto insurance policies with identical $20,000 limits. The decedent was killed by an uninsured driver while a passenger in another vehicle, and the administratrix received a proportional share of the $20,000 limit from the policy on that vehicle; she then sought to recover under the decedent's own policy. The court was asked whether the "other insurance" clause in the decedent's policy, which treated the coverage as excess and limited recovery based on other available insurance, barred any additional claim. The court held that the clause did not exclude coverage, ruling that the defendant could recover up to the $20,000 statutory minimum minus the amount already paid. It reasoned that state statutes and Insurance Commissioner regulations require full uninsured motorist protection up to the minimum limits and authorize reductions only in specified circumstances, rendering the conflicting portions of the policy clause void.

business & regulatory

The case involved an appeal by abutting landowners from a town zoning commission's approval of a site plan for forty-six units of elderly housing on a 2.2-acre parcel in Bloomfield. The plaintiffs claimed the approval was invalid due to inadequate notice of the hearing, an improper prior zoning classification, failure to comply with subdivision regulations, and procedural unfairness from a consultant's involvement. The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the appeal, holding that the notice satisfied statutory requirements because site plans were not among the documents required to be filed with the town clerk, the 1968 zoning change could not be collaterally attacked after the fifteen-day appeal period, the project did not meet the statutory definition of a subdivision, and the consultant's role created no due-process violation. The commission's actions were found to be within its administrative authority and not arbitrary or illegal.

propertyprocedure

The case involved a dispute between the Town of East Haven and the City of New Haven over the latter's operation and expansion of a municipal airport that straddles the boundary between the two towns. East Haven and local residents sued to block New Haven from closing a replacement road (Uriah Street/Ora Avenue) built under a 1940 contract and from acquiring additional land in East Haven to extend runways without the town's approval, alleging breach of the contract and violation of statutory procedures. The Connecticut Supreme Court ruled that New Haven retained authority under the 1929 special act to acquire land and expand the airport without East Haven's consent. The core reasoning was that the special act authorizing the airport was not repealed by later general statutes requiring municipal approval for airport expansions, as the legislature intended the early-established New Haven airport to operate as an exception to those general rules.

property

This case arose from a multi-vehicle collision on the Wilbur Cross Parkway in which plaintiffs sought damages for personal injuries allegedly caused by the negligence of defendants Ereshena, Thompson, and Corpaci. Corpaci filed a cross-claim against his co-defendants seeking recovery for damage to his own vehicle, which the trial court erased on motion by Thompson and Ereshena. The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed, holding that the 1969 amendment to Practice Book § 78 authorizing such cross-claims is procedural in nature and applies to pending actions, and that a statute-of-limitations defense cannot properly be raised by a motion to erase because it does not implicate the court's jurisdiction. The court therefore set aside the erasure and remanded with directions to deny the motion.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involved a breach of contract and fraud action by New England Floor Covering Co. against Architectural Interiors, Inc., and its officers individually for unpaid goods, misappropriation of funds, and related claims. After counsel withdrew, the individual defendants attempted to appear pro se for themselves and the corporation, leading to defaults when they failed to appear at trial despite multiple assignments and notices; the trial court entered defaults, assessed damages, and rendered judgment for the plaintiff. The court denied a motion to open the judgment, finding no sufficient showing of mistake or defense. On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed, holding that defaults at trial permitted immediate damage hearings and that the defendants had not established grounds to reopen under the rules and statutes. The core reasoning emphasized that failure to comply with trial assignments justified default and that no procedural rights were violated given the case's posture on the trial list.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case is a negligence action brought by the administrator of a decedent's estate against a trucking company for damages arising from a fatal collision on the New Jersey Turnpike between the decedent's car and the defendant's tractor-trailer. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed, claiming errors in the trial court's jury instructions and evidentiary rulings under Connecticut law. The court held that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the emergency doctrine despite a proper request to charge that placed the court on notice, and by admitting testimony from a police officer about the truck driver's prior consistent statements, which improperly bolstered the witness's credibility without any impeachment. These errors were deemed harmful because the admitted testimony could have influenced the jury's assessment of witness credibility in a case turning on conflicting accounts of the accident. The judgment was reversed and a new trial ordered.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved property owners seeking to recover under a fire insurance policy for the cost of removing the upper stories of their building after a fire in an adjoining structure impaired shared wall support, leading a building inspector to order partial demolition for safety. The trial court ruled for the plaintiffs, and the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that the loss qualified as a 'direct loss by fire' under the policy because the fire was the proximate cause that set the chain of events in motion, with the demolition order merely recognizing an unsafe condition created by the fire rather than constituting an independent cause. The parties had stipulated the relevant facts, including that only minor direct fire damage occurred to the plaintiffs' building itself.

property

In this case, homeowner Anselm Schurgast sued contractor Roger Schumann and his employees for damages after a fire destroyed a house under construction, alleging negligence in the use of a salamander stove and invoking res ipsa loquitur, while Schumann filed a third-party action against his insurer Aetna seeking a declaration of coverage under a liability policy. The trial court ruled in favor of Schurgast on the negligence claim and in favor of Schumann against Aetna on the coverage issues. On appeal, the court upheld the judgment against Schumann and his employees, finding sufficient evidence of their control and negligent operation of the stove, and ruled that Aetna breached its duty to defend and must pay the judgment up to policy limits, though it directed correction of the judgment to omit any ruling on a policy exclusion. The second count was noted as defective for lacking a negligence allegation, and the contract count had been withdrawn.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

