Ben F. Overton

This case arose from a 1989 lawsuit by the Estate of A.P. Stuckey and related parties against Rupert and Lettie Brown over claims of intentional interference with business relationships, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress stemming from a 1981 partnership or joint venture to operate a thoroughbred horse farm. A jury awarded the plaintiffs both compensatory and punitive damages, but the trial judge granted the Browns' motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, citing issues such as possible jury misconduct, disregard of instructions, and awards inconsistent with the evidence presented. The First District Court of Appeal reversed the trial judge's order, applying a "substantial competent evidence" standard. The Florida Supreme Court quashed the district court's decision, holding that trial judges have broad discretion to grant new trials when they find a verdict contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence and that appellate courts must review such orders only for abuse of discretion rather than reweighing the evidence under a stricter standard, and it remanded the case for a new trial while clarifying the applicable principles from prior precedent.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved William Steele, who was convicted of first-degree murder and claimed his retained attorney Terrence Kehoe orally agreed to file a timely Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 postconviction motion but failed to do so, causing the motion to be time-barred. Steele sued Kehoe for legal malpractice after his pro se attempts at relief were rejected, but lower courts dismissed the suit on the ground that a plaintiff must first obtain exoneration by having the conviction or sentence reduced. The Florida Supreme Court rephrased the certified questions and held that a hearing is appropriate to determine whether a belated postconviction motion should be allowed when an attorney was retained but neglected to file timely, and that exoneration is a prerequisite to maintaining a malpractice action arising from a criminal conviction. The core reasoning was that due process requires a procedure analogous to belated appeals to address attorney neglect in postconviction filings, while standard malpractice elements demand proof that the attorney's negligence proximately caused the loss, which cannot be shown without first succeeding in overturning the conviction. The Court also amended rule 3.850(b) to add an exception for attorney neglect.

criminal lawproceduretorts & liability

In this case, the Florida Department of Transportation initiated an eminent domain proceeding to acquire property leased by Gus Boulis, resulting in a jury valuation higher than the initial deposit and litigation costs including expert fees. The trial court awarded some costs but denied prejudgment interest on them, and the district court affirmed based on prior precedent. The Florida Supreme Court held that prejudgment interest must be awarded on reasonable costs in eminent domain cases, but only from the date the costs were actually paid and after the trial court determines entitlement to those costs. The core reasoning was that the Florida Constitution's requirement of full compensation to make the property owner whole supports interest on out-of-pocket costs once they are liquidated, consistent with the loss theory of prejudgment interest and without violating sovereign immunity principles.

property

The case concerned Anthony Gregory, who was sentenced to 90 days in jail for civil contempt after failing to pay child support arrearages, despite unrefuted evidence that he had no assets, had only recently been released from prior incarceration for the same issue, and had just begun new employment. The Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction despite the case becoming moot upon Gregory's release, in order to address recurring procedural problems in child support enforcement contempt proceedings handled by hearing officers under Florida Family Law Rule 12.491. The court distinguished civil contempt (coercive and requiring a finding of present ability to purge) from criminal contempt (punitive and requiring due process protections), noted the absence of a proper ability-to-pay determination, and referenced its recent adoption of Rule 12.615 to clarify required procedures. The opinion vacated a prior dismissal and emphasized the need for accurate findings and judicial review in such cases.

family lawprocedurecriminal law

The case concerned whether changes to Florida's gain-time statutes, which awarded credits to alleviate prison overcrowding, could be applied retroactively to revoke such credits when an inmate's probation was revoked, without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause. Anthony Lancaster's offense occurred in 1987; he received overcrowding credits and was released early but later lost those credits upon resentencing after a 1994 probation violation, pursuant to prior Florida precedent. The Florida Supreme Court, on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court in light of Lynce v. Mathis, held that ex post facto principles apply to overcrowding gain time and that the date of the offense controls the applicable rules, requiring restoration of the credits. The court reasoned that U.S. Supreme Court precedent has rejected the view that such credits are purely administrative or unvested, distinguishing this from cases where relief was denied, and directed the state to apply the ruling to similarly situated inmates.

criminal law

This case involved consolidated habeas corpus petitions by five Florida inmates challenging the state's replacement of earlier prison overcrowding gain-time programs (such as Emergency Gain Time, Administrative Gain Time, and Provisional Credits) with the Control Release Program, which reduced the availability of credits that could advance their release dates. The Florida Supreme Court granted the petitions, holding that the substitution violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The court's reasoning rested on U.S. Supreme Court precedents in Weaver v. Graham and Lynce v. Mathis, which require that inmates receive the benefit of the gain-time statutes in effect at the time of their offenses; the later program's different administration and thresholds improperly curtailed those benefits. The decision distinguished the case from others where no such violation occurred.

