John R. Thim

This case involved a dispute over which of two Connecticut state agencies—the Public Utilities Commission (P.U.C.) or the Water Resources Commission (W.R.C.)—had jurisdiction to issue permits for constructing overhead power transmission lines across navigable rivers. HELCO, an electric utility, sought approvals from both agencies to build lines crossing the Connecticut River; both granted permission, but the W.R.C. attached a condition requiring removal of an existing line. After a lower court ruling upholding the W.R.C.'s jurisdiction and finding its condition procedurally flawed, the Connecticut Supreme Court addressed the agencies' competing statutory claims. The court held that the W.R.C. possessed authority to regulate such structures under statutes governing obstructions in navigable waters (such as §§ 25-7, 25-7b, and 25-7d), while the P.U.C.'s powers under title 16 were limited to technical and location matters on private property and did not grant it exclusive control over navigable waterways.

business & regulatoryenvironment

The case State v. Darwin concerned Roy F. Darwin's second-degree murder conviction following a retrial after his initial conviction was reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court. The defendant challenged the denial of his motions to suppress evidence obtained from a February 1964 search warrant for his wife's vehicle and flashlights, as well as a bench warrant, arguing the search warrant affidavit lacked sufficient facts for probable cause and that certain statements were inadmissible without counsel. The court held the affidavit inadequate because it failed to provide independent facts showing the vehicle and items were likely used in the crime, beyond the mere fact of arrest, and that post-charge statements required counsel's presence or a valid waiver for admissibility. It therefore found error in admitting the evidence, set aside the judgment, and ordered a new trial while noting other evidence might still support a conviction.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case involved a defendant convicted under General Statutes §53-73 of breaking and entering a dwelling in the daytime after being found near the scene at night with stolen items from the home. The trial court found him guilty based on evidence showing the crime occurred between 8:30 and 10 p.m., and he later pleaded guilty as a third offender, receiving a sentence of three to thirty years. On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that the evidence established the acts took place at night and that the statute requires proof the breaking and entering occurred specifically in the daytime as an essential element. The court applied strict construction to the penal statute, rejected arguments that the daytime requirement was merely to distinguish it from common-law burglary, and concluded the state failed to prove the timing element, which also invalidated the third-offender adjudication.

criminal law

The case concerned whether the Public Utilities Commission or the Ambulance Commission had authority to issue a permit for non-emergency transportation of wheelchair patients, convalescents, infirm, handicapped, and elderly individuals in specially designed medicars operating from New Haven. The plaintiffs, licensed ambulance operators, appealed the Public Utilities Commission's decision to grant a livery permit, arguing that the service qualified as ambulance operations under General Statutes § 20-378 and thus fell under the Ambulance Commission's jurisdiction. The court affirmed the Public Utilities Commission's jurisdiction, holding that the medicars did not constitute ambulances because they provided no emergency medical service or assistance in transit and instead offered specialized livery transportation at normal speeds for passengers who did not require medical aid. The reasoning focused on the statutory definitions of "ambulance" and "patient," the purpose of chapter 397 to ensure emergency medical services and equipment, and the distinction that the application explicitly sought only transportation without emergency elements, making it subject to livery permitting under chapter 288.

business & regulatory

This case involved Louis Toomey suing the estate of his deceased wife for damages from injuries sustained in a single-car accident on October 28, 1967, where the wife was found to be the driver. The trial court entered judgment on a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, but on appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court reversed, holding that the motions to set aside the verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should have been granted. The court reasoned that there were no eyewitnesses, res ipsa loquitur does not apply to one-car accidents, and the circumstantial evidence of the car's skid and damage was insufficient to prove negligence by a preponderance of the evidence without speculation. The jury could not have found excessive speed or other negligence based on the road conditions and lack of other evidence.

torts & liability

This case arose from the state's condemnation of the plaintiff's land in East Granby for expansion of Bradley International Airport under the aeronautics commission's authority. The plaintiff challenged the proceeding, arguing that the commission improperly used the general condemnation statutes (§§ 8-128—8-133 and amended § 48-12) rather than the specific airport statute (§ 15-79), and sought to contest the taking's validity before any damages review. The court held that the 1967 amendment to § 48-12 did not alter § 15-79's requirements, so the commission lacked authority to proceed under the chosen statutes, rendering the certificate of taking null and void. Because the appeal was brought under an inapplicable procedure, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the matter and should have dismissed it rather than referring it to a referee for reassessment. The judgment was reversed with direction to dismiss the appeal.

propertyprocedure