Louis Shapiro

This case involved a seven-year-old plaintiff who fell from an apple tree on the defendant utility company's property after stepping on a rotten limb, sustaining head injuries; she sued as a licensee for damages under premises liability principles. A jury awarded her $25,000, but the trial court denied the defendant's motions for a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict. On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the defendant knew or had reason to know of the dangerous condition as required by Restatement (Second) of Torts §342, since no facts showed the tree was in a right-of-way area subject to inspection or that any agent's observation of the limb could be imputed to the company. The court therefore set aside the verdict and directed judgment for the defendant.

torts & liabilityproperty

This case involved a hospital's lawsuit against the city of Willimantic to recover payment for 25 days of medical care provided to Donald Loiseau, who was shot and wounded by a police officer while fleeing after committing a felony; the officer had called an ambulance, and police guarded Loiseau at the hospital. The trial court entered judgment for the defendant city, finding no express or implied promise by the city to pay the bill and no duty arising from the police department's charter responsibilities or its practice of paying for prisoners' meals and lodging. On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the facts did not support liability, as summoning medical care or notifying the city did not create an obligation and no statute or municipal policy imposed responsibility for such hospital services on the municipality.

criminal lawprocedurehealthcare

The case involved the City of New Haven's appeal from a Public Utilities Commission order approving applications by two utility companies to build high-voltage overhead electrical transmission lines through the city as part of the New England grid. The Court of Common Pleas modified the automatic supersedeas staying construction to allow limited foundation work and then dismissed the city's appeal from the PUC order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the modification was proper to prevent undue delay and burdens under new statutory procedures, and that the PUC's decision was supported by evidence on power needs, comparative costs of overhead versus underground lines, and conditions to address aesthetic and ecological impacts.

business & regulatoryenvironment

The case concerned whether the Town of Wethersfield could lawfully assess and tax HELCO's nine rights-of-way—held via easements or a long-term lease—for electric utility lines under General Statutes § 12-64. HELCO brought an action under § 12-119 asserting the interests were not taxable property, moved for summary judgment on that issue, and obtained judgment in its favor; the town appealed. The court affirmed, holding that the statute taxes only freehold interests in real estate listed in the name of the record owner, not limited chattel interests such as easements or leases for utility purposes, consistent with longstanding precedent interpreting the provision and related statutes. It noted that the power lines themselves remain taxable as personal property under other sections, and the statute contains no separate authorization to tax these rights-of-way as real estate.

taxesproperty

The case involved a challenge by an adjoining landowner to a town board's approval of a name change for an existing automobile junkyard business from Bill’s Garage to Bill’s Auto Wrecking, Inc., in a district where new junkyards were prohibited since 1967. The court dismissed the appeal, holding that the name change did not amount to issuing a new license and that the corporate entity was merely the alter ego of the individual owner, with no actual transfer of assets or ownership. Additionally, the court found that the 1967 restricted district resolution was invalid because it had not been properly published as required by statute.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case involved Sarah Frager's application under General Statutes § 52-410 to compel Pennsylvania General Insurance Company to arbitrate a claim under the uninsured motorist provisions of an automobile policy after a 1965 accident involving contact with an unidentified vehicle. The policy defined a hit-and-run automobile as an uninsured automobile only if the insured reported the accident to police within 24 hours and filed a sworn statement with the insurer within 30 days detailing a cause of action against an unidentifiable person. The defendant argued that Frager had never submitted the required sworn statement, and the Supreme Court of Connecticut agreed that this failure meant the incident did not qualify for coverage, reversing the trial court's order to arbitrate. The court rejected claims of waiver or procedural default by the insurer, holding that the sworn-statement requirement was a condition precedent to defining the accident as one involving an uninsured automobile.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a habeas corpus petition filed by a state prisoner who had pleaded guilty to indecent assault in 1966, claiming that his plea was involuntary because of pressure from his private counsel and that he was denied effective assistance when seeking to withdraw it at sentencing. The trial court dismissed the petition after a hearing on the merits. On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, concluding that the plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proving the plea was involuntary and that his decision not to withdraw it was made voluntarily with full understanding and adequate counsel. The court reasoned from the unchallenged facts that the sentencing court had given the plaintiff ample opportunity to change his plea after he expressed confusion, he ultimately declined to do so, and he never indicated dissatisfaction with counsel at the time.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, plaintiff Cecio Bros., Inc. sued defendant Feldmann in contract for a balance of $6,364.57 owed for materials, machinery, and labor supplied in 1961 for road resurfacing and other site work on the defendant's Stamford estate, plus damages; the defendant denied the claims and filed a counterclaim for $20,000. After transfer to the Superior Court and reference to a state referee, the referee, acting as the court, found that the plaintiff had performed the work in a good and workmanlike manner pursuant to an express agreement, rendered judgment for the plaintiff on both the complaint and counterclaim, and awarded the claimed balance with interest from July 14, 1961. On appeal, the defendant challenged numerous factual findings and the award of interest, but the court held that the referee's findings were supported by unchallenged evidence, that the facts established wrongful detention of the debt justifying interest, and that the remaining assignments of error lacked merit.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