In State v. Smith, defendants Stuart B. Smith and George H. Lombra were convicted by a jury of breaking and entering a building with intent to commit a crime under Connecticut General Statutes §53-76, based on evidence from a February 1966 incident at a North Branford shopping center involving forced doors at Judd’s package store and Dee’s department store. The defendants appealed, claiming insufficient evidence for the findings and verdict, improper admission of a tire iron as evidence, and error in denying separate trials, among other assignments. The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the circumstantial evidence—including matching footprints, pry marks consistent with the tire iron found near the scene, the defendants’ car and movements, and inferences of entry from the damaged door and alarm—was sufficient for the jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, that the tire iron was properly admitted after foundation, and that no motion for separate trials had been made at trial. The opinion emphasized that circumstantial evidence has equal probative force to direct evidence and that the defendants failed to timely preserve certain claims.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves a medical malpractice claim where the plaintiff alleged that the defendant physician negligently left a suture needle in her body after performing an episiotomy during childbirth in 1959. The jury failed to reach a verdict, leading the defendant to move for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which the trial court denied; the defendant appealed this denial. The court held that the denial was proper because circumstantial evidence, including the plaintiff's pain symptoms immediately after delivery that resolved only after the needle's removal 15 months later, along with evidence of normal recoveries from prior similar procedures, was sufficient for a jury to reasonably infer negligence and causation without needing additional expert testimony on those facts. The court emphasized that while the standard of care requires expert opinion, factual determinations are for the jury, and directed verdicts are disfavored.

torts & liabilityprocedurehealthcare

The case involved a bookkeeper charged with embezzlement by agent under General Statutes § 53-355 for using two presigned corporate checks totaling $4,000, made payable to her brother-in-law, who was not a creditor or employee of the company. The sole issue on appeal was whether the evidence was sufficient to prove the elements of agency, receipt of the funds, conversion, and felonious intent beyond a reasonable doubt. The court held that the defendant qualified as an agent under the statute because she had custody and control of the checks and corporate funds as part of her bookkeeping duties, and that her actions in completing and negotiating the checks to a non-authorized payee constituted conversion with intent to defraud. It rejected arguments that the statute was limited to certain fiduciary occupations and that bank account funds could not be in her care, citing precedents on control of employer funds through check-drawing authority. The conviction was affirmed.

criminal law

The case involved an executor seeking to invalidate an option to purchase real estate from a decedent's estate that had been granted to the decedent's nephew years earlier. The trial court ruled for the executor, and the appellate court affirmed. The core reasoning was that the option's description of the land was uncertain and indefinite because the excepted "houselot" of about one acre was not precisely bounded or identified, rendering the overall conveyance description too vague to satisfy the Statute of Frauds.

property

The case concerned a landowner's application to subdivide and purchase additional land abutting its property in Norwalk, which first received approval from the city planning commission but was then rejected by the common council without any stated reasons. The plaintiff appealed, claiming the council's action was arbitrary, that it failed to consider the commission's approval, and that the governing special acts and regulations were unconstitutional due to vague standards and lack of requirements to explain decisions. The trial court upheld the council's action, treating it as legislative and finding no obligation to provide reasons. On appeal, the court determined that the council acts with final authority over subdivisions and must follow its own regulations, which presuppose that applicants know the reasons for disapproval in order to base any resubmission on a substantial change in the underlying conditions; by failing to state those reasons the council violated the regulations. The judgment was reversed and the appeal sustained.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved a dispute over whether the state highway commissioner could unilaterally amend a condemnation notice to reduce the area of land taken from the plaintiff after the original notice was filed, partial payment disbursed, and physical possession taken for highway construction. The plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment on the parties' rights following the amended notice, which lowered the assessed damages and demanded repayment of over $124,000. The court held that the commissioner lacked authority to abandon or reduce any portion of the taking without the owner's consent or a court order. The reasoning centered on the principle that a constitutional taking occurred once the state took actual physical possession of the property and devoted it to public use by demolishing buildings and building the highway, even though formal title vesting under the statute had not yet occurred.

propertyprocedure

This case was a contract dispute brought by a New York jewelry retailer against Jean E. Leonard and the executrix of Herman H. Isacs Jr.'s estate to recover the $3050 unpaid balance on a $6050 diamond ring. The trial court entered judgment for the defendants, concluding there was no enforceable sale to the decedent because New York’s Statute of Frauds (Personal Property Law § 85) was not satisfied by any signed writing or part payment by him, Mrs. Leonard was not his agent, and no contract was formed with Mrs. Leonard herself due to the absence of agreed price or terms. The appellate court affirmed, holding that New York law applied to the New York transactions, the subordinate facts supported the trial court’s conclusions, and the plaintiff could not enforce the claim against either defendant.

business & regulatory

This case involved neighboring property owners in a residential development seeking to enjoin construction of a small unattached outbuilding for a swimming pool's filtering equipment, bathhouse, and toilet facilities, alleging violation of a restrictive covenant in the chain of title deeds. The covenant limited lots to residential use with a single-family home, permitted an attached garage, prohibited certain structures like board fences and chicken coops, and required prior submission and approval of all building plans by the original developer company. The trial court ruled for the defendants, finding the approval requirement personal to the company. On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the covenant did not expressly bar the outbuilding and that the approval clause was intended solely for the benefit of the now-absent company rather than running with the land to benefit other lot owners, especially after the company had sold all lots and disclaimed enforcement interest.

property