Stephen H. Grimes

The case concerned whether Container Corporation was covered as an additional insured under a liability insurance policy issued by Maryland Casualty to Southern Contractors for a negligence lawsuit filed by a Southern employee injured at Container's plant. The trial court and First District Court of Appeal ruled that the policy covered Container only for vicarious liability arising from Southern's operations, relying on the indemnity clause in the underlying contract between Container and Southern. The Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding that the policy endorsement language controls over the contract and that the undefined and ambiguous phrase limiting coverage to operations at the "operations site" must be construed in favor of the insured to include areas reasonably related to performing the contracted work. The court quashed the decision below, approved a conflicting district court opinion, and remanded for further proceedings.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

This case involved consolidated eminent domain actions in which Lee County used quick-taking proceedings to acquire private property and disputed the calculation of attorney's fees owed to the landowners under section 73.092, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1994). The statute bases fees on the "benefits achieved," defined as the difference between the final judgment or settlement and the condemning authority's last written offer before the owner hired counsel. The landowners argued that the county's initial good-faith estimate of value filed with the declaration of taking should count as that offer, which would increase the fee awards; the county maintained it was not an offer. The Florida Supreme Court held that a good-faith estimate is not a written offer for purposes of the statute, because the estimate serves only to allow the county to deposit funds and obtain title while the actual value remains subject to later determination. Accordingly, the court answered the certified question in the negative and approved the district court's reduction or denial of the larger fee awards sought by the owners.

propertyprocedure

The case concerned whether a police officer could lawfully enter the common areas of a rooming house without a warrant or consent to observe and arrest a resident for drug possession. The Florida Supreme Court held that the common living areas of rooming houses receive the same Fourth Amendment protections as the interiors of private homes, and therefore approved the appellate court's reversal of the trial court's denial of the suppression motion. The court reasoned that rooming houses constitute homes for their residents even when some areas like kitchens and hallways are shared, distinguishing them from unsecured apartment buildings where no such expectation of privacy exists in common spaces.

criminal law

The case concerned whether Joseph Sal Mancino could use Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) in 1996 to challenge the factual basis for a three-year minimum mandatory sentence imposed in 1984 after his no-contest plea to armed burglary, on the ground that the record showed no actual firearm possession. The trial court denied the motion as untimely under the two-year limit of rule 3.850, but the Second District reversed and held that 3.800(a) was available. The Florida Supreme Court quashed that decision, answered the certified question in the negative, and held that rule 3.850 rather than 3.800(a) is the proper vehicle because the claim requires an evidentiary determination of historical fact rather than a purely legal correction of an illegal sentence. The Court relied on its prior rulings in Callaway and Davis limiting rule 3.800(a) to sentencing errors that can be resolved without fact-finding and that exceed the statutory maximum. Because the time for a rule 3.850 motion had expired, the claim was denied.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved two unrelated incidents in which businesses sought coverage under comprehensive general liability (CGL) policies for third-party claims arising from accidental chemical releases: an ammonia spill from a blueprint machine that caused personal injuries and building evacuation, and aerial insecticide spraying that exposed individuals on adjacent property. The insurers denied coverage based on pollution exclusion clauses that barred liability for damages arising from the discharge of pollutants, defined to include irritants or contaminants such as fumes, chemicals, and waste. The Florida Supreme Court held that the exclusions were clear and unambiguous on their face, so they applied to deny coverage in both cases without need to resort to other interpretive doctrines. The court reasoned that the substances involved qualified as pollutants under the policy language and relevant regulations, and it declined to adopt the reasonable expectations doctrine because Florida law does not recognize it where policy terms are plain.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

In Ilkanic v. City of Fort Lauderdale, the petitioner was convicted of misdemeanor trespass and sentenced to 45 days in jail, after which the city sought to impose a statutory lien of $50 per day under section 960.293(2)(b) to recover incarceration costs as part of the Civil Restitution Lien and Crime Victims' Remedy Act. The county court declared the Act unconstitutional on equal protection, due process, vagueness, and excessive fines grounds, but the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed and upheld its validity. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the per diem charge reasonably relates to the legitimate goal of reimbursing public incarceration expenses, that classifying convicted offenders for this purpose satisfies equal protection, and that the resulting lien is enforceable like a civil judgment without violating procedural due process or homestead protections. The Court limited its ruling to the provisions directly at issue and noted the statute's average daily cost justification based on state data.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute between tenant Careers USA and landlord Sanctuary of Boca over the start dates for base and additional rent under a commercial lease, with Careers filing a declaratory judgment action seeking a court interpretation that delayed those obligations and also seeking limits on common area maintenance charges. The trial court ruled the lease was unambiguous and interpreted it in the landlord's favor on the rent timing but denied the landlord's request for attorney's fees. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the fee denial, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed that decision, holding that the declaratory judgment action qualified as litigation to enforce the lease terms because it determined the parties' rent obligations. The court reasoned that the prevailing party should recover fees under the lease provision regardless of whether the action was framed as declaratory judgment or breach of contract, disapproving contrary rulings from other districts that treated declaratory actions differently. The Court cautioned that fee awards still depend on the specific wording of each lease's attorney's fees clause.

