Richard Bell

The case involved a medical malpractice lawsuit filed in 1991 by the guardian of Carl Hall, who had suffered brain damage and become comatose after treatment at Douglas General Hospital in March 1986, against the physicians and their professional corporations. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that the action was barred by the statute of limitations in OCGA § 9-3-73(b), but the trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed, holding that the suit was time-barred. The court reasoned that the 1987 amendment to § 9-3-73 eliminated tolling of the two-year medical malpractice limitations period for persons legally incompetent because of mental retardation or mental illness (with a five-year outside limit), that the amendment required any such action to be filed by July 1, 1989, and that Hall's traumatic brain injury did not qualify for tolling under the statute's specific terms or preexisting common-law rules.

procedurehealthcaretorts & liability

Vance Berry appealed his convictions for malice murder and armed robbery after the trial court denied his motion for a new trial. Berry argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdicts, that the state violated Batson v. Kentucky by using nine of ten peremptory strikes against black jurors, that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, and that the trial court erred by refusing a requested charge on circumstantial evidence. The court held the evidence was sufficient under the Jackson v. Virginia standard, that the ineffective-assistance claim was not properly presented, and that the jury charge was adequately covered by the instructions given. On the Batson claim, the court found a prima facie inference of discrimination because the state used nearly all its strikes to remove black jurors and therefore remanded the case for a hearing on whether the strikes were race-neutral. The convictions were affirmed, with the case remanded only for further proceedings on the jury-selection issue.

criminal lawcivil rights

The case involved a construction company's lawsuit against the Georgia Department of Transportation seeking disclosure of the agency's Engineer's Cost Estimate documents under the Open Records Act after a payment dispute on a bridge project. The trial court granted summary judgment to the DOT, ruling that the documents were exempt from disclosure as secrets of state under OCGA §§ 24-9-21(4) and 24-9-27(d). The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed, holding that these privilege statutes do not create exemptions from the Open Records Act for public records like the cost estimates, as they are intended for matters such as national security or specific confidential inmate and parole information rather than routine agency bidding materials. The court emphasized that the Act requires broad disclosure of public records unless a specific statutory exemption applies, and no such exemption covered the ECE here.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case concerned whether shares of stock in a closely-held corporation qualified as a 'security' under the Georgia Securities Act of 1973 and federal securities laws, thereby triggering related claims. The trial court granted partial summary judgment dismissing the securities claims, and the Court of Appeals affirmed on the grounds that the stock failed both the statutory definition and the economic reality test. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the stock met the statutory definitions because it bore the usual characteristics of stock under the stock characterization test from Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth. The court explained that typical restrictions on negotiability in closely-held corporations and the unregistered status of the shares do not negate their character as securities, and that the economic reality test applies only if the stock characterization test is not met.

business & regulatory

This case involved a dispute in a divorce action over whether the parties had reached an enforceable settlement agreement, which was orally announced in court by counsel but later disputed when one party refused to sign a written revision containing additional terms. The trial court granted a motion to enforce the settlement by incorporating the written revision into the final divorce decree after limiting cross-examination and evidence at the hearing. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed, holding that the trial court erred by terminating the hearing before allowing full cross-examination of former counsel, presentation of evidence and argument, and by adopting a document that differed from the terms announced in court rather than the purported agreement itself. The court also noted that an estoppel argument had not been raised below and remanded for further proceedings to determine if a settlement existed and its terms.

family lawprocedure

In Davis v. Findley, the plaintiff sued his former attorney alleging legal malpractice on the ground that the attorney charged an excessive fee for handling a mobile home park sale, in violation of the Georgia Code of Professional Conduct. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, but the Court of Appeals reversed in part, finding a jury question existed on whether the alleged ethical violation could support a malpractice claim despite a valid fee contract. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court's judgment, concluding that a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility standing alone cannot establish a civil cause of action for damages. The court reasoned that the Code provides only for disciplinary sanctions by the State Bar and does not create private remedies or civil liability for clients.

torts & liability