Stephen H. Grimes

The case concerned whether Container Corporation was covered as an additional insured under a liability insurance policy issued by Maryland Casualty to Southern Contractors for a negligence lawsuit filed by a Southern employee injured at Container's plant. The trial court and First District Court of Appeal ruled that the policy covered Container only for vicarious liability arising from Southern's operations, relying on the indemnity clause in the underlying contract between Container and Southern. The Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding that the policy endorsement language controls over the contract and that the undefined and ambiguous phrase limiting coverage to operations at the "operations site" must be construed in favor of the insured to include areas reasonably related to performing the contracted work. The court quashed the decision below, approved a conflicting district court opinion, and remanded for further proceedings.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

This case involved consolidated eminent domain actions in which Lee County used quick-taking proceedings to acquire private property and disputed the calculation of attorney's fees owed to the landowners under section 73.092, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1994). The statute bases fees on the "benefits achieved," defined as the difference between the final judgment or settlement and the condemning authority's last written offer before the owner hired counsel. The landowners argued that the county's initial good-faith estimate of value filed with the declaration of taking should count as that offer, which would increase the fee awards; the county maintained it was not an offer. The Florida Supreme Court held that a good-faith estimate is not a written offer for purposes of the statute, because the estimate serves only to allow the county to deposit funds and obtain title while the actual value remains subject to later determination. Accordingly, the court answered the certified question in the negative and approved the district court's reduction or denial of the larger fee awards sought by the owners.

propertyprocedure

The case concerned whether a police officer could lawfully enter the common areas of a rooming house without a warrant or consent to observe and arrest a resident for drug possession. The Florida Supreme Court held that the common living areas of rooming houses receive the same Fourth Amendment protections as the interiors of private homes, and therefore approved the appellate court's reversal of the trial court's denial of the suppression motion. The court reasoned that rooming houses constitute homes for their residents even when some areas like kitchens and hallways are shared, distinguishing them from unsecured apartment buildings where no such expectation of privacy exists in common spaces.

criminal law

The case concerned whether Joseph Sal Mancino could use Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) in 1996 to challenge the factual basis for a three-year minimum mandatory sentence imposed in 1984 after his no-contest plea to armed burglary, on the ground that the record showed no actual firearm possession. The trial court denied the motion as untimely under the two-year limit of rule 3.850, but the Second District reversed and held that 3.800(a) was available. The Florida Supreme Court quashed that decision, answered the certified question in the negative, and held that rule 3.850 rather than 3.800(a) is the proper vehicle because the claim requires an evidentiary determination of historical fact rather than a purely legal correction of an illegal sentence. The Court relied on its prior rulings in Callaway and Davis limiting rule 3.800(a) to sentencing errors that can be resolved without fact-finding and that exceed the statutory maximum. Because the time for a rule 3.850 motion had expired, the claim was denied.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved two unrelated incidents in which businesses sought coverage under comprehensive general liability (CGL) policies for third-party claims arising from accidental chemical releases: an ammonia spill from a blueprint machine that caused personal injuries and building evacuation, and aerial insecticide spraying that exposed individuals on adjacent property. The insurers denied coverage based on pollution exclusion clauses that barred liability for damages arising from the discharge of pollutants, defined to include irritants or contaminants such as fumes, chemicals, and waste. The Florida Supreme Court held that the exclusions were clear and unambiguous on their face, so they applied to deny coverage in both cases without need to resort to other interpretive doctrines. The court reasoned that the substances involved qualified as pollutants under the policy language and relevant regulations, and it declined to adopt the reasonable expectations doctrine because Florida law does not recognize it where policy terms are plain.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

In Ilkanic v. City of Fort Lauderdale, the petitioner was convicted of misdemeanor trespass and sentenced to 45 days in jail, after which the city sought to impose a statutory lien of $50 per day under section 960.293(2)(b) to recover incarceration costs as part of the Civil Restitution Lien and Crime Victims' Remedy Act. The county court declared the Act unconstitutional on equal protection, due process, vagueness, and excessive fines grounds, but the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed and upheld its validity. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the per diem charge reasonably relates to the legitimate goal of reimbursing public incarceration expenses, that classifying convicted offenders for this purpose satisfies equal protection, and that the resulting lien is enforceable like a civil judgment without violating procedural due process or homestead protections. The Court limited its ruling to the provisions directly at issue and noted the statute's average daily cost justification based on state data.

criminal lawprocedure