Ben F. Overton

This case arose from a 1989 lawsuit by the Estate of A.P. Stuckey and related parties against Rupert and Lettie Brown over claims of intentional interference with business relationships, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress stemming from a 1981 partnership or joint venture to operate a thoroughbred horse farm. A jury awarded the plaintiffs both compensatory and punitive damages, but the trial judge granted the Browns' motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, citing issues such as possible jury misconduct, disregard of instructions, and awards inconsistent with the evidence presented. The First District Court of Appeal reversed the trial judge's order, applying a "substantial competent evidence" standard. The Florida Supreme Court quashed the district court's decision, holding that trial judges have broad discretion to grant new trials when they find a verdict contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence and that appellate courts must review such orders only for abuse of discretion rather than reweighing the evidence under a stricter standard, and it remanded the case for a new trial while clarifying the applicable principles from prior precedent.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved William Steele, who was convicted of first-degree murder and claimed his retained attorney Terrence Kehoe orally agreed to file a timely Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 postconviction motion but failed to do so, causing the motion to be time-barred. Steele sued Kehoe for legal malpractice after his pro se attempts at relief were rejected, but lower courts dismissed the suit on the ground that a plaintiff must first obtain exoneration by having the conviction or sentence reduced. The Florida Supreme Court rephrased the certified questions and held that a hearing is appropriate to determine whether a belated postconviction motion should be allowed when an attorney was retained but neglected to file timely, and that exoneration is a prerequisite to maintaining a malpractice action arising from a criminal conviction. The core reasoning was that due process requires a procedure analogous to belated appeals to address attorney neglect in postconviction filings, while standard malpractice elements demand proof that the attorney's negligence proximately caused the loss, which cannot be shown without first succeeding in overturning the conviction. The Court also amended rule 3.850(b) to add an exception for attorney neglect.

criminal lawproceduretorts & liability

In this case, the Florida Department of Transportation initiated an eminent domain proceeding to acquire property leased by Gus Boulis, resulting in a jury valuation higher than the initial deposit and litigation costs including expert fees. The trial court awarded some costs but denied prejudgment interest on them, and the district court affirmed based on prior precedent. The Florida Supreme Court held that prejudgment interest must be awarded on reasonable costs in eminent domain cases, but only from the date the costs were actually paid and after the trial court determines entitlement to those costs. The core reasoning was that the Florida Constitution's requirement of full compensation to make the property owner whole supports interest on out-of-pocket costs once they are liquidated, consistent with the loss theory of prejudgment interest and without violating sovereign immunity principles.

property

The case concerned Anthony Gregory, who was sentenced to 90 days in jail for civil contempt after failing to pay child support arrearages, despite unrefuted evidence that he had no assets, had only recently been released from prior incarceration for the same issue, and had just begun new employment. The Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction despite the case becoming moot upon Gregory's release, in order to address recurring procedural problems in child support enforcement contempt proceedings handled by hearing officers under Florida Family Law Rule 12.491. The court distinguished civil contempt (coercive and requiring a finding of present ability to purge) from criminal contempt (punitive and requiring due process protections), noted the absence of a proper ability-to-pay determination, and referenced its recent adoption of Rule 12.615 to clarify required procedures. The opinion vacated a prior dismissal and emphasized the need for accurate findings and judicial review in such cases.

family lawprocedurecriminal law

The case concerned whether changes to Florida's gain-time statutes, which awarded credits to alleviate prison overcrowding, could be applied retroactively to revoke such credits when an inmate's probation was revoked, without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause. Anthony Lancaster's offense occurred in 1987; he received overcrowding credits and was released early but later lost those credits upon resentencing after a 1994 probation violation, pursuant to prior Florida precedent. The Florida Supreme Court, on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court in light of Lynce v. Mathis, held that ex post facto principles apply to overcrowding gain time and that the date of the offense controls the applicable rules, requiring restoration of the credits. The court reasoned that U.S. Supreme Court precedent has rejected the view that such credits are purely administrative or unvested, distinguishing this from cases where relief was denied, and directed the state to apply the ruling to similarly situated inmates.

criminal law

This case involved consolidated habeas corpus petitions by five Florida inmates challenging the state's replacement of earlier prison overcrowding gain-time programs (such as Emergency Gain Time, Administrative Gain Time, and Provisional Credits) with the Control Release Program, which reduced the availability of credits that could advance their release dates. The Florida Supreme Court granted the petitions, holding that the substitution violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The court's reasoning rested on U.S. Supreme Court precedents in Weaver v. Graham and Lynce v. Mathis, which require that inmates receive the benefit of the gain-time statutes in effect at the time of their offenses; the later program's different administration and thresholds improperly curtailed those benefits. The decision distinguished the case from others where no such violation occurred.

criminal lawfederal power