Jesse G. Bowles

In Humphrey v. Langford, former South Carolina residents who had sold a business sued the buyer, a South Carolina resident, in Georgia after moving there; the defendant was served with process while temporarily present in the state for bowling. The trial court dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, holding that Georgia's statute authorizing jurisdiction over temporary sojourners violated due process under Shaffer v. Heitner. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed, ruling that transient personal jurisdiction based on actual service within the forum remains constitutional. The court reasoned that Shaffer and International Shoe addressed jurisdiction over absent defendants or property and did not invalidate the longstanding rule that a defendant's physical presence in the state at the time of service satisfies due process, without requiring a separate minimum-contacts analysis.

procedure

The case involved a challenge to Georgia's criminal solicitation statute, Code Ann. § 26-1007, under which defendant Davis was indicted for allegedly soliciting another person to sell marijuana, a felony. The trial court dismissed the indictment, ruling the statute unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because it could encompass protected speech. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute is not facially unconstitutional. The court reasoned that statutes are presumed constitutional, construed the law narrowly under the Brandenburg clear-and-present-danger test to reach only speech likely to incite imminent felonious conduct, and applied ejusdem generis to limit vague phrasing to overt attempts creating such a danger. The court left open whether the statute was unconstitutional as applied to Davis's specific statements.

criminal lawfree speech

This case concerned the State Revenue Commissioner's authority to adjust Douglas County's 1979 ad valorem tax digest by imposing an 11 percent factor increase after determining that the county's valuations did not meet the statutory requirement of assessments at 40 percent of fair market value. The county appealed the Commissioner's order, and the trial court denied the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment despite the absence of any opposing evidence from the county. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commissioner has broad statutory discretion to equalize tax digests across counties and that the evidence of his methodology, including sales ratio studies, established a prima facie case of reasonableness that went unrebutted. As a result, the trial court was required to grant summary judgment as a matter of law rather than treat the issue as one for trial.

taxespropertyprocedure

Wylie Snell, III was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. His appointed attorney filed a motion to withdraw under Anders v. California, submitting a brief that raised potential points of law that could support an appeal. The court examined those points as if they were enumerations of error and concluded none had merit. The court also determined that the evidence at trial was sufficient to enable any rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt under Jackson v. Virginia, leading it to grant the motion to withdraw and affirm the conviction.

criminal law

The case involved a customer who slipped and fell in a grocery store, sustaining a knee injury, and sued the store owner alleging the floor was dangerously slippery or had a foreign substance. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant, the Court of Appeals reversed, and the Georgia Supreme Court reversed again to uphold the summary judgment. The court held that the plaintiff's evidence was insufficient because she could not identify any hazard, foreign substance, or unusual condition, while the defendant provided uncontradicted testimony that the floor had been treated with non-slip wax days earlier and no defects were found after the fall. The opinion emphasized that a fall alone does not prove negligence and that the burden shifts to the plaintiff to produce specific evidence of the proprietor's lack of ordinary care once the defendant pierces the pleadings.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involves a dispute over real property that Larry Reid conveyed to his father George via quitclaim deed shortly before Larry's divorce from Marian Reid. In the second lawsuit, George sought possession and damages from Marian, who counterclaimed to cancel the deed for fraud and asserted other claims to the property. The court held that Larry, as grantor, is an indispensable party to any action to cancel the deed, so Marian must be given an opportunity to amend her counterclaim to add him as a party or face summary judgment on that issue. George was not entitled to summary judgment on Marian's other theories of recovery, such as resulting trust, because he failed to negate all possible issues of fact. The court also ruled that inconsistent pleadings are permitted and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion regarding rental payments or bond.

family lawpropertyprocedure

In State v. Johnson, the Georgia Supreme Court reviewed a Court of Appeals decision that had reversed a conviction for sale of marijuana due to the admission of evidence regarding two later drug sales by the same defendant to the same undercover officer. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and upheld the admissibility of that evidence. The court explained that while evidence of other crimes is generally inadmissible, an exception applies when the other crimes are similar or logically connected to the charged offense and help prove identity, motive, plan, scheme, bent of mind, or course of conduct. Here, the evidence was relevant to identity in a classic "swearing match" case where the defense challenged the officer's ability to accurately identify the seller, and the other sales did not need to be charged in the indictment because they were offered only for limited evidentiary purposes.

