James Leslie Coke

This case involves an appeal by the defendant from a circuit court order denying his request for security for costs. The plaintiff moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that term cases must be reviewed via exceptions or writ of error rather than a general appeal. The court determined that the order was issued by a circuit judge at chambers under the relevant statute, making a general appeal the appropriate method for review, and thus denied the motion to dismiss.

procedure

In Kiakona v. Kiakona, the husband filed for divorce alleging desertion, the wife cross-petitioned for failure to provide support, and the trial court granted the divorce to the husband while awarding child custody to the wife; the wife appealed. After the appeal was filed, the husband moved to strike the wife's brief and dismiss the appeal on the ground that her counsel, a deputy county attorney, was disqualified from representing a party in a divorce case. The court held that deputy county attorneys are indeed disqualified because the public is an implied party in all divorce actions and prosecuting officers must remain available to represent that interest, but it denied the motion to strike and dismiss. The core reasoning was that the wife had proceeded in good faith with counsel she reasonably believed was qualified, the opposing party had not timely objected and had even stipulated with counsel below, and dismissing the appeal would impose an unduly harsh penalty on the client for the attorney's conflict.

family lawprocedure

The consolidated cases concern actions to recover on promissory notes assigned for collection, in which the sole witness offered by the plaintiff was the original assignor who had previously been convicted of perjury and later received a full pardon from the territorial governor. After the trial court excluded the witness's testimony and offer of proof on grounds of incompetency under territorial statute despite the pardon, it entered judgment for the defendant. On writ of error the court held that a full pardon removes the disqualification arising from the perjury conviction, that the statute cannot limit the unrestricted pardon power granted the governor by section 66 of the Hawaiian Organic Act, and that the prior expressions on the issue were dictum; accordingly the judgments were reversed and the cases remanded for new trials.

criminal lawprocedurefederal power

This case involved a dispute between Hawaiian Hotels, Ltd. (the taxpayer) and the Territory of Hawaii's tax commissioner over an excise tax assessment of $3,833.12 on liquor sold by the taxpayer in July 1939. The taxpayer, which operated hotels and a golf club licensed as liquor dispensers, had acquired the liquor stock before the Hawaii Liquor Tax Act took effect on July 1, 1939, and argued that the Act did not authorize taxing pre-existing inventory upon subsequent sale. The court affirmed the assessment, holding that the tax was clearly an excise on the sale of liquor rather than a property tax on floor stock. It reasoned that the statute's language was unambiguous in requiring every dealer or person selling liquor to pay the tax, that the taxpayer's sales fell squarely within this requirement, and that no special treatment was warranted for liquor purchased before the Act's effective date.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

The case involved a dispute over a short-lived partnership formed in 1935 between Miura and Nishimoto (later joined by Ito) to manufacture and sell a specialty Japanese pickle product under the trade name 'Otome-Zuke,' with Nishimoto contributing the secret process, lease, and equipment while Miura handled sales and expenses. After Miura attempted to take sole control by printing new labels, circulating handbills claiming succession, and excluding Nishimoto from the business, Miura and Ito sued for partnership dissolution, an accounting, and transfer of the trade name and assets to the partnership; Nishimoto cross-claimed alleging fraud in the partnership formation and seeking sole ownership. The court affirmed the interlocutory decree dissolving the partnership and addressing the trade name and assets but modified it to strike the $250 attorney's fee award to Nishimoto, reasoning that no temporary injunction had been issued and neither statute nor precedent permitted such fees as damages in equity absent a common-benefit fund or other specific authorization.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a plaintiff who sued to recover hospital and doctor's fees he paid for his unmarried daughter's childbirth after the defendant, who caused her pregnancy, orally promised at a conference with authorities to cover those expenses. The district court dismissed the claim, finding the oral agreement unenforceable under the statute of frauds requiring written promises to answer for the debt of another. On appeal limited to that legal issue, the court reversed, holding that the statute did not apply because the defendant's promise was made directly to the plaintiff and not to the original creditors, and remanded for further proceedings.

