John R. Thim

This case involved a dispute over which of two Connecticut state agencies—the Public Utilities Commission (P.U.C.) or the Water Resources Commission (W.R.C.)—had jurisdiction to issue permits for constructing overhead power transmission lines across navigable rivers. HELCO, an electric utility, sought approvals from both agencies to build lines crossing the Connecticut River; both granted permission, but the W.R.C. attached a condition requiring removal of an existing line. After a lower court ruling upholding the W.R.C.'s jurisdiction and finding its condition procedurally flawed, the Connecticut Supreme Court addressed the agencies' competing statutory claims. The court held that the W.R.C. possessed authority to regulate such structures under statutes governing obstructions in navigable waters (such as §§ 25-7, 25-7b, and 25-7d), while the P.U.C.'s powers under title 16 were limited to technical and location matters on private property and did not grant it exclusive control over navigable waterways.

business & regulatoryenvironment

The case State v. Darwin concerned Roy F. Darwin's second-degree murder conviction following a retrial after his initial conviction was reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court. The defendant challenged the denial of his motions to suppress evidence obtained from a February 1964 search warrant for his wife's vehicle and flashlights, as well as a bench warrant, arguing the search warrant affidavit lacked sufficient facts for probable cause and that certain statements were inadmissible without counsel. The court held the affidavit inadequate because it failed to provide independent facts showing the vehicle and items were likely used in the crime, beyond the mere fact of arrest, and that post-charge statements required counsel's presence or a valid waiver for admissibility. It therefore found error in admitting the evidence, set aside the judgment, and ordered a new trial while noting other evidence might still support a conviction.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case involved a defendant convicted under General Statutes §53-73 of breaking and entering a dwelling in the daytime after being found near the scene at night with stolen items from the home. The trial court found him guilty based on evidence showing the crime occurred between 8:30 and 10 p.m., and he later pleaded guilty as a third offender, receiving a sentence of three to thirty years. On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that the evidence established the acts took place at night and that the statute requires proof the breaking and entering occurred specifically in the daytime as an essential element. The court applied strict construction to the penal statute, rejected arguments that the daytime requirement was merely to distinguish it from common-law burglary, and concluded the state failed to prove the timing element, which also invalidated the third-offender adjudication.

criminal law

The case concerned whether the Public Utilities Commission or the Ambulance Commission had authority to issue a permit for non-emergency transportation of wheelchair patients, convalescents, infirm, handicapped, and elderly individuals in specially designed medicars operating from New Haven. The plaintiffs, licensed ambulance operators, appealed the Public Utilities Commission's decision to grant a livery permit, arguing that the service qualified as ambulance operations under General Statutes § 20-378 and thus fell under the Ambulance Commission's jurisdiction. The court affirmed the Public Utilities Commission's jurisdiction, holding that the medicars did not constitute ambulances because they provided no emergency medical service or assistance in transit and instead offered specialized livery transportation at normal speeds for passengers who did not require medical aid. The reasoning focused on the statutory definitions of "ambulance" and "patient," the purpose of chapter 397 to ensure emergency medical services and equipment, and the distinction that the application explicitly sought only transportation without emergency elements, making it subject to livery permitting under chapter 288.

business & regulatory

This case involved Louis Toomey suing the estate of his deceased wife for damages from injuries sustained in a single-car accident on October 28, 1967, where the wife was found to be the driver. The trial court entered judgment on a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, but on appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court reversed, holding that the motions to set aside the verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should have been granted. The court reasoned that there were no eyewitnesses, res ipsa loquitur does not apply to one-car accidents, and the circumstantial evidence of the car's skid and damage was insufficient to prove negligence by a preponderance of the evidence without speculation. The jury could not have found excessive speed or other negligence based on the road conditions and lack of other evidence.

torts & liability

This case arose from the state's condemnation of the plaintiff's land in East Granby for expansion of Bradley International Airport under the aeronautics commission's authority. The plaintiff challenged the proceeding, arguing that the commission improperly used the general condemnation statutes (§§ 8-128—8-133 and amended § 48-12) rather than the specific airport statute (§ 15-79), and sought to contest the taking's validity before any damages review. The court held that the 1967 amendment to § 48-12 did not alter § 15-79's requirements, so the commission lacked authority to proceed under the chosen statutes, rendering the certificate of taking null and void. Because the appeal was brought under an inapplicable procedure, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the matter and should have dismissed it rather than referring it to a referee for reassessment. The judgment was reversed with direction to dismiss the appeal.

