William G. Clark

In Jones v. O'Young, plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice suit against several physicians alleging that negligent treatment of a post-accident leg infection (pseudomonas osteomyelitis) resulted in amputation. The trial court certified a question asking whether a plaintiff's expert must practice the same medical specialty as the defendant physicians to testify on the standard of care. The Illinois Supreme Court answered the certified question in the negative, holding that under the foundational requirements established in Purtill v. Hess an expert need only be licensed in the relevant school of medicine and familiar with the applicable methods, procedures, and treatments, regardless of specialty match, so long as the alleged negligence falls within the expert's demonstrated knowledge and experience.

healthcareproceduretorts & liability

The case involved a challenge to section 11-501.6 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, which authorized police to require a breath or blood test from any driver involved in an accident causing injury if there was probable cause to believe the driver was at fault, even without suspicion of intoxication. After plaintiff Bruce Allen King refused such a test following a collision, the Secretary of State suspended his license for six months; King sued for administrative review and a declaratory judgment that the statute was unconstitutional. The circuit court agreed, holding the provision invalid under state and federal constitutions as authorizing unreasonable searches and seizures, and enjoined its enforcement. On direct appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that the searches were unreasonable because they lacked individualized suspicion and were more intrusive than permitted by precedents like sobriety checkpoint cases. The court did not reach the separate issue of whether the administrative findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

This case involved a dispute over attorney fees in a divorce proceeding, where Mrs. Pagano challenged an order requiring her to pay a portion of fees to her former law firm, Rinella & Rinella, after she had signed agreed orders waiving a fee hearing under section 508 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act. The circuit court, following a remand from Pagano I, awarded the firm $21,470.25 in fees, allocated 60% to Mr. Pagano and 40% to Mrs. Pagano, and found that Rinella had not breached its fiduciary duties or exerted undue influence. On appeal, Mrs. Pagano contested the findings of no misconduct, alleged breach of a contract to first seek fees from her ex-husband, and argued the fee split was unfair given her financial situation. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions, holding that the firm met its contractual obligations by petitioning for fees from both parties, that no undue influence occurred, and that the allocation was within the circuit court's discretion based on the parties' relative financial abilities.

family law

The case concerned an amended complaint filed by the Illinois Attorney General and Department of Transportation against multiple construction contractors, alleging common law fraud, violations of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, unjust enrichment, and breach of contract arising from the McCormick Place Annex project and state highway construction contracts. The trial court dismissed the complaint under section 2-615, ruling that the Attorney General lacked standing to sue on behalf of the Metropolitan Fair and Exposition Authority, failed to state a cause of action, and that state courts lacked jurisdiction over federal RICO claims. The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the Attorney General possesses common law standing to assert claims on behalf of the public and taxpayers even without authorization from the Authority, analyzed the sufficiency of the fraud and related counts, and ultimately affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings including reconsideration of a motion to amend.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a plaintiff shot in the parking lot of a Ramada Inn restaurant owned by the defendant, who sued alleging negligence for failing to provide security guards and adequate lighting. At trial, the defendant presented testimony from an investigating police officer opining that the area was not high-crime and no security was needed, resulting in a verdict for the defendant. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the officer was an expert witness under Supreme Court Rule 220 due to his specialized knowledge and should have been disclosed in advance, so the failure to do so required reversal. The core reasoning centered on the rule's disclosure requirements applying to experts based on their expertise, even if not formally retained, to ensure fair trial preparation.

proceduretorts & liability

In this case, defendants Anthony Speight and Melvin Whitten were charged in Cook County circuit court with armed robbery and attempted armed robbery after accosting two victims in an alley. Following their convictions at trial, the appellate court reversed both, citing improper judicial notice of facts discrediting a defense witness in Whitten's bench trial and erroneous admission of other-crimes evidence (a "pony pack") in Speight's jury trial. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and reinstated the convictions, reasoning that the witness testimony was offered only for character and reputation purposes rather than as an alibi, so no discovery violation or prejudicial judicial notice occurred, and that any errors in Speight's trial were either cured by jury admonitions or harmless given the strength of the identification evidence.

criminal lawprocedure

In this post-conviction proceeding, defendants Roger Collins and William Bracey, who had been convicted of armed robbery, aggravated kidnapping, and murder and sentenced to death, challenged the dismissal of their petition without an evidentiary hearing. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal, holding that the claim regarding a judge's wife serving on the jury was waived on direct appeal and thus barred by res judicata. The court further ruled that the defendants' claim of improper peremptory challenges to exclude black jurors failed because Batson v. Kentucky did not apply to this collateral review and the defendants made no showing of systematic exclusion under the applicable Swain v. Alabama standard. Finally, the denial of funds for an investigator to examine jury issues was within the trial court's discretion and not manifestly erroneous.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned a wrongful death suit brought by the estate of Stephen Frye against Medicare-Glaser pharmacy and its pharmacist, Evelyn Nightengale, alleging negligent undertaking after the pharmacist affixed a "May Cause Drowsiness" label to a Fiorinal prescription but omitted a computer-suggested alcohol-interaction warning, which the plaintiff claimed contributed to Frye's fatal mixing of the drug with alcohol. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the defendants on this count, the appellate court reversed, and the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate decision, affirming summary judgment for the pharmacy. The court reasoned that the pharmacist's voluntary act of placing one specific warning label did not create a duty to provide all possible warnings or to warn comprehensively about every side effect, and the record showed no evidence that this partial undertaking increased the risk of harm or induced reliance by the decedent under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323. The court declined to impose an affirmative duty on pharmacists to counsel patients beyond what they voluntarily undertook.

torts & liabilityhealthcareprocedure

The case involved defendant Charles Wheeler, who was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault against his daughter after a jury trial. The central issue was whether the trial court properly denied the defendant's request for his expert to examine the victim regarding rape trauma syndrome evidence that the prosecution planned to introduce under statutory authority. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the defendant should have been afforded the opportunity for such an examination to ensure a fair trial, and if the victim refuses, the state cannot present testimony from an examining expert on the syndrome. The court reasoned that this balances the victim's privacy interests with the defendant's constitutional rights, while still allowing the state to use non-examining experts. Because the error was not harmless given the closely balanced evidence turning on credibility, the conviction was reversed and the case remanded.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned an action by the Illinois Attorney General against Progressive Land Developers, Inc., seeking to recover assets allegedly derived from charitable contributions to the Nation of Islam by imposing a constructive trust on a theory of unjust enrichment. The trial court dismissed the suit on multiple grounds including res judicata, and the appellate court affirmed on res judicata and laches. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed solely on res judicata, finding that the elements were met because a prior probate proceeding over Elijah Muhammad's estate had already determined that the assets were charitable rather than personal property, the causes of action were identical, and the Attorney General was in privity with the Nation of Islam which had fully litigated the issues.

procedureproperty

The case involved David Smith, who was charged with murder, felony murder, home invasion, and aggravated criminal sexual assault in the 1987 stabbing death of Lisa Ferguson in Chicago. After a jury trial, Smith was convicted on multiple counts and sentenced to death following a separate sentencing hearing. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the convictions but vacated the death sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. The court held that the trial judge's refusal to ask potential jurors during voir dire whether they would automatically impose the death penalty upon conviction violated the defendant's due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, as required by the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Morgan v. Illinois.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case arising from a multi-vehicle accident on Interstate 55, plaintiffs sued Central Illinois Light Company and the Koch defendants for personal injuries and property damage, after which Central filed a contribution claim against Koch and Koch filed one against Central. Plaintiffs then moved for voluntary dismissal under section 2-1009 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but Central objected on the ground that its contribution claim against a codefendant qualified as a counterclaim requiring its consent. The trial court granted the dismissal, but the appellate court reversed, and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed that reversal. The court held that a contribution claim by one defendant against a codefendant constitutes a counterclaim within the meaning of section 2-1009, relying on the plain statutory definition in section 2-608 that expressly includes such cross-defendant claims and finding no legislative intent to limit the term to claims against plaintiffs. The decision turned on principles of statutory interpretation, rejecting prior dicta as inapplicable and emphasizing that the legislature could have added qualifying language if it intended a narrower scope.

proceduretorts & liability

In People v. Eagle Books, Inc., the defendant bookstore faced 144 counts of obscenity under Illinois law after police seized 155 magazines during a multi-hour search of its premises pursuant to a warrant authorizing seizure of materials depicting specific sexual acts. The defendant moved to quash the warrant and suppress the evidence, arguing constitutional violations including vagueness in the statute's affirmative defense provisions. The court held that the seizure constituted an overbroad, wholesale taking of numerous items without first affording the owner an opportunity to litigate obscenity, effectively functioning as a general search that infringed First Amendment protections. Relying on precedent from People v. Kimmel, it concluded that such sweeping seizures prior to judicial determination of obscenity cannot stand, leading to suppression of all seized materials and reversal of the circuit court's judgment.

criminal lawfree speechprocedure

The case involved the conviction of defendant James E. Wittenmyer following a bench trial for three counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse and one count of aggravated criminal sexual assault committed against his two minor step-grandchildren while they were in his care during the summer of 1989. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent five-year terms on the abuse convictions and a consecutive seven-year term on the assault conviction. The appellate court affirmed the convictions but modified the sentence to run all terms concurrently, finding that the offenses were part of a single course of conduct. The supreme court reversed the appellate court's sentencing modification and reinstated the consecutive sentence, holding that the plain language and legislative history of section 5-8-4(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections mandate consecutive sentences for any conviction under sections 12-13 or 12-14 of the Criminal Code, creating a distinct exception from the severe bodily injury requirement.

criminal law

The case involved challenges by the Forest Preserve District of Kane County and a property owner to two public acts amending the Downstate Forest Preserve District Act, which imposed requirements for municipal concurrence before certain forest preserve districts could acquire land within city limits; these acts applied specifically to Kane County and later also Will County. The circuit court ruled the amendments unconstitutional under the Illinois Constitution's prohibition on special legislation and under equal protection guarantees in both the state and federal constitutions. On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court determined the dispute was moot because the legislature had enacted a subsequent amendment that replaced the challenged language, and the property at issue had already been sold to the district. The court therefore vacated the circuit court's judgment without reaching the constitutional issues.

propertyprocedurecivil rights

In this case, defendant Roosevelt Lucas was charged with conspiracy and first-degree murder for the 1987 stabbing and beating death of Pontiac Correctional Center Superintendent Robert Taylor. After a jury trial in Grundy County, Lucas was convicted of murder, found eligible for the death penalty because the victim was a correctional officer, and sentenced to death. On direct appeal, Lucas raised multiple claims of error, including challenges to evidence, jury fairness, and the constitutionality of Illinois' death penalty statute, but many issues were waived and the court found no plain error. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and death sentence, rejecting the constitutional challenges as previously decided and upholding the jury's findings.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a wrongful death and personal injury suit by Lois Thacker against asbestos suppliers for her husband's lung cancer and asbestosis, which developed from his work at a UNARCO plant from 1954 to 1962. After a jury awarded damages to the plaintiff, the appellate court initially reversed but then affirmed the verdict, and the Illinois Supreme Court granted review. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that evidence of visible asbestos dust throughout the large open plant, combined with proof of Manville shipments and the cumulative nature of asbestos exposure, was sufficient for the jury to find causation under the frequency, regularity, and proximity test without requiring expert testimony on fiber drift.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a railroad employee who fell through an opening in a bridge deck while performing track work and sued his employer under the Federal Employers' Liability Act for injuries sustained. The jury awarded damages after being instructed on OSHA fall-protection regulations applicable to workplaces more than 25 feet above the ground. The central issue was whether a 1978 Federal Railroad Administration policy statement preempted those OSHA regulations under section 4(b)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, thereby rendering them inadmissible. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the regulations were properly admitted at trial, reasoning that the policy statement did not clearly displace OSHA's authority over fall-protection on railroad bridges and that a subsequent agency interpretation supported their applicability.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatoryfederal power

This case involved multiple businesses in the Village of South Holland challenging the constitutionality of the village's Sunday Closing Ordinance, which banned most wholesale and retail sales as well as repair, maintenance, and personal services on Sundays, subject to specified exceptions for necessities like food, gasoline, newspapers, and emergency repairs. One business was also prosecuted and convicted under the ordinance for selling cigarettes and car washes on a Sunday. The plaintiffs filed a declaratory judgment action, and after cross-motions for summary judgment and a trial, the lower courts upheld the ordinance and the conviction. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ordinance constituted a valid exercise of the village's police power because it bore a reasonable relationship to protecting public welfare through a day of rest and the exceptions were a reasonable means of balancing that goal with access to essential items.

business & regulatoryreligious liberty

The case concerned a construction worker's personal injury claims against a construction company for damages from a 1986 fall at a job site, brought under the Structural Work Act and common-law negligence. The certified question was whether the two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury actions or the four-year statute for tort actions arising from the design, planning, supervision, or construction of improvements to real property applied when the suit was filed more than two years after the injury. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the four-year limitations period in section 13-214(a) controls, reasoning from rules of statutory construction that the legislature intended this period to govern such claims, as shown by the parallel language and history of the accompanying ten-year repose provision.

proceduretorts & liability