Alan C. Sundberg

In G.E.G. v. State, a juvenile petitioner challenged his delinquency adjudication for unlawful possession of less than five grams of cannabis after officers seized a plastic bag of a brown substance from him, conducted a field test indicating it was marijuana, and presented chain-of-custody testimony plus a chemist's confirmation at the adjudicatory hearing, but the state never offered the substance itself into evidence. The Florida Supreme Court resolved a conflict among district courts by holding that the controlled substance, if available, must be introduced in a possession case, yet a defendant who fails to object to its nonintroduction cannot raise the omission on appeal. The core reasoning invoked the spirit of the best-evidence principle to avoid prosecutorial gamesmanship that could thwart defense objections to chain of custody and to prevent forcing the defendant to introduce the item himself to challenge its authenticity.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned a high school student who suffered permanent paralysis from injuries during an unsupervised hazing ceremony conducted by a school-sanctioned club, leading his father and him to sue the school board, principal, and faculty adviser for negligence in failing to monitor the club's activities or enforce supervision rules. The trial court had dismissed the complaint, but the district court reversed, holding that 1980 amendments to Florida's sovereign immunity statute were unconstitutional because they retroactively eliminated the plaintiffs' vested rights to sue individual employees and that the facts stated claims for ordinary negligence against all defendants plus willful negligence against the individuals. On review, the Florida Supreme Court agreed that the amendments could not constitutionally apply retroactively to bar the suits and that a duty to supervise existed under the circumstances, but it rejected the willful negligence claim against the employees and clarified limits on school officials' liability for student activities.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co., Inc., the petitioners sued Kee, Inc., the successor company, for injuries caused by a defective lawn mower manufactured in 1967 by its predecessor business, claiming negligence, implied warranty, and strict liability. The Florida Supreme Court held that Kee, Inc. was not liable for the predecessor's products under the traditional corporate law rule governing asset purchases. The court reasoned that successor liability arises only in limited circumstances such as express assumption of liabilities, de facto merger, mere continuation, or fraud, and it declined to adopt a broader "product-line" exception used in a few other jurisdictions. It emphasized countervailing policy concerns, including the risk of economic harm to small businesses from expanded liability for prior defects.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

The case concerned whether Florida law allows a tort claim for interference with an inheritance expectancy after a will has been probated. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants used undue influence to procure a will favoring themselves over an earlier will that benefited the plaintiffs, but the plaintiffs had filed and then voluntarily dismissed a probate revocation petition and accepted benefits under the probated will. The Florida Supreme Court answered the certified question in the affirmative, holding that section 733.103(2), Florida Statutes, makes the probate decree conclusive on issues of execution, capacity, fraud, duress, and undue influence. Because the plaintiffs had notice and an opportunity to litigate those issues in probate but chose not to, they could not relitigate them in a later collateral tort action. The court reasoned that when probate provides an adequate remedy, that avenue must be pursued first, consistent with the majority rule in other jurisdictions.

torts & liabilitypropertyprocedure

The case concerned whether the Fifth District Court of Appeal could invoke Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.331(c) to conduct an en banc rehearing and reverse its own prior decision in an insurance coverage dispute after the court's term had expired. State Farm sought mandamus relief from the Florida Supreme Court to vacate the later judgment on grounds that the district court lacked jurisdiction. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that the en banc rule is a procedural mechanism rather than a jurisdictional grant and does not override the longstanding common-law principle that an appellate court's authority to recall or alter its mandate ends with the term in which the mandate issued. This limit exists to promote finality in litigation. The court therefore directed the district court to vacate its post-term judgment and reinstate its original decision.

procedure

The case involved a disciplinary action by The Florida Bar against attorney Barry D. Schreiber for sending a direct mail letter to a potential client offering his services in immigration and naturalization matters, which the Bar charged as prohibited solicitation under the Code of Professional Responsibility. The referee dismissed the charges, finding the conduct to be protected commercial speech under the First Amendment. On review, the Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding that the state's interests in regulating attorney professional conduct prevail over the attorney's right to engage in such mail solicitation. The court reasoned that this form of commercial speech, driven by pecuniary self-interest without any political or associational elements, receives limited constitutional protection and can be restricted, unlike the altruistic solicitations allowed in cases such as In re Primus.

free speechbusiness & regulatory

The case concerned the validation of industrial development revenue bonds issued by the Volusia County Industrial Development Authority to finance the purchase and expansion of an existing for-profit nursing home facility, which would then be sold to and operated by a private limited partnership. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's validation order. The court held that the project served a paramount public purpose with only incidental private benefits, consistent with its recent precedent in State v. Leon County, and thus did not violate article VII, section 10 of the Florida Constitution. It further ruled that the 1980 statutory amendment expanding the definition of "project" to include investor-owned health care facilities satisfied the single-subject and title requirements of article III, section 6, and that the mortgage securing the bonds did not improperly pledge public credit because repayment rested solely on the private operator and facility.