criminal lawprocedure

In Wimpey v. Pope, a divorced husband and wife had incorporated a settlement agreement into their 1978 divorce decree covering child custody and support, division of property including mobile home payments, and shared responsibility for the children's medical expenses. After the wife remarried, she sought to hold the husband in contempt for arrears on child support, mobile home payments, and psychologist bills for the children. The trial court found the husband in contempt and ordered payment of the arrears plus future psychologist expenses. On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the contempt finding as to the mobile home payments, reasoning that they constituted child support rather than alimony that would terminate upon remarriage under Code Ann. § 30-209, but reversed the requirement to pay psychologist bills, holding that a psychologist is not a doctor and such services were not contemplated by the medical expense provision in the agreement.

family lawproperty

The case involved a prisoner, McDowell, who sought a free copy of his trial transcript and court records from the county of his conviction to use as evidence in a habeas corpus petition filed in another county. The trial court dismissed his motion, captioned as a habeas petition, for improper venue and later denied it on the merits after clarification. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the denial, holding that an indigent prisoner has no due process or equal protection right to free court records in collateral post-conviction proceedings without a showing of necessity or justification, such as never having previously received a copy or the records being otherwise unavailable. McDowell failed to make that showing under precedents like Evans v. Watson and Billups v. State. The judgment was affirmed.

criminal lawprocedure

This case was a divorce action filed in DeKalb County Superior Court by the wife, who sought temporary and permanent custody of the minor children along with child support. The parties consented to a temporary order granting the wife custody and $100 monthly per child in support, but the husband later moved to vacate the support portion after the wife filed a contempt motion, citing her initial complaint's failure to include information required by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. The trial court vacated that part of the order, finding it lacked jurisdiction due to the pleading defect. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the court had subject matter and personal jurisdiction, the defect was procedural and curable by amendment (which the wife had filed, relating back to the original complaint), and the consent temporary order was not void. The court reasoned that the Act's requirements must be read in conjunction with the Civil Practice Act, which allows amendments to cure such issues without invalidating prior orders.

family lawprocedure

In this case, citizens and taxpayers of Ware County filed a quo warranto proceeding to oust Knot Culpepper from his position on the Ware County Board of Education on the ground that he was employed by the Brantley County Board of Education. The trial court granted the requested relief and declared the office vacant. On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Code Ann. § 32-903.1 expressly disqualified Culpepper from serving. Culpepper's equal protection challenge to the statute was rejected because common-law conflict-of-interest rules independently bar a person from serving on a board by which he or she is employed, and the statute did not abrogate those rules.

electionscivil rightsprocedure

This case arose when Mrs. Clark was injured by a .25 caliber pistol manufactured by Colt that fell from Coleman’s purse, discharged, and struck her; Coleman cross-claimed against Colt for indemnification, alleging defective design and inadequate safety instructions. The trial court directed a verdict for Colt on the cross-claim after the jury found both parties liable to Clark, and the Georgia Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals to reinstate that ruling. The court held that Coleman and Colt were joint tortfeasors because the manufacturer was strictly liable in tort and Coleman was negligent, but Coleman’s negligence was active rather than passive, as she failed to read the instructions and carried a loaded pistol into a public place where she dropped it. Under Georgia precedent, only passive negligence allows indemnity against a joint tortfeasor whose conduct is the proximate cause. The facts were so plain that the degree of negligence could be decided as a matter of law without a jury.

gunstorts & liability

This case involved the conviction of defendant Hill for the forcible rape and murder of a twelve-year-old girl, with the jury imposing a death sentence for the murder based on two aggravating circumstances: commission of the murder during another capital felony (rape) and the murder being outrageously vile, involving torture or depravity of mind. The defendant received a life sentence for the rape. Evidence included witness accounts of the defendant with the victim near the time of the crime, his suspicious statements and injuries afterward, blood matching the victim on his clothing, and a sling found at the scene that fit him. The court reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the convictions and aggravating factors, the constitutionality of the death penalty application, and comparisons to similar cases, ultimately affirming the convictions and sentences.