propertybusiness & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned whether a 1994 special law applicable only to Alachua County, which permitted the use of local government infrastructure surtax revenues for the operation and maintenance of parks and recreation facilities, violated the Florida Constitution. The trial court and First District Court of Appeal held the special law unconstitutional, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed. The Court reasoned that article VII, section 1(a) preempts all forms of non-ad valorem taxation to the state except as authorized by general law, and that the permissible uses of surtax proceeds are an integral part of the tax authorization itself rather than a separable spending matter. It further noted that article VII, section 9(a) requires general-law authorization for counties to levy such taxes, preventing special laws from expanding their scope. The decision rejected arguments distinguishing taxation from expenditure rules, emphasizing the constitutional division of tax authority between state and local governments.

taxes

David Taylor was convicted of DUI resulting in serious bodily injury, a third-degree felony, and received a 10-year probation sentence that exceeded the five-year statutory maximum. After violating probation within the first five years, he was sentenced to prison and challenged the revocation on grounds that the original sentence was illegal and thus void. The Florida Supreme Court held that probation revocation was proper because the violation occurred during the legal portion of the sentence. The court reasoned that an excessive sentence is void only as to the excess over the statutory maximum, so a defendant cannot avoid punishment for a violation unrelated to that excess. The decision approved the lower court's ruling and disapproved a conflicting precedent.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether third-party claimants injured by an insured could sue the liability insurer directly for bad faith under section 624.155(1)(b)1 after obtaining a judgment within policy limits that the insurer paid. The trial court granted summary judgment to State Farm on the ground that the statute did not authorize such a claim, but the Fourth District reversed. The Florida Supreme Court quashed the district court's decision and reinstated the summary judgment, holding that subsection (1)(b)1 creates a cause of action only for the insured, not for third parties, because the duty is defined in terms of fairness to the insured and the provision codifies prior case law addressing excess judgments against the insured. The court noted that other subsections of the statute refer specifically to insureds or exclude liability coverage, confirming that third-party bad-faith actions under this subsection are unavailable absent an excess judgment.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

The case involved plaintiffs Susan, Bettie, and Jonathan Wood who sued Eli Lilly and Upjohn after suffering illnesses linked to their mother's ingestion of DES while pregnant, but who could not identify the specific manufacturer of the drug. After the district court dismissed their claims for failure to identify the manufacturer and the Eleventh Circuit remanded in light of Conley v. Boyle Drug Co. (which first recognized a market-share alternate theory of liability in DES cases), the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on statute-of-limitations grounds. The Florida Supreme Court answered the certified question by holding that the four-year statute of limitations for such negligence actions begins to run on the date the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of her injury, rather than on the date Conley was decided. The court reasoned that Conley merely supplied a new theory of liability rather than creating a new cause of action, and that nothing in Conley or prior precedent supported delaying the running of the limitations period until a new liability theory was adopted.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case concerned a breach of contract dispute in which Miorelli Engineering, Inc. sued Brevard County for damages arising from extra work performed on a spring training facility that was outside the scope of the original written contract and not authorized by required change orders. The trial court denied the County's motion for partial summary judgment asserting sovereign immunity, and the Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed that ruling. The Florida Supreme Court quashed the district court's decision on the extra-work claim, holding that the implied waiver of sovereign immunity recognized in Pan-Am Tobacco applies only to express written contracts and their implied covenants, not to claims for additional work wholly beyond the contract terms. The Court distinguished the present facts from cases involving breaches of implied conditions within the contract and emphasized stricter enforcement of written-change-order requirements in public contracts.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned the timeliness of a motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850(b) following a conviction for first-degree murder. Beaty's direct appeal was affirmed by the Second District Court of Appeal in a per curiam decision without opinion, with the mandate issuing on June 22, 1993; he later filed a pro se request for Supreme Court review, which was denied, and then filed his postconviction motion on July 25, 1995. The trial court and district court below both held the motion untimely because the two-year filing period ran from the district court's mandate rather than from the denial of review. The Florida Supreme Court agreed, reasoning that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over per curiam affirmances without opinion under Florida Star v. B.J.F., so such decisions become final upon issuance of the district court's mandate without tolling the postconviction deadline. The Court disapproved Nava v. State to the extent it suggested otherwise and approved the decision below.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether Ronnie Woodall's claim for underinsured motorist benefits against Travelers Indemnity was barred by the five-year statute of limitations for contract actions. The accident occurred in 1987, but the tortfeasor's $10,000 liability limits were not tendered until 1993, after which Woodall sought Travelers' approval to settle and then sued for the difference up to his $60,000 UM coverage. The Florida Supreme Court held that the cause of action accrued on the date of the accident under its prior Kilbreath precedent, so the suit was untimely, and that a policy exhaustion clause requiring settlement with the liability insurer first did not change the accrual date. The court reasoned that UM claims remain predicated on the underlying tort action against the underinsured driver rather than arising only upon breach of the insurance contract, and that the 1987 version of section 627.727(6) did not alter this rule.