procedurefamily law

The case involved whether a conviction for manslaughter from operating a motor vehicle, after a guilty plea and initial probation that was later revoked with sentencing, required the court to revoke the defendant's operator's and chauffeur's licenses under a 1937 Hawaii statute. The court determined that the first reserved question was moot because the conviction had become final with the imposition of sentence. Regarding the second question, the court held that the statute required immediate revocation of the operator's license (restricted to automobiles) even though the incident occurred on private property, as the law mandates revocation upon final conviction for such an offense without distinguishing location or license type, aiming to remove unfit drivers from public highways.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute over rights to a 1921 special homestead agreement for land in Hawaii after the purchaser, Mrs. Hannah Vierra, died intestate in 1932. The Waiakea Mill Company, which held a related sugarcane cultivation contract, sought a declaratory judgment on whether the widower or the five children were entitled to the property and contract benefits under sections 1598 and 1630 of the Revised Laws. The court held that the children succeeded to the rights as heirs, based on the agreement's explicit definition of 'purchaser' to include heirs, and that a 1929 statute altering descent rules for homesteads did not apply retroactively to pre-existing contracts. The decision rested on contract interpretation principles, the absence of retrospective language in the statute, and the Organic Act's limits on legislative changes to public land laws.

propertyfamily law

This case involves the administration of large estates and trusts created by the wills of Samuel Clesson Allen and his widow Bathsheba M. Allen, including Mrs. Allen's exercise of a power of appointment over the residue of her husband's trust estate for the benefit of her siblings and their descendants as life tenants and remaindermen. The dispute centered on whether stock dividends from the trust assets should be apportioned between life tenants and remaindermen, the effect of any agreement or acquiescence by life tenants to non-apportionment, and related factual issues about potential renunciation of interests by certain life tenants. The court held that the circuit court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the bill, that errors in resolving disputed facts were not jurisdictional, and that the decree should be modified accordingly, remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with its views on apportionment and distribution.

propertyfamily lawprocedure

The case involved Edwin Kaupu's conviction for involuntary manslaughter under Hawaii territorial law after he struck and killed Laurentina Brito with his automobile while driving on a public highway in Maui County. The indictment charged reckless operation of the vehicle in violation of a territorial statute prohibiting furious or heedless driving that imminently endangers personal safety. The appellate court found reversible errors in the trial proceedings, including the admission into evidence of a county traffic ordinance that was broader than the charged statute (by including endangerment to property) without limiting instructions, and an inconsistent jury instruction on contributory negligence that improperly conflated its irrelevance as a defense with its potential relevance to proximate cause. These errors led the court to conclude that Kaupu did not receive a fair trial, resulting in the conviction being set aside and the case remanded for a new trial.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved an indictment charging James N. Yoshimura with two counts of manslaughter for causing the death of Katsutaro Urabe by striking him with an automobile on a public highway in Hawaii. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to quash the indictment on grounds that it failed to sufficiently inform him of the nature and cause of the accusation in violation of the Sixth Amendment. The Territory appealed, arguing the charges were adequate. The Hawaii Supreme Court held that the first count, which merely tracked the statutory language of manslaughter without details, was deficient and properly quashed. However, the second count, which specified the reckless and negligent operation of the vehicle as the unlawful act causing death, provided sufficient particulars about the time, place, manner, and means of the offense to apprise the defendant and was therefore valid.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned a dispute over the ownership of a 2.5-acre kuleana land parcel at Waikane, Oahu, originally awarded to Kahinu, specifically whether a 1907 deed from Mileka Kaikala to L.L. McCandless conveyed that kuleana in addition to her interest in the larger ahupuaa of Waikane. The trial court ruled in favor of McCandless, finding that the deed included the kuleana based on its language and the parties' actions. On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that the deed's second granting clause, translated from Hawaiian, referred only to interests within the ahupuaa and did not include the separately reserved kuleana, and that certain factual findings regarding possession and taro crops lacked evidentiary support. The court remanded the case for a new trial, emphasizing the need for proper expert translation and adherence to evidence rules in interpreting the deed.

propertyprocedure

The case concerned an application by Kaimuki Land Company to register title in land court to a parcel of land in Honolulu under chapter 144, R.L.H. 1935, which was contested by Marguerite Mamo Clark asserting ownership as the adopted child of a life tenant under a 1896 deed and by trustees of the Cummins estate claiming through a contemporaneous trust deed. The trial court dismissed the application after concluding that Clark held title. On writs of error, the appellate court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the applicant had not established marketable title and that land court proceedings are limited to determining the applicant's claim against answering contestants without authority to adjudicate disputes among multiple defendants.