criminal lawfederal power

Vincent Faustino Rivera, an inmate serving a life sentence for two murders committed in 1990, petitioned the Florida Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus seeking to challenge the dismissal of an appeal in the First District Court of Appeal. The court denied the petition as procedurally barred because it attempted to relitigate issues that could have been or were raised on direct appeal or in prior postconviction proceedings. The court noted that Rivera had filed at least twenty prior petitions in the court, along with additional filings in other courts, most of which were repetitive challenges to his convictions, sentences, or disciplinary actions. The court reasoned that its resources are finite and must be reserved for genuine disputes, that extraordinary writs are reserved for extraordinary causes, and that Rivera's continuous frivolous filings had substantially interfered with the orderly process of judicial administration. Accordingly, the court exercised its inherent authority to bar Rivera from any future filings concerning issues that should have been or were raised on appeal or in prior postconviction proceedings and that do not clearly invoke the court's exclusive jurisdiction.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved the Florida Supreme Court's review of petitions from the Family Law Rules Committee and Family Court Steering Committee to revise and clarify amendments to the Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure and forms, following the court's prior 1998 opinion. The court approved modifications to Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 10-2.1 to exempt nonlawyer disclosure requirements on domestic violence petition forms and restated Florida Family Law Rule 12.170 to explicitly cover both counterclaims and crossclaims. It rejected requests to allow routine sealing of financial affidavits in family law cases under Rules 12.280 and 12.400, holding that such a policy would violate the strong presumption of public access to court records established in precedent like Barron v. Florida Freedom Newspapers, Inc., and article I, section 24 of the Florida Constitution. The decision emphasized that family law proceedings receive no special exemption from openness requirements absent legislative action, while also updating various forms for clarification.

family lawprocedure

The case concerned whether a qualified reporter's privilege in Florida protects a journalist from being deposed about nonconfidential information gathered by interviewing the victim in a criminal prosecution arising from a domestic violence incident and car collision. The Second District Court of Appeal had ruled that the privilege applies only when confidential sources are involved and thus allowed the defendant to depose the reporter. The Florida Supreme Court held that the privilege extends to both confidential and nonconfidential information but must be weighed against the defendant's rights to compulsory process and due process through a balancing test; under that test the privilege did not bar disclosure here, rendering any error harmless.

criminal lawfree speechprocedure

The case concerned Morris Communications Corporation's attempt to quash a subpoena duces tecum seeking nonconfidential information from one of its reporters in an underlying civil proceeding. The Florida Supreme Court reviewed a district court decision that had denied the motion based on the absence of a reporter's privilege for nonconfidential sources. Relying on its simultaneous holding in State v. Davis, the court determined that a qualified reporter's privilege exists in Florida and extends to both confidential and nonconfidential information obtained during a reporter's work. The privilege is subject to a three-prong balancing test assessing relevance of the information, availability from alternative sources, and the movant's compelling need, though it does not protect eyewitness observations of crimes. The court answered the certified question in the affirmative, clarified that the privilege applies in civil proceedings, quashed the district court's decision, and remanded for reconsideration of the motion under the Davis standard.

free speechprocedure

This case concerned whether a Florida district court could review a trial court's nonfinal order denying the Department of Corrections' motion for summary judgment based on workers' compensation immunity. The Florida Supreme Court held that such nonfinal orders are not appealable under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130 unless the trial court order specifically states that the immunity defense is unavailable as a matter of law. The reasoning relied on the precedent in Hastings v. Demming, which established this requirement, and since the order here lacked such a statement, the district court properly dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

procedurelabor & employment

This case involved a dispute over which state court—Florida or Virginia—should exercise jurisdiction in a child custody matter after a Massachusetts divorce, where the mother had moved to Florida with the children and the father to Virginia. The Florida Supreme Court considered whether an evidentiary hearing is required before a Florida judge can determine that a sister state's custody proceeding conforms with the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and thereby precludes Florida jurisdiction, as well as rules governing communications between judges in different states. The court decided that holding an evidentiary hearing is a discretionary matter for the trial judge, but prospectively required that parties be allowed to participate in any inter-state judicial communications and that the judge make specific findings on the jurisdictional basis. Because the petitioner had fully participated in the Virginia proceedings, the court concluded the Florida trial judge properly dismissed the Florida petition and approved the result reached by the district court of appeal.

