Kenneth B. Bell

The case Khianthalat v. State involved a defendant charged with multiple counts of lewd or lascivious battery under section 800.04(4), Florida Statutes (2002), for engaging in sexual activity with a 13-year-old victim. The defendant requested a jury instruction on simple battery as a permissive lesser-included offense, but the trial court denied it, and the Second District affirmed. The Florida Supreme Court held that the defendant was not entitled to the instruction when the information did not allege lack of consent and the evidence at trial did not support it. The core reasoning was that the two conditions for such an instruction were not met, as the elements of simple battery include acting against the victim's will, which was absent here, and section 800.04(4) criminalizes the conduct even if consensual unlike statutes for children under 12.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned a 1991 recorded deed conveying a family horse farm to a named trustee under an identified trust agreement, and whether that deed transferred fee simple title to the trustee individually or only legal title in trust under pre-2004 Florida Statutes section 689.07(1). In a bankruptcy proceeding, the bankruptcy trustee argued the property belonged to the individual trustee's estate. The Florida Supreme Court held that the deed conveyed only legal title to the grantee as trustee. The court reasoned that the deed's references to the trust by name and date, along with its multiple mentions of the trust agreement, settlors, and beneficiaries, demonstrated the grantors' intent to convey the property in trust and placed third parties on notice, consistent with the statute's purpose of preventing secret trusts.

property

This case involved a legal malpractice claim by Security National Servicing Corporation against the Law Office of David J. Stern, P.A., arising from Stern's mistaken dismissal of a timely mortgage foreclosure action, leaving only an untimely one that was dismissed. Security National, which acquired the mortgage and note after the malpractice occurred, sued Stern claiming standing either through an attorney-client relationship or as an assignee of the mortgage. The Florida Supreme Court held that Security National lacked standing to pursue the malpractice claim, as there was no direct attorney-client relationship at the time of the malpractice and legal malpractice claims are not assignable along with the underlying mortgage and note. The court reasoned that such assignments are generally not permitted due to the personal nature of the attorney-client relationship and policy concerns against champerty and maintenance.

proceduretorts & liabilityproperty

The case concerned Dewarn Antonio Brown, who was charged with armed robbery and first-degree felony murder arising from a robbery attempt that resulted in a death. The jury convicted Brown of the lesser offense of petit theft on the robbery count and of first-degree felony murder, after which the trial court vacated the murder conviction as inconsistent with the theft verdict; the Third District reversed that ruling. The Florida Supreme Court held that the convictions were true inconsistent verdicts because the felony-murder conviction required proof of robbery or attempted robbery as the underlying felony, yet the jury's theft verdict negated that element, and the verdict forms were nonparallel due to the omission of attempted robbery as a lesser offense on the robbery count. The court therefore quashed the Third District's decision and remanded with directions to reinstate the trial court's order vacating the felony-murder conviction, while also rejecting the argument that Brown had waived the inconsistency by agreeing to a standard jury instruction.

criminal lawprocedure

In McDonald v. State, the Florida Supreme Court reviewed a case involving a defendant convicted of carjacking with a firearm, robbery with a firearm, and related offenses who was sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender (PRR) shortly after release from prison. The court considered two certified conflict issues: whether a mandatory minimum sentence under the 10-20-LIFE statute must run concurrently with a greater PRR sentence, and whether the PRR statute mandates a life sentence (rather than thirty years) for first-degree robbery with a firearm. The court approved the Fourth District's decision, holding that the statutes require concurrent imposition of the lesser 10-20-LIFE mandatory minimums with the PRR sentences and that life imprisonment applies under the PRR statute to felonies punishable by life. The reasoning rested on the plain language of sections 775.082(9) and 775.087, Florida Statutes (2000), which the court interpreted to reflect legislative intent that lesser mandatory minimum terms be included and that the specified felony classifications trigger life sentences.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Leroy Reeves, who was convicted of four third-degree felonies—burglary of a structure, grand theft, resisting a law enforcement officer with violence, and battery on a law enforcement officer—arising from a 1999 incident at a gas station. The trial court imposed a five-year Prison Releasee Reoffender (PRR) sentence for one count followed by three consecutive five-year sentences under the Criminal Punishment Code (CPC) for the others, and Reeves challenged the consecutive structure as illegal when offenses stemmed from a single criminal episode. The Florida Supreme Court held that a PRR sentence followed consecutively by an unenhanced CPC sentence is lawful even for crimes from the same episode, because the PRR statute mandates the statutory maximum without creating an enhancement beyond it. The Court further determined that Reeves's offenses occurred in two separate episodes, allowing consecutive sentencing within the trial court's discretion under section 775.021(4)(a). It approved the Fifth District's decision and disapproved conflicting precedent from the Second District.

