Richard Bell

The case involved a medical malpractice lawsuit filed in 1991 by the guardian of Carl Hall, who had suffered brain damage and become comatose after treatment at Douglas General Hospital in March 1986, against the physicians and their professional corporations. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that the action was barred by the statute of limitations in OCGA § 9-3-73(b), but the trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed, holding that the suit was time-barred. The court reasoned that the 1987 amendment to § 9-3-73 eliminated tolling of the two-year medical malpractice limitations period for persons legally incompetent because of mental retardation or mental illness (with a five-year outside limit), that the amendment required any such action to be filed by July 1, 1989, and that Hall's traumatic brain injury did not qualify for tolling under the statute's specific terms or preexisting common-law rules.

procedurehealthcaretorts & liability

Vance Berry appealed his convictions for malice murder and armed robbery after the trial court denied his motion for a new trial. Berry argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdicts, that the state violated Batson v. Kentucky by using nine of ten peremptory strikes against black jurors, that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, and that the trial court erred by refusing a requested charge on circumstantial evidence. The court held the evidence was sufficient under the Jackson v. Virginia standard, that the ineffective-assistance claim was not properly presented, and that the jury charge was adequately covered by the instructions given. On the Batson claim, the court found a prima facie inference of discrimination because the state used nearly all its strikes to remove black jurors and therefore remanded the case for a hearing on whether the strikes were race-neutral. The convictions were affirmed, with the case remanded only for further proceedings on the jury-selection issue.

criminal lawcivil rights

The case involved a construction company's lawsuit against the Georgia Department of Transportation seeking disclosure of the agency's Engineer's Cost Estimate documents under the Open Records Act after a payment dispute on a bridge project. The trial court granted summary judgment to the DOT, ruling that the documents were exempt from disclosure as secrets of state under OCGA §§ 24-9-21(4) and 24-9-27(d). The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed, holding that these privilege statutes do not create exemptions from the Open Records Act for public records like the cost estimates, as they are intended for matters such as national security or specific confidential inmate and parole information rather than routine agency bidding materials. The court emphasized that the Act requires broad disclosure of public records unless a specific statutory exemption applies, and no such exemption covered the ECE here.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case concerned whether shares of stock in a closely-held corporation qualified as a 'security' under the Georgia Securities Act of 1973 and federal securities laws, thereby triggering related claims. The trial court granted partial summary judgment dismissing the securities claims, and the Court of Appeals affirmed on the grounds that the stock failed both the statutory definition and the economic reality test. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the stock met the statutory definitions because it bore the usual characteristics of stock under the stock characterization test from Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth. The court explained that typical restrictions on negotiability in closely-held corporations and the unregistered status of the shares do not negate their character as securities, and that the economic reality test applies only if the stock characterization test is not met.

business & regulatory

This case involved a dispute in a divorce action over whether the parties had reached an enforceable settlement agreement, which was orally announced in court by counsel but later disputed when one party refused to sign a written revision containing additional terms. The trial court granted a motion to enforce the settlement by incorporating the written revision into the final divorce decree after limiting cross-examination and evidence at the hearing. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed, holding that the trial court erred by terminating the hearing before allowing full cross-examination of former counsel, presentation of evidence and argument, and by adopting a document that differed from the terms announced in court rather than the purported agreement itself. The court also noted that an estoppel argument had not been raised below and remanded for further proceedings to determine if a settlement existed and its terms.

family lawprocedure

In Davis v. Findley, the plaintiff sued his former attorney alleging legal malpractice on the ground that the attorney charged an excessive fee for handling a mobile home park sale, in violation of the Georgia Code of Professional Conduct. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, but the Court of Appeals reversed in part, finding a jury question existed on whether the alleged ethical violation could support a malpractice claim despite a valid fee contract. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court's judgment, concluding that a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility standing alone cannot establish a civil cause of action for damages. The court reasoned that the Code provides only for disciplinary sanctions by the State Bar and does not create private remedies or civil liability for clients.

torts & liability

The case concerned a medical malpractice claim brought on behalf of Krista Smith, who allegedly suffered brain damage at birth in 1981; the plaintiffs argued that OCGA § 9-3-73(b) unconstitutionally shortened the statute of limitations for minors in medical malpractice cases, violating equal protection under the U.S. and Georgia Constitutions by treating such claims differently from other injury claims by minors. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants on statute-of-limitations grounds, and the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that the statute was constitutional as applied, reasoning that it advanced legitimate legislative objectives related to medical malpractice litigation without an impermissible classification.

