Kenneth B. Bell

The case Khianthalat v. State involved a defendant charged with multiple counts of lewd or lascivious battery under section 800.04(4), Florida Statutes (2002), for engaging in sexual activity with a 13-year-old victim. The defendant requested a jury instruction on simple battery as a permissive lesser-included offense, but the trial court denied it, and the Second District affirmed. The Florida Supreme Court held that the defendant was not entitled to the instruction when the information did not allege lack of consent and the evidence at trial did not support it. The core reasoning was that the two conditions for such an instruction were not met, as the elements of simple battery include acting against the victim's will, which was absent here, and section 800.04(4) criminalizes the conduct even if consensual unlike statutes for children under 12.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned a 1991 recorded deed conveying a family horse farm to a named trustee under an identified trust agreement, and whether that deed transferred fee simple title to the trustee individually or only legal title in trust under pre-2004 Florida Statutes section 689.07(1). In a bankruptcy proceeding, the bankruptcy trustee argued the property belonged to the individual trustee's estate. The Florida Supreme Court held that the deed conveyed only legal title to the grantee as trustee. The court reasoned that the deed's references to the trust by name and date, along with its multiple mentions of the trust agreement, settlors, and beneficiaries, demonstrated the grantors' intent to convey the property in trust and placed third parties on notice, consistent with the statute's purpose of preventing secret trusts.

property

This case involved a legal malpractice claim by Security National Servicing Corporation against the Law Office of David J. Stern, P.A., arising from Stern's mistaken dismissal of a timely mortgage foreclosure action, leaving only an untimely one that was dismissed. Security National, which acquired the mortgage and note after the malpractice occurred, sued Stern claiming standing either through an attorney-client relationship or as an assignee of the mortgage. The Florida Supreme Court held that Security National lacked standing to pursue the malpractice claim, as there was no direct attorney-client relationship at the time of the malpractice and legal malpractice claims are not assignable along with the underlying mortgage and note. The court reasoned that such assignments are generally not permitted due to the personal nature of the attorney-client relationship and policy concerns against champerty and maintenance.

proceduretorts & liabilityproperty

The case concerned Dewarn Antonio Brown, who was charged with armed robbery and first-degree felony murder arising from a robbery attempt that resulted in a death. The jury convicted Brown of the lesser offense of petit theft on the robbery count and of first-degree felony murder, after which the trial court vacated the murder conviction as inconsistent with the theft verdict; the Third District reversed that ruling. The Florida Supreme Court held that the convictions were true inconsistent verdicts because the felony-murder conviction required proof of robbery or attempted robbery as the underlying felony, yet the jury's theft verdict negated that element, and the verdict forms were nonparallel due to the omission of attempted robbery as a lesser offense on the robbery count. The court therefore quashed the Third District's decision and remanded with directions to reinstate the trial court's order vacating the felony-murder conviction, while also rejecting the argument that Brown had waived the inconsistency by agreeing to a standard jury instruction.

criminal lawprocedure

In McDonald v. State, the Florida Supreme Court reviewed a case involving a defendant convicted of carjacking with a firearm, robbery with a firearm, and related offenses who was sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender (PRR) shortly after release from prison. The court considered two certified conflict issues: whether a mandatory minimum sentence under the 10-20-LIFE statute must run concurrently with a greater PRR sentence, and whether the PRR statute mandates a life sentence (rather than thirty years) for first-degree robbery with a firearm. The court approved the Fourth District's decision, holding that the statutes require concurrent imposition of the lesser 10-20-LIFE mandatory minimums with the PRR sentences and that life imprisonment applies under the PRR statute to felonies punishable by life. The reasoning rested on the plain language of sections 775.082(9) and 775.087, Florida Statutes (2000), which the court interpreted to reflect legislative intent that lesser mandatory minimum terms be included and that the specified felony classifications trigger life sentences.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Leroy Reeves, who was convicted of four third-degree felonies—burglary of a structure, grand theft, resisting a law enforcement officer with violence, and battery on a law enforcement officer—arising from a 1999 incident at a gas station. The trial court imposed a five-year Prison Releasee Reoffender (PRR) sentence for one count followed by three consecutive five-year sentences under the Criminal Punishment Code (CPC) for the others, and Reeves challenged the consecutive structure as illegal when offenses stemmed from a single criminal episode. The Florida Supreme Court held that a PRR sentence followed consecutively by an unenhanced CPC sentence is lawful even for crimes from the same episode, because the PRR statute mandates the statutory maximum without creating an enhancement beyond it. The Court further determined that Reeves's offenses occurred in two separate episodes, allowing consecutive sentencing within the trial court's discretion under section 775.021(4)(a). It approved the Fifth District's decision and disapproved conflicting precedent from the Second District.

criminal lawprocedure