criminal law

The case involved a dispute over a contract for the purchase of real property where the buyer sought specific performance and damages for fraud after the seller canceled the deal when closing did not occur on the specified date. The trial court granted summary judgment to the seller, but the appellate court reversed in part, holding that factual issues remained regarding whether the buyer obtained the required loan approval and whether the seller waived the timely closing requirement, making the contract enforceable. The court affirmed summary judgment on the fraud claim because the seller's evidence showed no fraudulent deception about extending the deadline, and the buyer failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact.

propertyprocedure

The case involved a dispute over access to a lake shown on a 1969 subdivision plat. Cleo Roberts sold lots by reference to the plat at auction, with lake-adjacent lots bringing higher prices; Roberts later purported to sell the lake itself, and title eventually passed to Lottie Odom, who planned to fence it. Mamye Higgins, an adjacent lot owner, sued to enjoin the fencing and any interference with lake use. The trial court held that Odom owned the lake outright and Higgins had no rights in it. The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that sale of lots according to a plat designating the lake created an irrevocable easement for adjoining owners that could not be defeated by later conveyance of the lake area.

property

The case concerned whether partial performance of an agreement could provide consideration for an accord and satisfaction allowing a debtor to pay less than the full amount of a liquidated debt exceeding $31,000. The Georgia Supreme Court held that an executory agreement to accept a lesser sum is not binding without new consideration or complete performance, and partial performance alone does not suffice as consideration. The court reasoned from established precedents that any new agreement requires either full execution or additional consideration such as a promise of early payment or release from a mortgage, though it noted factual disputes about whether such elements were present or performed. It disapproved inconsistent language in the Court of Appeals opinion but affirmed the judgment remanding the case for jury determination on the existence of a binding agreement.

business & regulatory

The case involved Law Lincoln Mercury, an automobile dealership, challenging a sales and use tax assessment by the State Revenue Commission on seven demonstrator vehicles that had been used for more than six months by the company's president, sales staff, their wives, and one loaned to a college. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Commission, and the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed. The court held that under Code Ann. § 92-3410a(a) and Revenue Regulation § 560-12-2.9(5), use of the vehicles beyond six months raised a rebuttable presumption that they were not held solely for retention, demonstration, or display in the regular course of business, and the dealership's evidence of mixed personal and business use failed to rebut that presumption. The court further rejected arguments that any non-demonstration use was insignificant or that the assessment created an improper duplication of taxes under Code Ann. § 92-3402a(b), noting that the statute treats such personal use as a taxable retail sale by the purchaser.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

In Brown v. State, Tommy Lee Brown was convicted by a jury in Putnam County of murdering Ronnie Lee Nelson and sentenced to life imprisonment, after which he appealed on multiple grounds including insufficient evidence, an allegedly biased juror who had spoken with witnesses, the trial court's refusal to instruct on voluntary manslaughter, and errors in sentencing. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, finding the evidence sufficient under the Jackson v. Virginia standard, no improper juror conduct or harm shown despite dispersal, no requirement to charge on voluntary manslaughter absent a written request, and no need for a presentence hearing in a murder case with only life imprisonment available. However, the court reversed the portion of the sentence imposing probation supervision as improper under the Statewide Probation Act and remanded for resentencing to eliminate that element.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned a dispute over which statute of limitations applied to an alleged daughter's 1978 lawsuit seeking to recover personal property distributed from her father's 1971 estate after a probate court order declaring no administration necessary; the defendants, the deceased's siblings, had received the assets. The court held that the four-year limitations period of Code Ann. § 3-1003 for actions to recover personalty or damages for conversion governed the claim and barred the suit, rather than any ten-year period applicable to executors or trustees. It reasoned that the defendants acted under court authority and were not executors de son tort, that any alleged concealment did not constitute actual fraud tolling the statute because no confidential relationship existed and the facts were matters of public record, and that the cause of action accrued in 1971.

propertyprocedurefamily law

In Banks v. State, the defendant was indicted and convicted of murder and two counts of aggravated assault based on three separate incidents in Atlanta on May 7, 1979, involving assaults on teenage girls that included a shooting death and another shooting. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences of life imprisonment plus ten years. The court held that the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, that the gun was properly admitted as discovered during a search incident to arrest, that no evidence supported the special plea of mental incompetency to stand trial, and that jury selection issues raised no reversible error, including questions related to capital punishment where no death sentence was imposed.

criminal law