This case involved a sixteen-year-old plaintiff injured while tobogganing on the defendant's property when his toboggan struck a mound of dirt from an open trench at the bottom of a hill. The plaintiff sued the landowner for negligence, alleging failure to warn of or remedy the hazard, and the defendant moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant, which the appellate court affirmed, holding that the plaintiff was a licensee who knew of the trench and gully from prior runs and appreciated the risks. Under premises liability rules, a landowner owes no duty to keep premises safe for a licensee aware of the condition, and the child trespasser or attractive nuisance doctrine did not apply because the plaintiff discovered and understood the hazard.

torts & liabilityproperty

The case involved Holt-Lock, Inc.'s application to the Granby zoning and planning commission for a special permit to remove sand and gravel from approximately sixty acres of its land, which the commission denied after a public hearing. The trial court found the plaintiff aggrieved but dismissed its appeal, ruling against it on issues including whether the commission had improperly received post-hearing evidence and whether the denial amounted to a confiscation of property. On further appeal, the court affirmed, holding that the commission neither accepted nor considered the challenged post-hearing materials in a manner that violated procedural safeguards, and that the plaintiff's constitutional due-process claim was premature because it had not exhausted remedies by seeking a special exception from the board of appeals under the town's flood-plain regulations.

business & regulatoryenvironmentpropertyprocedure

The case involved an appeal from a probate court decree naming the defendant aunt as the sole heir and distributee of an intestate estate. The plaintiffs, who were first cousins of the deceased, claimed they should share in the distribution by legally representing their deceased uncle, who was a brother of the deceased's mother. The Superior Court sustained the defendants' pleas in abatement, ruling that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they were not aggrieved persons under the relevant statutes. The core reasoning was that General Statutes § 45-276 limits representation among collateral relatives to the children of the intestate's brothers and sisters, with no such right extended to cousins or other next of kin in equal degree, and thus the plaintiffs had no pecuniary interest in the estate.

family lawproperty

This case involved a negligence claim by plaintiff Bridget Acampora, who alleged she was injured after slipping on snow and ice in a parking lot owned by the defendants and used by employees in their building. After a jury verdict for the plaintiff, the defendants appealed, raising issues including a claimed material variance between the pleadings and evidence about the fall's location, various evidentiary rulings, and jury instructions on damages. The court affirmed the judgment on liability, holding that the defendants waived any variance objection by failing to object to the evidence at trial and that other evidentiary claims lacked merit. However, it found reversible error in the damages phase because the trial court improperly excluded cross-examination on bill payments under the collateral source rule and allowed the jury to consider life expectancy damages without supporting evidence or mortality tables. The court ordered a new trial limited to the amount of damages.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The plaintiff sued the estate of Frederick M. Taylor to recover losses from worthless stock purchased under a written agreement, claiming an oral indemnity contract in which Taylor personally guaranteed no loss. The trial court found that no such indemnity agreement existed and ruled for the defendants. On appeal, the court affirmed the judgment, holding that the plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proving the alleged oral contract, as the trial court was entitled to discredit his testimony in the absence of corroboration and the record supported only the written stock purchase agreement without any indemnity terms.

business & regulatory

The case involved tenants who leased property with an option to purchase but fell behind on rent payments. They attempted to exercise the option by giving notice, but the landlords refused to convey the property. The trial court denied relief, finding that timely rent payment was a condition precedent to the option, there was no waiver by the landlords, and the tenants' failure was due to gross negligence precluding equitable relief. The appellate court affirmed the judgment for the defendants, holding that the conclusions were supported by the facts found.

property

The case involved plaintiffs seeking damages after an automobile driven by Robert T. Miska struck their house in 1964. Following a defendants' verdict, the plaintiffs appealed, claiming errors in the jury charge, the refusal of a requested instruction, and various evidentiary rulings. The court found no error, holding that no exceptions were taken to the charge, the requested instruction on presuming the decedent's normal health was inconsistent with law, and the trial court acted within its discretion in admitting medical history evidence including meningoencephalitis and a prior broken nose. Certain claims were not preserved due to inadequate findings or lack of objections. The judgment was affirmed.

torts & liabilityprocedure