business & regulatoryhealthcaretaxes

In State v. Leon County, the Florida Supreme Court reviewed a circuit court's order validating Leon County's issuance of $2 million in revenue bonds to finance construction of a for-profit nursing home under the Florida Industrial Development Financing Act. The court affirmed the validation, concluding that the project was constitutionally permissible even if it did not qualify as an industrial or manufacturing plant. The core reasoning was that the bonds did not pledge state or county credit and served a paramount public purpose, as supported by legislative findings on the importance of health care facilities to the economy and welfare of citizens, along with prior precedent recognizing the public benefits of such facilities.

business & regulatoryhealthcare

The case concerned whether a prisoner incarcerated as a special condition of probation under Florida statutes was eligible for parole consideration under section 947.16(1). The Florida Supreme Court held that incarceration imposed as a condition of probation does not constitute a sentence, so the Parole and Probation Commission has no duty to consider the prisoner for parole. The court further ruled that such a condition of probation may not exceed one year of confinement. This construction was adopted to maintain the statutory distinction between probation and sentencing, prevent judicial encroachment on parole authority, and avoid constitutional issues regarding separation of powers and equal protection. The decision revisited and clarified prior precedent on split-sentence probation alternatives.

criminal law

This case involved disciplinary proceedings brought by the Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission against Circuit Judge Dick C.P. Lantz for multiple violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The judge pled guilty or no contest to six categories of misconduct, including repeated displays of arrogance toward litigants and attorneys, creating an appearance of impropriety by contacting a litigant, making comments in court that cast doubt on judicial impartiality, soliciting election support from an attorney, improperly retaining court reporter notes, and awarding excessive fees to a personal friend. The Commission recommended a public reprimand along with orders for cost reimbursement, recusal from certain matters, and restrictions on future appointments. The Florida Supreme Court approved the recommendation in full, issuing the reprimand through its opinion and directing compliance with the additional terms. The decision rested on the judge's admissions, the negotiated proposal accepted by the Commission, and the record presented, despite noted inconsistencies with prior cases involving similar misconduct.

procedure

This case involved a challenge by unsuccessful candidate Bill Flynn to the election of Scott McPherson as State Representative for District 117, alleging that McPherson had filed a false candidate oath because he was not a resident or qualified elector of the district. Flynn sued in circuit court under Florida's election contest statutes (sections 102.168 and 102.1682) seeking to oust McPherson and have himself declared the winner. The Florida Supreme Court held that the judiciary lacks jurisdiction to determine a person's qualifications to hold legislative office after election and seating. The core reasoning was that article III, section 2 of the Florida Constitution expressly makes each house of the legislature the sole judge of its members' qualifications, elections, and returns, consistent with separation of powers principles and precedents holding that such matters are political questions outside judicial authority.

elections

The case involved Peoples Bank of Indian River County's appeal of the Florida Department of Banking and Finance's denial of its application for a new bank charter under chapter 659, Florida Statutes, based on failure to meet statutory criteria for public convenience and local conditions supporting successful operation. The bank challenged the constitutionality of section 659.03 as an improper delegation of legislative authority and section 120.60(3) as violating due process and equal protection by requiring a hearing request within 21 days of notice publication, while also alleging improper agency consideration of evidence without rebuttal opportunity. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the district court's upholding of the agency denial, holding that the statutes contained adequate standards, provided reasonable notice and hearing opportunities, and did not deny constitutional rights even if official notice of certain materials occurred, as long as parties had some chance for rebuttal. The court rejected the delegation and constitutional claims by reference to prior precedent and affirmed the decision.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved appellants who applied in 1974 to organize a state bank on Big Pine Key, Florida; after resubmitting the application under updated procedures, the Department of Banking and Finance denied the charter in 1977 following a field investigation. Appellants challenged the denial via certiorari, arguing that subsections 659.03(1)(b) and (c), Florida Statutes (1977), unconstitutionally delegated legislative power without sufficient standards and that the evaluation process violated due process. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision upholding the agency action, ruling that the full statutory scheme in section 659.03, when subsections (1) and (2) are read together, supplies adequate legislative guidelines for the Department's investigations and discretionary approvals or denials. The Court concluded that the Department implements rather than makes law, distinguishing the provisions from the invalid statute in Dickinson v. State.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a Florida real estate developer that borrowed funds from a Massachusetts business trust under a loan agreement containing a choice-of-law clause selecting Massachusetts law, which does not penalize the interest rate charged. After default and settlement, the borrower later sued claiming the loan violated Florida usury statutes, and lower courts applied Florida law to award penalties. The Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding that the contractual choice of Massachusetts law controlled. The court reasoned that in an interstate commercial loan with contacts in multiple states, a choice-of-law provision is enforceable if the selected jurisdiction has a normal relationship to the transaction, which Massachusetts satisfied through the lender's organization, office, and performance of the contract there.