torts & liabilityprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case Garcia v. Reyes involved minor children seeking to bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a police officer and city for loss of family companionship and support after their father was wrongfully imprisoned for 30 months due to an entrapment in a drug sting, with his conviction later reversed. The Florida Supreme Court answered the certified question in the negative, holding that the children do not have a cause of action under section 1983 for temporary deprivation of family association. The court's reasoning was that the U.S. Supreme Court has not recognized such a right under the Due Process Clause actionable via section 1983, most federal circuits do not permit family members to sue for injuries to another, and prior cases recognizing such claims involved permanent separations like death rather than temporary incarceration.

civil rightsfamily lawcriminal law

This case concerned a lawsuit by a terminally ill AIDS patient and his physician seeking to invalidate Florida's criminal prohibition on assisted suicide. The plaintiffs argued that the statute violated the state constitutional privacy right as well as federal due process and equal protection guarantees, and they requested an injunction allowing the doctor to provide lethal medication without prosecution. After a bench trial, the lower court ruled for the plaintiffs on privacy and equal protection grounds. The Florida Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the state's interests in preserving life and preventing potential abuse outweighed any asserted privacy interest and that no fundamental right to assisted suicide existed under either the state or federal constitutions.

criminal lawhealthcarecivil rights

The case concerned whether a dormitory and food service project for state universities, financed through certificates of participation and held under a lease with an option to purchase by a nonprofit corporation (SRH) created for that purpose, qualified for an ad valorem tax exemption. The Leon County Educational Facilities Authority, a public entity, sought the exemption after the property appraiser denied it in 1993, despite prior approval. The trial court and First District Court of Appeal ruled against the exemption, holding that legal title vested in SRH rather than the Authority under sections 196.192 and 196.199, Florida Statutes. The Florida Supreme Court reversed, determining that the Authority was the equitable owner because it held virtually all benefits and burdens of ownership, including responsibility for maintenance, insurance, taxes, and a nominal purchase option, and thus the project was exempt from taxation as government property used for public purposes. The court remanded for resolution of reserved issues and clarified that the 1988 statutory amendment did not preclude equitable owners from qualifying.

taxesproperty

The case concerned the constitutionality of section 316.193(6)(d), Florida Statutes (1993), a provision in the state's DUI statute that requires courts to order impoundment or immobilization of a convicted defendant's vehicle, subject to a family hardship exception. The trial court refused to apply the penalty after Raymond Muller pled no contest to DUI, and the district court of appeal affirmed, holding the statute unconstitutionally vague for lacking an enforcement mechanism and a definition of immobilization. The Florida Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the provision gives fair notice of the penalty upon conviction and that concerns over enforcement or the meaning of immobilization do not render it vague under traditional due process standards. The court also rejected claims that Muller had standing to challenge the statute on behalf of non-owner defendants or that it violated equal protection.

criminal law

The case concerned the admissibility of inculpatory statements made by Duane Owen during police interrogation in a first-degree murder prosecution. After Owen's initial conviction was reversed based on prior Florida precedent requiring officers to cease questioning upon an equivocal invocation of Miranda rights, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Davis v. United States. The Florida Supreme Court answered the certified question by holding that Davis applies in Florida, so that after a valid Miranda waiver, police need not stop or clarify when a suspect makes only an ambiguous or equivocal assertion of the right to counsel or the right to remain silent. The court reasoned that the bright-line rule announced in Davis extends by the same logic to equivocal invocations of the right to cut off questioning.

criminal law

The case involved James and Phyllis Tanner suing physicians and a medical center for negligence that caused the stillbirth of their child during the mother's forty-first week of pregnancy. The Florida Supreme Court recognized a cause of action for negligent stillbirth, allowing both parents to recover damages for emotional distress and mental anguish even without physical impact or injury to the mother. The court reasoned that Florida's wrongful death statute does not apply because a fetus is not a "person," but a direct common-law tort claim for the negligence causing the stillbirth is distinct and permits recovery limited to mental pain, anguish, and related medical expenses. The impact rule was held inapplicable to this narrow category of cases.

torts & liabilityhealthcare