Alan C. Sundberg

In G.E.G. v. State, a juvenile petitioner challenged his delinquency adjudication for unlawful possession of less than five grams of cannabis after officers seized a plastic bag of a brown substance from him, conducted a field test indicating it was marijuana, and presented chain-of-custody testimony plus a chemist's confirmation at the adjudicatory hearing, but the state never offered the substance itself into evidence. The Florida Supreme Court resolved a conflict among district courts by holding that the controlled substance, if available, must be introduced in a possession case, yet a defendant who fails to object to its nonintroduction cannot raise the omission on appeal. The core reasoning invoked the spirit of the best-evidence principle to avoid prosecutorial gamesmanship that could thwart defense objections to chain of custody and to prevent forcing the defendant to introduce the item himself to challenge its authenticity.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned a high school student who suffered permanent paralysis from injuries during an unsupervised hazing ceremony conducted by a school-sanctioned club, leading his father and him to sue the school board, principal, and faculty adviser for negligence in failing to monitor the club's activities or enforce supervision rules. The trial court had dismissed the complaint, but the district court reversed, holding that 1980 amendments to Florida's sovereign immunity statute were unconstitutional because they retroactively eliminated the plaintiffs' vested rights to sue individual employees and that the facts stated claims for ordinary negligence against all defendants plus willful negligence against the individuals. On review, the Florida Supreme Court agreed that the amendments could not constitutionally apply retroactively to bar the suits and that a duty to supervise existed under the circumstances, but it rejected the willful negligence claim against the employees and clarified limits on school officials' liability for student activities.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co., Inc., the petitioners sued Kee, Inc., the successor company, for injuries caused by a defective lawn mower manufactured in 1967 by its predecessor business, claiming negligence, implied warranty, and strict liability. The Florida Supreme Court held that Kee, Inc. was not liable for the predecessor's products under the traditional corporate law rule governing asset purchases. The court reasoned that successor liability arises only in limited circumstances such as express assumption of liabilities, de facto merger, mere continuation, or fraud, and it declined to adopt a broader "product-line" exception used in a few other jurisdictions. It emphasized countervailing policy concerns, including the risk of economic harm to small businesses from expanded liability for prior defects.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

The case concerned whether Florida law allows a tort claim for interference with an inheritance expectancy after a will has been probated. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants used undue influence to procure a will favoring themselves over an earlier will that benefited the plaintiffs, but the plaintiffs had filed and then voluntarily dismissed a probate revocation petition and accepted benefits under the probated will. The Florida Supreme Court answered the certified question in the affirmative, holding that section 733.103(2), Florida Statutes, makes the probate decree conclusive on issues of execution, capacity, fraud, duress, and undue influence. Because the plaintiffs had notice and an opportunity to litigate those issues in probate but chose not to, they could not relitigate them in a later collateral tort action. The court reasoned that when probate provides an adequate remedy, that avenue must be pursued first, consistent with the majority rule in other jurisdictions.

torts & liabilitypropertyprocedure

The case concerned whether the Fifth District Court of Appeal could invoke Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.331(c) to conduct an en banc rehearing and reverse its own prior decision in an insurance coverage dispute after the court's term had expired. State Farm sought mandamus relief from the Florida Supreme Court to vacate the later judgment on grounds that the district court lacked jurisdiction. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that the en banc rule is a procedural mechanism rather than a jurisdictional grant and does not override the longstanding common-law principle that an appellate court's authority to recall or alter its mandate ends with the term in which the mandate issued. This limit exists to promote finality in litigation. The court therefore directed the district court to vacate its post-term judgment and reinstate its original decision.

procedure

The case involved a disciplinary action by The Florida Bar against attorney Barry D. Schreiber for sending a direct mail letter to a potential client offering his services in immigration and naturalization matters, which the Bar charged as prohibited solicitation under the Code of Professional Responsibility. The referee dismissed the charges, finding the conduct to be protected commercial speech under the First Amendment. On review, the Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding that the state's interests in regulating attorney professional conduct prevail over the attorney's right to engage in such mail solicitation. The court reasoned that this form of commercial speech, driven by pecuniary self-interest without any political or associational elements, receives limited constitutional protection and can be restricted, unlike the altruistic solicitations allowed in cases such as In re Primus.

free speechbusiness & regulatory