propertyprocedure

The case involved a defendant charged with first-degree murder after he struck his mother with a hammer, causing her death; he was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder following a trial in which he raised an insanity defense. On appeal, the defendant challenged pre-trial rulings denying his motion to quash the bench warrant and grand jury proceedings, as well as trial matters including jury instructions and the sufficiency of evidence on his sanity. The court decided that there was no error in any of the challenged rulings and affirmed the conviction. It reasoned that the defendant was not entitled to civil discovery rules in a criminal case, that state procedures for bypassing a probable cause hearing were valid and longstanding, that the grand jury process did not require defense counsel or recording, and that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find the defendant sane beyond a reasonable doubt.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned whether executors of a decedent's estate could maintain an action to quiet title to real property without alleging that the land was needed to pay estate claims. The trial court overruled a demurrer and entered judgment quieting title in the executors and intervening buyers, but the Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the portion of the judgment favoring the executors. The court reasoned that under General Statutes § 47-31, a plaintiff must allege an actual interest in the property, and an executor's limited statutory interest in real estate does not meet that requirement absent a showing that the property is required for administration of the estate. The court affirmed the judgment in favor of the intervening plaintiffs on their tract but directed modification of the judgment to clearly describe the property and to deny relief to the executors.

propertyprocedure

In Gagnon v. United Aircraft Corporation, the plaintiff, an employee who had executed and had approved a waiver of workers' compensation rights for a preexisting physical defect under General Statutes § 31-325, asked the compensation commissioner to declare the waiver null and void even though no compensable injury or claim had been asserted. The court decided that the commissioner had no jurisdiction to inquire into or annul the validity of an already-approved waiver in the absence of a compensation claim. The core reasoning was that the statute grants the commissioner no power to reopen the question of a waiver's validity after approval, unlike the express continuing jurisdiction provided for voluntary compensation agreements, and that permitting such challenges would produce needless litigation, delay, and uncertainty contrary to the act's objectives of encouraging employment of persons with physical defects while avoiding unnecessary disputes.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case involved a dispute over title to a right of way that the plaintiff claimed was appurtenant to her land (Goddard Meadow) and ran across land owned by the defendant. The trial court found for the plaintiff and upheld her use of the way reserved in a 1924 deed by a common predecessor in title. On appeal, the court reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial, ruling that the plaintiff had not presented competent evidence that the grantor owned Goddard Meadow when the easement was reserved. Without proof of unity of title at that time, no appurtenant right of way could attach to the plaintiff's property under established easement law.

property

This case involved a negligence action by a taxicab company and its driver, Joseph Natale, seeking damages for personal injuries and property damage from a collision with an automobile driven by the defendant's decedent, Ralph Flynn, on Long Wharf Drive in New Haven. After a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs, which the trial court accepted, and the defendant appealed the denial of motions for a directed verdict and to set aside the verdict, along with claims of error in jury instructions and an evidentiary ruling. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed, holding that circumstantial evidence of the accident's circumstances—including the severe damage to the vehicles and lack of skid marks—permitted the jury to reasonably infer negligence by Flynn without speculation, and that any error in admitting a police diagram as evidence of post-impact vehicle paths was harmless because it was cumulative of other evidence on speed.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In Wood v. Town of Wilton, neighboring property owners sued to enjoin the Town of Wilton from operating a sanitary landfill on a portion of a 65-acre rural tract, claiming the use would constitute a nuisance. The trial court permanently enjoined the proposed use, but the Connecticut Supreme Court reversed and directed judgment for the town. The court held that the town's site selection followed proper study and approvals by engineers and state health officials, was not arbitrary, and that operational plans—no burning, daily covering with fill, buffer screening, and limited hours—did not support conclusions of fire hazard, unreasonable traffic, or depreciating blight; any actual future nuisance could be addressed later.

environmentpropertytorts & liability

The case concerned a zoning commission's grant of a petition by Pentad Corporation to rezone its 62-acre property in Farmington from a residential classification (R-30) to a restricted apartment zone (R.A.), which neighboring property owners appealed as arbitrary and inconsistent with the public welfare. The Court of Common Pleas dismissed the appeal, and the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the commission's action was a valid exercise of its legislative discretion as part of the comprehensive plan. The court reasoned that changed conditions since a prior 1961 zoning upgrade—including the new state medical-dental school, a local redevelopment project, interstate highway connections, and newly available public sewers and water—demonstrated a need for multiple dwellings and justified the boundary alteration without arbitrariness. It also rejected claims of improper notice and post-hearing evidence, finding the published notice sufficient and the supplemental technical information within the commission's authority to obtain.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

This case was a negligence action in which the plaintiff sought damages for injuries caused when an automobile driven by Igors Blankenfeld, an employee of the Jewish Home for the Aged, struck him on the steps of the Home's premises. Blankenfeld had been defaulted, but the Home moved for and obtained a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the ground that he was not acting within the scope of his employment. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the evidence permitted only the conclusion that Blankenfeld was using his own car on his day off to pay personal bills downtown, with no authorization or errand for the Home at the time. The plaintiff bore the burden of proving agency and course of employment under respondeat superior principles, but testimony and payroll records did not establish that the act furthered the Home's business.