criminal lawprocedure

In Parker v. Parker, the Florida Supreme Court addressed whether a former wife's misrepresentation of a child's paternity during dissolution of marriage proceedings constitutes extrinsic or intrinsic fraud. The case arose after the husband, upon discovering through DNA testing that he was not the biological father, sought to vacate the 2001 final judgment that established paternity and child support obligations, or alternatively pursued damages in a separate civil action. The court held that such misrepresentation is intrinsic fraud under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b), requiring any motion for relief from judgment to be filed within one year of the final order. This conclusion aligned with the court's prior precedent distinguishing types of fraud in marital dissolution cases and led to disapproval of a conflicting First District decision. As a result, the husband's claims were deemed time-barred.

family lawprocedure

The case addressed whether administrative law judges (ALJs) have jurisdiction under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act (NICA) to determine if healthcare providers complied with the statutory notice requirement to obstetrical patients about the no-fault compensation plan. Two consolidated cases involved parents who filed NICA claims under protest after their civil malpractice suits were abated, alleging lack of notice from hospitals and providers. The Florida Supreme Court resolved a conflict among district courts by holding that ALJs possess such jurisdiction when notice is raised in a NICA claim. The core reasoning rested on the statutory directive that ALJs "hear and determine" claims, which requires resolving notice issues as they affect the exclusivity of the NICA remedy.

healthcareproceduretorts & liability

The case concerned whether convictions for both organized fraud and multiple counts of grand theft, based on the same fraudulent business conduct by the defendant in selling home improvement products, violated double jeopardy principles. The Florida Supreme Court held that the statutory elements of the offenses must be compared to determine the lesser offense, rather than comparing the severity of punishments. Finding that all elements of grand theft are subsumed within organized fraud, the court ruled that the grand theft convictions should be vacated as lesser included offenses while affirming the organized fraud conviction. This resolved a conflict among district courts of appeal on the proper analysis for lesser offenses in double jeopardy cases.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether section 627.428, Florida Statutes, permits an appellate court to award conditional attorney's fees to an insured (or the insured's assignee) who loses the appeal but might ultimately prevail in the litigation. The Florida Supreme Court held that the statute's plain language authorizes such fees only "in the event of an appeal in which the insured or beneficiary prevails," so conditional awards are not allowed when the insured loses on appeal. The Court reached this conclusion by strictly construing the statutory text, approving the Third District's denial of fees in this case, and disapproving the Fourth District's contrary approach in Gedeon. The decision resolves a certified conflict among district courts of appeal regarding the proper interpretation of the fee-shifting provision in insurance disputes.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In Sanders v. State, the defendant was charged with attempted first-degree murder involving discharge of a firearm causing great bodily harm and was convicted of the lesser-included offense of attempted second-degree murder with the same firearm enhancements, resulting in the same maximum penalty of life imprisonment under Florida's 10-20-life statute. The trial court had omitted instructions on aggravated battery due to concerns over duplicate penalties on the verdict form. The Florida Supreme Court addressed a certified question on whether a lesser-included offense must always carry a lesser penalty than the charged offense or the next option on the verdict form. The court answered no, holding that substantive offenses and sentence-enhancing factors like firearm use are distinct, so verdict forms need not guarantee strictly descending penalties and may use separate interrogatories for enhancements.

criminal lawprocedureguns

The case concerned whether a jury verdict finding the defendant guilty of aggravated assault with a firearm, as alleged in the information, authorized imposition of the three-year mandatory minimum sentence under section 775.087(2)(a), Florida Statutes, for firearm use during specified crimes. The trial court imposed the mandatory minimum after the jury convicted the defendant as charged, but the Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the jury should have been instructed on the lesser offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and asked to make a separate finding on firearm use to preserve the jury's pardon power. The Florida Supreme Court quashed the district court's decision, ruling that the jury's specific finding of guilt on the offense with a firearm as charged in the information was sufficient to support the mandatory minimum. The core reasoning was that the charging document alleged use of a firearm, the jury was instructed accordingly, and undisputed evidence showed the deadly weapon was a firearm, so no additional lesser-included offense instruction was required.

criminal lawprocedureguns

The case involved Westside EKG Associates suing several health maintenance organizations (HMOs) for breach of a third-party beneficiary contract, alleging the HMOs failed to pay or timely contest claims for medical services as required by the prompt pay provisions in section 641.3155 of Florida's Health Maintenance Organization Act. The Florida Supreme Court addressed whether a medical service provider could pursue such a common-law contract claim based on alleged statutory violations. The court held that a provider may bring a cause of action as a third-party beneficiary to the HMO-subscriber contract when the HMO fails to comply with those prompt pay requirements. The reasoning centered on the provider's ability to enforce the contract terms that incorporate the statutory obligations for timely claims processing.

