Jesse G. Bowles

In Humphrey v. Langford, former South Carolina residents who had sold a business sued the buyer, a South Carolina resident, in Georgia after moving there; the defendant was served with process while temporarily present in the state for bowling. The trial court dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, holding that Georgia's statute authorizing jurisdiction over temporary sojourners violated due process under Shaffer v. Heitner. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed, ruling that transient personal jurisdiction based on actual service within the forum remains constitutional. The court reasoned that Shaffer and International Shoe addressed jurisdiction over absent defendants or property and did not invalidate the longstanding rule that a defendant's physical presence in the state at the time of service satisfies due process, without requiring a separate minimum-contacts analysis.

procedure

The case involved a challenge to Georgia's criminal solicitation statute, Code Ann. § 26-1007, under which defendant Davis was indicted for allegedly soliciting another person to sell marijuana, a felony. The trial court dismissed the indictment, ruling the statute unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because it could encompass protected speech. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute is not facially unconstitutional. The court reasoned that statutes are presumed constitutional, construed the law narrowly under the Brandenburg clear-and-present-danger test to reach only speech likely to incite imminent felonious conduct, and applied ejusdem generis to limit vague phrasing to overt attempts creating such a danger. The court left open whether the statute was unconstitutional as applied to Davis's specific statements.

criminal lawfree speech

This case concerned the State Revenue Commissioner's authority to adjust Douglas County's 1979 ad valorem tax digest by imposing an 11 percent factor increase after determining that the county's valuations did not meet the statutory requirement of assessments at 40 percent of fair market value. The county appealed the Commissioner's order, and the trial court denied the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment despite the absence of any opposing evidence from the county. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commissioner has broad statutory discretion to equalize tax digests across counties and that the evidence of his methodology, including sales ratio studies, established a prima facie case of reasonableness that went unrebutted. As a result, the trial court was required to grant summary judgment as a matter of law rather than treat the issue as one for trial.

taxespropertyprocedure

Wylie Snell, III was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. His appointed attorney filed a motion to withdraw under Anders v. California, submitting a brief that raised potential points of law that could support an appeal. The court examined those points as if they were enumerations of error and concluded none had merit. The court also determined that the evidence at trial was sufficient to enable any rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt under Jackson v. Virginia, leading it to grant the motion to withdraw and affirm the conviction.

criminal law

The case involved a customer who slipped and fell in a grocery store, sustaining a knee injury, and sued the store owner alleging the floor was dangerously slippery or had a foreign substance. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant, the Court of Appeals reversed, and the Georgia Supreme Court reversed again to uphold the summary judgment. The court held that the plaintiff's evidence was insufficient because she could not identify any hazard, foreign substance, or unusual condition, while the defendant provided uncontradicted testimony that the floor had been treated with non-slip wax days earlier and no defects were found after the fall. The opinion emphasized that a fall alone does not prove negligence and that the burden shifts to the plaintiff to produce specific evidence of the proprietor's lack of ordinary care once the defendant pierces the pleadings.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involves a dispute over real property that Larry Reid conveyed to his father George via quitclaim deed shortly before Larry's divorce from Marian Reid. In the second lawsuit, George sought possession and damages from Marian, who counterclaimed to cancel the deed for fraud and asserted other claims to the property. The court held that Larry, as grantor, is an indispensable party to any action to cancel the deed, so Marian must be given an opportunity to amend her counterclaim to add him as a party or face summary judgment on that issue. George was not entitled to summary judgment on Marian's other theories of recovery, such as resulting trust, because he failed to negate all possible issues of fact. The court also ruled that inconsistent pleadings are permitted and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion regarding rental payments or bond.

family lawpropertyprocedure