torts & liabilitylabor & employmentprocedure

In Szlinsky v. Denhup, the plaintiff sued the defendant for personal injuries from a car collision, and a jury returned a verdict in her favor after five days of trial and approximately seven hours of deliberations. The defendant appealed, arguing that a supplemental jury instruction given after reports of disagreement was inadequate for omitting reference to the burden of proof and that the trial court violated General Statutes § 52-223 by returning the jury for further deliberations after three disagreement reports. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that the supplemental instruction was proper when read with the basic charge, that the statute limiting returns of the jury applies only to verdicts and not disagreement reports, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in managing the deliberations. The core reasoning emphasized that supplemental instructions need not repeat all prior elements unless necessary for understanding and that judicial discretion governs the duration of jury deliberations absent statutory limits.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved the owner and lessee of an automotive service station in a Bloomfield, Connecticut business zone seeking to add a third service bay to their existing two-bay station. The zoning regulations prohibited enlarging such a station if any part of the property was within 400 feet of a public school along public streets, and the plaintiffs' property was only 215 feet away; after the building inspector denied a permit, the zoning board denied their request for a variance on the ground that no hardship existed. The Court of Common Pleas reversed the board, concluding that the addition would not constitute an enlargement and that the distance regulation was too vague, resulting in unnecessary hardship. The Connecticut Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the proposed addition was clearly an enlargement of the station and that any hardship from the regulation was merely financial and insufficient to justify a variance. The court therefore set aside the lower court's judgment and directed dismissal of the appeal.

propertybusiness & regulatory

In this case from 1965, property owners sought a declaratory judgment under Connecticut General Statutes § 49-13 to invalidate two recorded first mortgages from 1939 on their Bridgeport real estate, claiming undisturbed possession for over seventeen years without payments or other recognitions of the debts. The trial court denied relief after finding that the plaintiffs had continued making payments until 1943 and later made express statements acknowledging the unpaid debts and their intent to pay if collected. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that the statute authorizes invalidation only if no evidence exists of any payment or act recognizing the mortgage's validity within the period, and that the plaintiffs' acknowledgments disqualified them from relief; the court noted the statute is not a statute of limitations but a limited mechanism for clearing undisputed clouds on title. The court did not reach equitable arguments, as the statutory conditions were not satisfied.

propertyprocedure

In this divorce case, the Superior Court had awarded the wife custody of the couple's six children and ordered the husband to pay $150 weekly in undivided child support plus certain dental expenses exceeding $50 unless elective. After two children were emancipated, the husband unilaterally reduced payments by $25 each time and refused to reimburse the wife for orthodontic work on one child; the wife sought to hold him in contempt for noncompliance. The trial court interpreted the support order as automatically reducible on a pro rata basis and found the dental expense reimbursable without prior approval, but the Supreme Court reversed both rulings. It held that an undivided support order for multiple children does not automatically decrease upon emancipation of one or more, as the amount reflects the payer's ability rather than equal per-child needs and any change requires a formal modification; it further held that the record lacked evidence showing the orthodontic treatment was necessary rather than elective, which would have required the husband's prior approval under the decree. The case was remanded to calculate any arrearage and determine whether the dental treatment was elective.

family lawprocedure

This case concerns a claim of fraudulent nondisclosure in the 1959 sale of real property, where the buyers were not informed that portions of the driveway, parking area, and swimming pool encroached on a neighbor's land. Following a prior appeal that limited retrial to damages, the trial court awarded the plaintiffs $4500 in general damages (the difference between the property's represented value of $34,000 and its market value with the encroachments) plus $3300 in consequential damages for relocating the pool to make the property usable and salable. The defendants appealed, arguing that expert testimony was required to justify abandoning the original pool and that the court misapplied the damages rule. The Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed, holding that the trial judge could determine the necessity of relocation based on ordinary knowledge without expert evidence, and that the award properly followed the benefit-of-the-bargain measure plus direct consequential costs. There is no error.

propertytorts & liability

The case was a personal injury action brought under Connecticut General Statutes § 22-357, which imposes liability on dog owners for damages caused by their dogs. The plaintiff claimed he was chased by the defendant’s dog into a street and struck by a car; the defendant denied that it was his dog and offered multiple witnesses who testified that he and his dog were elsewhere at the time. A jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to set it aside. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Errors affirmed, ruling that questions of witness credibility and the weight of conflicting evidence are for the jury to resolve and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in upholding the verdict.

torts & liability