procedurehealthcarecivil rights

This case arose after the drowning of a boy in a pool operated by the Metter/Candler County Recreation Department; his survivors sued the City of Metter and later the Department, but the state court ruled the City was not a proper party and the Department was protected by sovereign immunity unless insured. Florida International Indemnity Co., which had issued a liability policy naming only the City, sought a federal declaratory judgment that it owed no coverage to the Department, while the survivors intervened and sought to reform the policy to add the Department as an insured. The Georgia Supreme Court, answering certified questions, held that the survivors were not third-party beneficiaries of the policy and therefore lacked standing to seek reformation. The court reasoned that, unlike statutorily mandated insurance coverages that create public third-party beneficiary rights, the City's policy was not required by law, and the constitutional waiver of sovereign immunity upon procurement of insurance did not establish an intent to confer enforceable contract rights on injured members of the public.

torts & liability

In Cruz-Padillo v. State, the appellant was convicted of felony murder based on aggravated assault, voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during a felony after shooting and killing the victim following an argument outside a restaurant where both worked. The trial court merged the manslaughter and assault convictions into the felony murder conviction and imposed a life sentence plus five years. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the felony murder and firearm convictions, concluding that the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant waived challenges to the verdict form and sentencing by failing to object at trial, that requiring the defendant to testify first violated constitutional rights to silence and due process but was harmless error, and that other evidentiary and procedural rulings presented no reversible error.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

The case concerned Earl Lee Edwards's conviction for malice murder after he shot and killed Tommy Wene, the boyfriend of Edwards's ex-wife, following an argument at the ex-wife's home where Wene was mowing the lawn. Edwards appealed on multiple grounds, including insufficient evidence of intent, improper admission of evidence about prior threats he had made, a violation of the rule of sequestration during testimony, and ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the conviction, holding that the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict was sufficient under Jackson v. Virginia to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The court further ruled that the prior threats were admissible because they occurred within a relevant time frame and helped establish motive, intent, and bent of mind, while finding no error in the handling of the sequestration issue or the ineffective-assistance claim.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved John James Lively, Jr., who was convicted in Wilkes County of two counts of murder and one count of aggravated assault related to the shooting deaths of his former companion and her sister, and sentenced to death. Lively appealed, arguing that the trial court should have excused a prospective juror for cause because the juror was listed as a state's witness, had a close relationship with one victim as her employer and pallbearer, and had personal knowledge of the relationship between Lively and the victim. The court agreed, holding that the juror's close ties and potential witness status disqualified him, as jurors must be impartial and current law prohibits witnesses from serving on juries due to sequestration requirements and other rules. Consequently, the court reversed the conviction, finding that Lively was denied a full panel of qualified jurors, but noted that the evidence was sufficient to allow retrial.

criminal lawprocedure

In Battles v. State, the defendant was convicted of felony murder after striking and killing the victim with a blunt object during a confrontation at a nightclub, where the underlying felony was aggravated assault; he received a life sentence. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, rejecting claims that the trial court gave an erroneous jury instruction implying possible probation for murder, that the merger rule should bar using aggravated assault as the predicate felony, that testimony improperly placed the defendant's character in issue, and that a fatal variance existed between the indictment (alleging a wrench as the weapon) and evidence (suggesting a gun). The court held that the evidence was sufficient under Jackson v. Virginia, the jury instructions were proper and did not violate statutory limits on discussing punishment, Georgia does not apply the full merger rule, and any variance was not prejudicial because the defendant was adequately informed of the charges and protected from double jeopardy. It also found no error in denying charges on self-defense or involuntary manslaughter and in admitting a crime-scene photograph.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned property owners in the Trail Creek Subdivision who challenged the validity of Douglas County's creation of a Street Light District (SLD) in 1985 and its later conversion to a Street Light Tax District (SLTD) in 1990, along with associated assessments and ad valorem taxes for street lights. The plaintiffs argued that the districts were established without the required public notice and hearing under the county's Street Light Ordinance because the petition lacked signatures from 100% of lot owners, and they sought declaratory relief, refunds, and class certification. The court held that the SLD and SLTD were invalid due to the denial of the plaintiffs' right to notice of the hearing under the ordinance, as the petition did not meet the 100% signature threshold that would have exempted the county from advertising requirements. It further ruled that the trial court properly denied class certification. The core reasoning focused on the plain language of the ordinance's petition and notice provisions and the lack of common interests among proposed class members.