family lawprocedure

The case concerned whether a trial court has jurisdiction to rule on the merits of a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion for postconviction relief while the defendant's direct appeal from the underlying conviction is still pending. The Florida Supreme Court held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to decide the motion and that the district court's subsequent affirmance of that ruling on the merits was likewise a nullity. The court reached this conclusion by applying its prior decisions in State v. Meneses and Hall v. State, which establish that a trial court cannot address postconviction motions during the pendency of a direct appeal. It therefore quashed the district court's decision and directed that the trial court's order be vacated, while allowing the defendant to refile the motion after the direct appeal concludes without triggering the rule's bar on successive motions.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned whether Florida's Capital Collateral Regional Counsel (CCRC) offices had statutory authority to represent death row inmates in federal civil rights lawsuits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging the method of execution, such as the functioning of the electric chair. The Florida Supreme Court held that CCRC's role is strictly limited to collateral actions attacking the validity of a conviction or sentence, such as habeas corpus or motions under Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.850, 3.851, and 3.852. The court based its decision on the plain language of sections 27.702 and 27.7001, Florida Statutes, which specify that CCRC representation is for the sole purpose of challenging the legality of the judgment and sentence and explicitly excludes civil litigation. Although the underlying federal lawsuit had already been resolved in the state's favor, the court addressed the issue due to its public importance and potential to recur.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

In this case, prisoner James J. Quigley filed a declaratory judgment action in circuit court challenging the constitutionality of a Florida law on court costs for indigent prisoners and later sought to appeal its dismissal while proceeding in forma pauperis. The district court transferred his indigency motions to the circuit court, which denied them for failing to meet statutory affidavit requirements, leading to dismissal of the appeal for nonpayment of fees. Quigley then petitioned the Florida Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to reinstate the appeal and grant pauper status. The Supreme Court transferred the matter back to the First District Court of Appeal, holding that Quigley's second motion should have been treated as a review request under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.430 and that Rule 9.040(c) requires courts to address the proper remedy when an improper one is sought.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved J.B., a juvenile charged with underage possession of alcohol after an officer observed two bottles discarded from the vehicle he was driving and J.B. admitted possessing "beer" following Miranda warnings; the bottles themselves were later discarded, leading to suppression of evidence about their contents at trial. J.B. was found guilty based on his admission despite the lack of independent proof that the substance was alcoholic, and on appeal he argued that the absence of corpus delicti evidence rendered the conviction invalid. The Florida Supreme Court held that the corpus delicti issue must be raised via contemporaneous objection at trial to be preserved for appeal and does not constitute fundamental error that can be raised for the first time on appeal. The court reaffirmed the requirement of independent corpus delicti for admissions but concluded that its absence here did not deny due process, approving the district court's affirmance and disapproving conflicting precedent.

criminal lawprocedure

In Crosby v. Jones, clients sued their former attorney for legal malpractice after he advised them to settle with and dismiss claims against certain defendants in an auto accident case, which resulted in the loss of their claims against a remaining passive tortfeasor under then-existing precedent. The trial court granted summary judgment to the attorney on grounds of judgmental immunity, but the district court reversed, holding that a jury should decide whether the attorney exercised reasonable judgment in an unsettled area of law. The Florida Supreme Court quashed the district court's decision, ruling that the attorney's actions were supported by legal justification and case law in his district at the time, so the issue was properly resolved as a matter of law rather than fact, and there was no duty to advise clients of conflicting precedent under these circumstances.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved William Henry Lowrey's conviction for carrying a concealed firearm, which he appealed on the basis that one juror had been under criminal prosecution by the same state attorney's office at the time of trial but failed to disclose it during voir dire. The Florida Supreme Court reviewed a certified question from the First District Court of Appeal regarding whether a defendant must prove actual harm from such a juror's service to obtain a new trial. The court held that inherent prejudice is presumed in these circumstances, so the defendant is entitled to a new trial without demonstrating actual bias or harm, and it distinguished this from prior precedent involving other statutory disqualifications. The reasoning centered on the statutory bar against jurors under prosecution, the risk of perceived or actual favoritism toward the prosecuting office, and the need to ensure a jury composed of statutorily qualified members.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether attorney's fees and costs awarded against a surety on a guardianship bond under section 627.428 could exceed the bond's face amount when the surety delayed payment after the original guardian misappropriated funds from minors. The trial court granted summary judgment for the bond principal plus interest and later awarded additional fees and costs exceeding the $66,000 bond limit, finding the delay unreasonable; the First District reversed on the excess amount, citing section 744.357's limit that a surety not be charged beyond the ward's property. The Florida Supreme Court held that sureties qualify as insurers under the statute, that section 627.428 authorizes fees against them, and that such fees may exceed the bond when caused by the surety's own unreasonable delay rather than the principal's misconduct. It answered the certified question in the affirmative, quashed the district court's limitation, and remanded to reinstate the trial court's award.

business & regulatoryprocedure

Ervin McCray filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus claiming ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in his 1980 first-degree murder conviction, for which his death sentence had been reduced to life imprisonment in 1982. The Florida Supreme Court denied the petition as barred by the doctrine of laches. The court reasoned that the fifteen-year delay was unreasonable with no justification offered by the petitioner, and that such delays inherently prejudice the state through lost records, faded memories, and unavailable witnesses. It created a presumption that habeas petitions alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel filed more than five years after the conviction becomes final are barred unless the petitioner alleges under oath that counsel affirmatively misled him about the appeal results.

criminal lawprocedure