propertyprocedure

The case involved an appeal from a conviction under a Honolulu city ordinance regulating motor vehicle common carriers, where the defendant, who operated a passenger vehicle for hire, was found guilty of arriving five minutes ahead of his scheduled time at a stop. The district magistrate had rejected arguments that section 4 of the ordinance was void for indefiniteness. The Hawaii Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that the ordinance was invalid because it defined a "common carrier" as the vehicle itself and required the vehicle to file tariffs and schedules with the police, which was impossible for an inanimate object to perform. The court reasoned that the ordinance's language was unambiguous yet created requirements that could not be fulfilled, rendering it vague, inoperative, and unenforceable, with no permissible construction that could salvage it.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned Ilene Warren's conviction for manslaughter after a police officer, Wah Choon Lee, was electrocuted when he touched a metal plate on the door of her house that she had wired with 600 volts of electricity. Warren had installed the device to deter police and others, and the officer died while responding to a fellow officer's call for assistance during an arrest attempt inside the premises. The court affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding that the evidence established an unlawful killing without justification and that the trial court's rulings on character evidence and jury instructions did not prejudice the defendant. The reasoning emphasized that the officer was not a felonious intruder and that no facts supported a claim of self-defense or trespass justifying the use of a deadly instrumentality.

criminal law

This case involved a criminal prosecution in the Territory of Hawaii for assault and battery with a dangerous weapon, in which the defendant was convicted after an altercation on a public road where he fired a revolver in response to an alleged assault by the prosecuting witness armed with a club. The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly limited cross-examination of the prosecuting witness regarding the meaning of a 'fencing sign' made with the club, which was relevant to whether the defendant reasonably believed he faced imminent danger for purposes of self-defense. The court held that the cross-examination was unduly restricted, preventing the defendant from presenting evidence on the apparent danger as it appeared to him at the time, and that this deprivation of a fair trial required reversal. Accordingly, the court sustained the exceptions and remanded the case for further proceedings. The opinion also briefly addressed a separate evidentiary issue involving potential bias of a witness but focused primarily on the self-defense cross-examination error.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerns the interpretation of a 1896 trust deed by John A. Cummins directing distribution of his approximately $400,000 estate, specifically whether an adopted child qualifies as "lawful issue" entitled to share in the corpus upon the death of the settlor's last surviving child and whether a named beneficiary is entitled to a lifetime annuity. The opinion concurs that Flora Crowell is entitled to receive her $30 monthly annuity for life, either through retained trust funds or purchase of an annuity. It dissents from the conclusion that Margaret Mamo Clark, an adopted daughter, qualifies as "lawful issue," reasoning that the settlor's intent—viewed in the historical context of 1896 when adoption did not equate to blood relation or "keiki ponoi"—was to limit distribution to his own blood descendants, and that trust terms control over statutes of descent applicable to intestate estates.

family lawproperty

The case involved a dispute over control of property placed in a trust by Rebecca Hakalau before her death, after she executed a will that appeared to alter beneficiaries and her widower Edward Hakalau sought dower or other interests in the assets. The trustee sought court instructions when the will's executors demanded surrender of the trust property, and the circuit court ordered the trust terminated and assets transferred to the estate. On appeal, the supreme court reversed, holding that Rebecca died without owning any property because the trust remained in effect and the reserved powers did not cause the assets to revert to her estate. The core reasoning was that the trust document validly conveyed the property, the will did not revoke it, and thus no estate assets existed from which the widower could claim an interest.

propertyfamily lawprocedure

This case involves a suit by a divorced wife and her minor daughter to enforce a trust created by the ex-husband (settlor) in a 1930 deed, which transferred property to a trustee to pay alimony and child support as required by the divorce decree, with fallback provisions for maintenance if the decree became unenforceable. Multiple third parties, including creditors, an insurance company, and government entities holding liens or assignments on the trust property, demurred to the complaint. The court overruled the demurrers on interlocutory appeal, holding that certain 1932 transfers and assignments of trust property were void and that the trust must be administered under the original deed. The core reasoning was that the bill sufficiently alleged facts showing the third parties dealt with the property with notice of the trust's limitations, precluding any claim of innocent purchaser status, and that the later documents violated the trust terms.

family lawpropertyprocedure

The case concerned the interpretation of a 1896 trust deed executed by John A. Cummins, which directed that after his death the net income of the trust estate be paid in equal shares to his four surviving children (or their issue per stirpes) until the death of the last surviving child, at which point the corpus would be distributed to the grandchildren. May K. Clark, one of the children, died in 1935 leaving a will that bequeathed her estate to her husband and adopted daughter; the dispute arose when other beneficiaries sought a ruling that her share of trust income terminated at her death rather than passing through her estate. The circuit court held that each surviving child's interest was a vested, alienable right as a tenant in common (not a joint tenancy with survivorship), so the share continued until the trust's termination and was distributable under Clark's will; the Hawaii Supreme Court affirmed on the merits, reasoning that the deed's language created no right of survivorship among the children and that such interests pass to heirs or devisees upon death.

propertyfamily lawprocedure