healthcarebusiness & regulatory

The case concerned a challenge to the City of Hollywood's ordinance authorizing police to seize and impound vehicles used in certain misdemeanor offenses, such as soliciting prostitution, after Colon Mulligan's vehicle was impounded following his arrest. The trial court upheld the ordinance, but the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that it was preempted by or conflicted with the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act (FCFA). The Florida Supreme Court rephrased the certified question and held that the FCFA does not preempt municipalities from enacting such ordinances under their home rule powers, because the ordinance effects an impoundment rather than a forfeiture governed by the FCFA. The court further concluded that the ordinance does not conflict with the FCFA and remanded the case for further proceedings.

criminal lawpropertyprocedure

This case addressed whether a person in mere possession of seized property, such as currency found during a traffic stop, has standing to challenge probable cause at an adversarial preliminary hearing under Florida's Contraband Forfeiture Act without proving a proprietary interest. The Florida Supreme Court held that the Act grants standing to any 'person entitled to notice,' which expressly includes those in possession at the time of seizure, allowing participation in the initial hearing. The Court reasoned that the preliminary stage only determines probable cause for seizure and does not adjudicate ownership interests, unlike the later forfeiture proceeding where claimants must demonstrate a proprietary interest under a narrower statutory definition. It distinguished the two stages of forfeiture proceedings and applied strict construction to the statute, quashing the Third District's contrary ruling and approving conflicting decisions from the Fourth District.

criminal lawpropertyprocedure

This case concerned whether a legal father—the man married to the child's mother at the time of birth—is an indispensable party in a state-initiated paternity action under chapter 409, Florida Statutes, seeking to establish that another man is the biological father and owes child support. The Florida Supreme Court held that the legal father must be joined as a party unless the pleadings conclusively show his parental rights have already been terminated by a prior judgment. The court reasoned that the legal father retains a presumption of legitimacy and potential rights or responsibilities that could be affected by the proceeding, and without his participation it is impossible to determine whether he wishes to assert those interests. The decision approved the Second District's ruling in the case below and disapproved a conflicting First District opinion.

family lawprocedure

The case involved Lawrence Logan, who was convicted of armed robberies committed in 1984 and initially sentenced under the 1983 guidelines; after his original sentence was vacated, he was resentenced in 2001 and elected to be sentenced "under the guidelines." The Second District Court of Appeal held that this election meant applying the Criminal Punishment Code (CPC) enacted in 1998, under which Logan's life sentences were not departures requiring written reasons. The Florida Supreme Court quashed that decision, holding that Logan's election entitled him to resentencing under section 921.001(4)(b)(1), the 1983 guidelines. The Court reasoned that the CPC by its terms applies only to offenses committed on or after October 1, 1998, while section 921.001(4)(b)(1) expressly permits defendants whose crimes predated that date to affirmatively elect the earlier guidelines, consistent with the precedent in Smith v. State.

criminal lawprocedure

This case addressed whether a trial court should apply the substantial change test or the factors in section 61.13 when modifying a rotating custody agreement between divorced parents who shared responsibility but had no designated primary residential parent. The parties had agreed to a split rotating custody plan after their 2000 divorce, but the mother later refused to follow it, leading both parents to seek primary custody in a modification proceeding. The Supreme Court of Florida held that the two-part substantial change test applies to modifications of all custody agreements, including rotating ones, unless the final judgment specifies otherwise. The court reasoned that a final custody decree carries res judicata effect and can be modified only upon a showing of facts unknown at the time of the decree or a subsequent substantial change in circumstances that makes modification in the child's best interests.

family law

In State v. Clements, the Florida Supreme Court addressed whether the prosecution could file a mid-trial amended information adding a capital sexual battery charge without court approval in a case involving sexual activity with a minor over whom the defendant had authority. The trial court had denied leave to amend after determining it would prejudice the defendant and proceeded to conviction on the original charge. The district court reversed, holding that the amended information took effect upon filing. The Supreme Court quashed that decision, holding that under established precedent a trial court must approve mid-trial amendments and may deny them upon a showing of prejudice to the defendant's substantial rights. The case was remanded for consideration of any evidentiary issues arising during the amendment dispute.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved challenges to the constitutionality of Florida's Sexual Predators Act, which requires individuals convicted of certain sexual offenses to be designated as sexual predators subject to registration and public notification requirements without any hearing on actual dangerousness. The Florida Supreme Court consolidated appeals from two district courts of appeal, one upholding the Act against procedural-due-process and separation-of-powers claims and the other striking it down on procedural-due-process grounds. The Court held the Act constitutional as to those challenges. Its reasoning relied on U.S. Supreme Court precedent establishing that due process does not entitle offenders to a hearing on dangerousness because that issue is not material under a statute that ties designation solely to the fact of conviction.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure