William G. Clark

In Jones v. O'Young, plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice suit against several physicians alleging that negligent treatment of a post-accident leg infection (pseudomonas osteomyelitis) resulted in amputation. The trial court certified a question asking whether a plaintiff's expert must practice the same medical specialty as the defendant physicians to testify on the standard of care. The Illinois Supreme Court answered the certified question in the negative, holding that under the foundational requirements established in Purtill v. Hess an expert need only be licensed in the relevant school of medicine and familiar with the applicable methods, procedures, and treatments, regardless of specialty match, so long as the alleged negligence falls within the expert's demonstrated knowledge and experience.

healthcareproceduretorts & liability

The case involved a challenge to section 11-501.6 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, which authorized police to require a breath or blood test from any driver involved in an accident causing injury if there was probable cause to believe the driver was at fault, even without suspicion of intoxication. After plaintiff Bruce Allen King refused such a test following a collision, the Secretary of State suspended his license for six months; King sued for administrative review and a declaratory judgment that the statute was unconstitutional. The circuit court agreed, holding the provision invalid under state and federal constitutions as authorizing unreasonable searches and seizures, and enjoined its enforcement. On direct appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that the searches were unreasonable because they lacked individualized suspicion and were more intrusive than permitted by precedents like sobriety checkpoint cases. The court did not reach the separate issue of whether the administrative findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

This case involved a dispute over attorney fees in a divorce proceeding, where Mrs. Pagano challenged an order requiring her to pay a portion of fees to her former law firm, Rinella & Rinella, after she had signed agreed orders waiving a fee hearing under section 508 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act. The circuit court, following a remand from Pagano I, awarded the firm $21,470.25 in fees, allocated 60% to Mr. Pagano and 40% to Mrs. Pagano, and found that Rinella had not breached its fiduciary duties or exerted undue influence. On appeal, Mrs. Pagano contested the findings of no misconduct, alleged breach of a contract to first seek fees from her ex-husband, and argued the fee split was unfair given her financial situation. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions, holding that the firm met its contractual obligations by petitioning for fees from both parties, that no undue influence occurred, and that the allocation was within the circuit court's discretion based on the parties' relative financial abilities.

family law

The case concerned an amended complaint filed by the Illinois Attorney General and Department of Transportation against multiple construction contractors, alleging common law fraud, violations of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, unjust enrichment, and breach of contract arising from the McCormick Place Annex project and state highway construction contracts. The trial court dismissed the complaint under section 2-615, ruling that the Attorney General lacked standing to sue on behalf of the Metropolitan Fair and Exposition Authority, failed to state a cause of action, and that state courts lacked jurisdiction over federal RICO claims. The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the Attorney General possesses common law standing to assert claims on behalf of the public and taxpayers even without authorization from the Authority, analyzed the sufficiency of the fraud and related counts, and ultimately affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings including reconsideration of a motion to amend.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a plaintiff shot in the parking lot of a Ramada Inn restaurant owned by the defendant, who sued alleging negligence for failing to provide security guards and adequate lighting. At trial, the defendant presented testimony from an investigating police officer opining that the area was not high-crime and no security was needed, resulting in a verdict for the defendant. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the officer was an expert witness under Supreme Court Rule 220 due to his specialized knowledge and should have been disclosed in advance, so the failure to do so required reversal. The core reasoning centered on the rule's disclosure requirements applying to experts based on their expertise, even if not formally retained, to ensure fair trial preparation.

proceduretorts & liability

In this case, defendants Anthony Speight and Melvin Whitten were charged in Cook County circuit court with armed robbery and attempted armed robbery after accosting two victims in an alley. Following their convictions at trial, the appellate court reversed both, citing improper judicial notice of facts discrediting a defense witness in Whitten's bench trial and erroneous admission of other-crimes evidence (a "pony pack") in Speight's jury trial. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and reinstated the convictions, reasoning that the witness testimony was offered only for character and reputation purposes rather than as an alibi, so no discovery violation or prejudicial judicial notice occurred, and that any errors in Speight's trial were either cured by jury admonitions or harmless given the strength of the identification evidence.

criminal lawprocedure