This case involves an appeal by the defendant from a circuit court order denying his request for security for costs. The plaintiff moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that term cases must be reviewed via exceptions or writ of error rather than a general appeal. The court determined that the order was issued by a circuit judge at chambers under the relevant statute, making a general appeal the appropriate method for review, and thus denied the motion to dismiss.
In Kiakona v. Kiakona, the husband filed for divorce alleging desertion, the wife cross-petitioned for failure to provide support, and the trial court granted the divorce to the husband while awarding child custody to the wife; the wife appealed. After the appeal was filed, the husband moved to strike the wife's brief and dismiss the appeal on the ground that her counsel, a deputy county attorney, was disqualified from representing a party in a divorce case. The court held that deputy county attorneys are indeed disqualified because the public is an implied party in all divorce actions and prosecuting officers must remain available to represent that interest, but it denied the motion to strike and dismiss. The core reasoning was that the wife had proceeded in good faith with counsel she reasonably believed was qualified, the opposing party had not timely objected and had even stipulated with counsel below, and dismissing the appeal would impose an unduly harsh penalty on the client for the attorney's conflict.
The consolidated cases concern actions to recover on promissory notes assigned for collection, in which the sole witness offered by the plaintiff was the original assignor who had previously been convicted of perjury and later received a full pardon from the territorial governor. After the trial court excluded the witness's testimony and offer of proof on grounds of incompetency under territorial statute despite the pardon, it entered judgment for the defendant. On writ of error the court held that a full pardon removes the disqualification arising from the perjury conviction, that the statute cannot limit the unrestricted pardon power granted the governor by section 66 of the Hawaiian Organic Act, and that the prior expressions on the issue were dictum; accordingly the judgments were reversed and the cases remanded for new trials.
This case involved a dispute between Hawaiian Hotels, Ltd. (the taxpayer) and the Territory of Hawaii's tax commissioner over an excise tax assessment of $3,833.12 on liquor sold by the taxpayer in July 1939. The taxpayer, which operated hotels and a golf club licensed as liquor dispensers, had acquired the liquor stock before the Hawaii Liquor Tax Act took effect on July 1, 1939, and argued that the Act did not authorize taxing pre-existing inventory upon subsequent sale. The court affirmed the assessment, holding that the tax was clearly an excise on the sale of liquor rather than a property tax on floor stock. It reasoned that the statute's language was unambiguous in requiring every dealer or person selling liquor to pay the tax, that the taxpayer's sales fell squarely within this requirement, and that no special treatment was warranted for liquor purchased before the Act's effective date.
The case involved a dispute over a short-lived partnership formed in 1935 between Miura and Nishimoto (later joined by Ito) to manufacture and sell a specialty Japanese pickle product under the trade name 'Otome-Zuke,' with Nishimoto contributing the secret process, lease, and equipment while Miura handled sales and expenses. After Miura attempted to take sole control by printing new labels, circulating handbills claiming succession, and excluding Nishimoto from the business, Miura and Ito sued for partnership dissolution, an accounting, and transfer of the trade name and assets to the partnership; Nishimoto cross-claimed alleging fraud in the partnership formation and seeking sole ownership. The court affirmed the interlocutory decree dissolving the partnership and addressing the trade name and assets but modified it to strike the $250 attorney's fee award to Nishimoto, reasoning that no temporary injunction had been issued and neither statute nor precedent permitted such fees as damages in equity absent a common-benefit fund or other specific authorization.
The case involved a plaintiff who sued to recover hospital and doctor's fees he paid for his unmarried daughter's childbirth after the defendant, who caused her pregnancy, orally promised at a conference with authorities to cover those expenses. The district court dismissed the claim, finding the oral agreement unenforceable under the statute of frauds requiring written promises to answer for the debt of another. On appeal limited to that legal issue, the court reversed, holding that the statute did not apply because the defendant's promise was made directly to the plaintiff and not to the original creditors, and remanded for further proceedings.