business & regulatory

In Grant v. State, the petitioner challenged his convictions for false imprisonment, sexual battery, and robbery arising from the abduction, rape, and robbery of a victim in 1975. The Florida Supreme Court reviewed claims regarding the validity of a search warrant, improper comments on the defendant's failure to testify, the admissibility of out-of-court identifications from photographic and physical lineups plus a showup, and the adequacy of the charging document for false imprisonment. The court affirmed the sexual battery and robbery convictions, holding that the identification procedures were not unnecessarily suggestive and met reliability standards under federal precedent, while reversing the false imprisonment conviction because the information did not specifically allege an intent to secretly confine as required by longstanding Florida case law. The matter was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a constitutional challenge to Florida's Law Enforcement Funds Act, which requires organizations and professional solicitors seeking contributions on behalf of law enforcement personnel to register with the Department of State, post a bond, disclose information, and follow rules against misleading practices. Appellants, law enforcement associations and fundraisers, argued the act violated equal protection by targeting only law enforcement solicitations, imposed an unlawful prior restraint on speech, and interfered with their right to conduct business without due process. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision upholding the act's core provisions while striking down two subsections that capped professional solicitors' fees and organizations' fundraising costs at 25 percent of gross contributions. The court reasoned that the legislature could regulate one category of perceived abuses at a time without violating equal protection, as the distinctions were based on practical differences and opportunities for abuse, and the registration and conduct requirements did not unconstitutionally burden speech or business rights.

business & regulatoryfree speechcivil rights

In Kendrick v. Everheart, a putative father who had custody of five children born out of wedlock filed suit seeking a judicial determination of his paternity, amendment of the children's birth certificates, custody, and support from the mother, while also challenging the constitutionality of section 742.011, Florida Statutes, which permits only unmarried women to bring paternity actions. The trial court dismissed the action on the pleadings, ruling that the statute's purpose is to allow mothers to obtain support from fathers rather than to enable putative fathers to establish paternity, that declaratory relief under chapter 86 was unavailable, and that the statute did not violate equal protection or access to courts. On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court addressed whether men and women are similarly situated for equal protection purposes under the statute, the availability of alternative declaratory judgment relief to adjudicate paternity, and the need to consider the best interests of the children in any such proceeding.

family lawcivil rights

This case involved a boundary dispute between neighboring property owners, the Marshalls and the Johnsons, stemming from ambiguous deed descriptions from their common grantor regarding division of shoreline property. The trial court ruled in favor of the Marshalls by establishing a boundary line based on the evidence presented, but the district court reversed after re-evaluating the parol evidence. The Florida Supreme Court quashed the district court's decision, reasoning that appellate courts may not substitute their judgment for that of the trial court when competent evidence supports the trial court's findings, and substantial evidence existed to uphold the original judgment.

property

The case concerned a challenge by several municipal utilities to orders of the Florida Public Service Commission approving a natural gas utility's application to issue promissory notes and stock. The proceeds were to fund the purchase of distribution properties from another gas company, which would facilitate a merger between that company and a third entity. The Supreme Court of Florida denied the petition for review, holding that the Commission was not required to consider the desirability of the unrelated merger in the securities proceeding and could properly reserve rate-valuation and cost issues for a later ratemaking case. The Court explained that the Commission's statutory jurisdiction over utility securities issuances is limited and does not extend to influencing mergers over which it lacks authority.

business & regulatory

The case concerned whether the withdrawal of the sole Republican candidate for a Florida House seat after the close of qualifying but before the primary created a 'vacancy in nomination' under section 100.111(3)(a), Florida Statutes, requiring the Governor to call a special primary election. The Republican State Executive Committee petitioned for a writ of mandamus to compel Governor Graham to do so, while the Governor maintained that no vacancy could arise until after the first primary. The Florida Supreme Court granted the petition and held that a vacancy had occurred. It reasoned that section 101.252(1) automatically nominates an unopposed candidate at the close of qualifying, so the subsequent withdrawal triggered the statutory duty to call a special election, consistent with the policy of maximizing voter choice.

elections