This case involved a seven-year-old plaintiff who fell from an apple tree on the defendant utility company's property after stepping on a rotten limb, sustaining head injuries; she sued as a licensee for damages under premises liability principles. A jury awarded her $25,000, but the trial court denied the defendant's motions for a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict. On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the defendant knew or had reason to know of the dangerous condition as required by Restatement (Second) of Torts §342, since no facts showed the tree was in a right-of-way area subject to inspection or that any agent's observation of the limb could be imputed to the company. The court therefore set aside the verdict and directed judgment for the defendant.
This case involved a hospital's lawsuit against the city of Willimantic to recover payment for 25 days of medical care provided to Donald Loiseau, who was shot and wounded by a police officer while fleeing after committing a felony; the officer had called an ambulance, and police guarded Loiseau at the hospital. The trial court entered judgment for the defendant city, finding no express or implied promise by the city to pay the bill and no duty arising from the police department's charter responsibilities or its practice of paying for prisoners' meals and lodging. On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the facts did not support liability, as summoning medical care or notifying the city did not create an obligation and no statute or municipal policy imposed responsibility for such hospital services on the municipality.
The case involved the City of New Haven's appeal from a Public Utilities Commission order approving applications by two utility companies to build high-voltage overhead electrical transmission lines through the city as part of the New England grid. The Court of Common Pleas modified the automatic supersedeas staying construction to allow limited foundation work and then dismissed the city's appeal from the PUC order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the modification was proper to prevent undue delay and burdens under new statutory procedures, and that the PUC's decision was supported by evidence on power needs, comparative costs of overhead versus underground lines, and conditions to address aesthetic and ecological impacts.
The case concerned whether the Town of Wethersfield could lawfully assess and tax HELCO's nine rights-of-way—held via easements or a long-term lease—for electric utility lines under General Statutes § 12-64. HELCO brought an action under § 12-119 asserting the interests were not taxable property, moved for summary judgment on that issue, and obtained judgment in its favor; the town appealed. The court affirmed, holding that the statute taxes only freehold interests in real estate listed in the name of the record owner, not limited chattel interests such as easements or leases for utility purposes, consistent with longstanding precedent interpreting the provision and related statutes. It noted that the power lines themselves remain taxable as personal property under other sections, and the statute contains no separate authorization to tax these rights-of-way as real estate.
The case involved a challenge by an adjoining landowner to a town board's approval of a name change for an existing automobile junkyard business from Bill’s Garage to Bill’s Auto Wrecking, Inc., in a district where new junkyards were prohibited since 1967. The court dismissed the appeal, holding that the name change did not amount to issuing a new license and that the corporate entity was merely the alter ego of the individual owner, with no actual transfer of assets or ownership. Additionally, the court found that the 1967 restricted district resolution was invalid because it had not been properly published as required by statute.
The case involved Sarah Frager's application under General Statutes § 52-410 to compel Pennsylvania General Insurance Company to arbitrate a claim under the uninsured motorist provisions of an automobile policy after a 1965 accident involving contact with an unidentified vehicle. The policy defined a hit-and-run automobile as an uninsured automobile only if the insured reported the accident to police within 24 hours and filed a sworn statement with the insurer within 30 days detailing a cause of action against an unidentifiable person. The defendant argued that Frager had never submitted the required sworn statement, and the Supreme Court of Connecticut agreed that this failure meant the incident did not qualify for coverage, reversing the trial court's order to arbitrate. The court rejected claims of waiver or procedural default by the insurer, holding that the sworn-statement requirement was a condition precedent to defining the accident as one involving an uninsured automobile.