taxespropertyprocedure

This case is an interlocutory appeal in a Georgia death penalty prosecution addressing two pretrial issues. The court held that victim impact evidence is limited by state precedent from Muckle v. State, which bars testimony specifically intended to show the personal characteristics of the victims or the psychological, emotional, and physical impact of the crimes on the victims' families and community, though evidence admissible for other purposes may be introduced even if it incidentally conveys such impact; the court also held that the defendant was entitled to a preliminary expert review of hospital records to assess whether the cause of one victim's death could be disputed. The trial court's denial of the defendant's motions on both issues was reversed. The reasoning rested on the distinction between federal Eighth Amendment permissibility under Payne v. Tennessee and the stricter limits imposed by Georgia law in capital cases, along with the need for threshold expert assistance on potentially material medical issues.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves the convictions of James Ray Ward for the murder, kidnapping with bodily injury, and feticide of a pregnant woman in Walker County, Georgia, for which he received a death sentence. Ward appealed his convictions and sentence, challenging the admission of evidence from similar extrinsic crimes to prove motive and identity, the use of expert testimony on sexual deviations, and certain jury instructions. The court affirmed the convictions and death sentence, reasoning that the extrinsic transactions were relevant to establish the defendant's pattern of behavior and identity, that the expert testimony was admissible, and that any errors in jury instructions were not reversible as they did not improperly influence the sentencing decision. The death sentence was also found not to be disproportionate to similar cases.

criminal lawprocedure

In Gadd v. Wilson & Company, Engineers & Architects, the plaintiff appealed the dismissal of her professional malpractice complaint for failing to comply with the expert affidavit requirement under OCGA § 9-11-9.1. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the initial affidavit was sufficient even though it did not explicitly name the defendant as the negligent party. The court reasoned that the statute's language does not require explicit identification, and when the defendant is the sole party, the negligence is implicitly attributed to them; the affidavit should be construed favorably to the plaintiff consistent with the Civil Practice Act's liberal pleading standards, as long as it serves the purpose of reducing frivolous suits.

proceduretorts & liability

This case concerned whether OCGA § 24-9-5(b) barred a criminal defendant from challenging the competency of a child victim witness alleged to lack the use of reason due to mental retardation. The trial court and Court of Appeals held that the statute made all child crime victims competent to testify, but the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed. The court reasoned that a literal reading of the 1989 amendment would create an absurdity by treating mentally incompetent children differently from adults, contrary to pre-amendment law that had singled out children only for oath-related challenges. It therefore construed subsection (b) as eliminating only the oath-understanding basis for child incompetency while preserving challenges under subsection (a) for lack of reason. The court remanded for a competency hearing on the relevant witness, with instructions that the conviction stands or falls depending on the outcome.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned a 1987 divorce decree that incorporated a settlement requiring the ex-husband to pay the ex-wife half of his military retirement benefits for support until his death. After the ex-wife remarried in 1989, the ex-husband sued for a declaration that his obligation ended. The court held that the obligation constituted periodic alimony because the amount and duration depended on the length of the payor's life. Under OCGA § 19-6-5(b), such alimony terminates on remarriage unless the decree otherwise provides, but the phrase requiring payments to continue until the ex-husband's death was ambiguous on that point. The trial court therefore erred in granting judgment on the pleadings, and the case was reversed and remanded for construction of the agreement under ordinary rules.

family law

The case involved James Chester's appeal of his convictions for the vehicular homicide of Christy Lamaine and the malice murder of Darlene Deaton after he struck the two girls with his vehicle while driving intoxicated and angry. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the convictions. The court found sufficient evidence to support the malice murder conviction, as Chester knew he had hit the victims, continued driving, and abandoned one victim in an isolated area without seeking medical help, implying malice. The court also rejected challenges to the indictment's validity and various jury instructions, including on flight and prior similar incidents.

criminal law

The case was a Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) and state tort action in which former railroad employee Kenneth Smith sought to cancel two releases he signed in December 1985, one resigning his job and one settling his claim for an August 1985 workplace injury, on the ground that he lacked mental capacity due to a recent psychotic episode. After a jury trial on the validity of the releases, the jury set them aside, allowing Smith to proceed with claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress against his former employers and supervisors. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the principle of ratification, which applies under both Georgia law and FELA once mental capacity is regained, and that there was evidence from which a jury could find ratification through the plaintiff’s subsequent conduct. The court also found conflicting evidence on the plaintiff’s mental capacity at the time the releases were executed, precluding a directed verdict on that issue.

labor & employmenttorts & liabilityprocedure