Harold E. Achor

The case involved appellant Shaw's convictions for second-degree burglary and being a habitual criminal, resulting in sentences of two to five years and life imprisonment, respectively. Shaw challenged the joint trial of the charges, the sufficiency of the evidence identifying him as a burglar, and whether a prior petit larceny conviction sentenced to the Indiana State Farm qualified under the habitual criminal statute requiring prior imprisonment in a penal institution for felonies. The court held that the joint trial did not violate constitutional rights and was not properly preserved for review, that conflicting witness testimony on identity was sufficient without reweighing on appeal, and that the state farm sentence did not meet the statutory requirements for a felony penal institution. It concluded there was no reversible error and affirmed the trial court's decision.

criminal lawprocedure

This case is an appeal from a first-degree murder conviction and death sentence in which the defendant, who had prior sex offense convictions, was found to have raped, killed, and dismembered an eleven-year-old girl before disposing of her body. The defendant pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity and challenged the trial court's denial of a continuance to obtain rebuttal expert testimony after court-appointed psychiatrists testified that he was legally sane, as well as other evidentiary rulings including the admission of photographs of the dismembered body. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that denial of the continuance was not an abuse of discretion because the defendant had extensively cross-examined the state's experts, presented his own medical witnesses, and failed to show surprise or prejudice that would require delay. It further reasoned that the challenged evidence was relevant to the defendant's state of mind and intent to conceal the crime, and that other asserted grounds were waived or unsupported.

criminal lawprocedure

In Pritchard v. State, the petitioner, after pleading guilty to robbery, sought a writ of certiorari to challenge the trial court's denial of his request to file a belated motion for new trial, claiming that his waiver of counsel was not knowing due to emotional stress, ignorance of the law, police pressure, and rushed arraignment, in violation of due process and equal protection under the Indiana and U.S. Constitutions. The Indiana Supreme Court denied the petition. The court reasoned that a motion for new trial is not available after a guilty plea because no trial occurred, making a petition to vacate the judgment and withdraw the plea the appropriate remedy instead, and further that the arraignment transcript contradicted the petitioner's factual allegations.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a petitioner convicted of first-degree burglary in 1960 based on an affidavit alleging he broke into a dwelling with intent to commit rape; a separate rape charge from the same facts was pending at filing but later dismissed in 1961. He petitioned for a writ of error coram nobis claiming the conviction was void under a statute barring a new affidavit for the same offense while another was pending, then sought mandamus to compel appointment of counsel and a transcript for appeal after denial. The court denied mandamus, holding that burglary and rape are distinct offenses not covered by the statute, that a plea in abatement at trial was the proper way to raise the issue, and that the public defender was the appropriate party to handle such claims. It tagged the matter with criminal law and procedure.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved an appellant who was twice tried on charges of involuntary manslaughter and reckless homicide arising from the same fatal incident; he was convicted of reckless homicide both times after the jury was silent on the manslaughter count, with the first conviction reversed on appeal leading to a retrial. The court held that the silence on one count did not constitute an acquittal and that retrying both charges did not violate double jeopardy protections under the Indiana Constitution. It reasoned that the reckless homicide verdict encompassed the elements of the other offense and that a granted new trial resets the parties to their pre-trial positions, vacating any prior results as provided by statute. The court therefore affirmed the second conviction after rejecting the appellant's claims of error.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether a defendant charged with violating a city ordinance in the Hammond City Court could obtain a change of venue from Lake County to a circuit or superior court in another county. The trial court granted mandamus ordering the change, but the Indiana Supreme Court reversed. The court held that the 1961 reenactment of the 1905 statute governing city courts expressly barred any change of venue from such courts (while allowing a change from the judge) and thereby impliedly repealed a 1951 amendment that had permitted transfers to adjoining counties. This conclusion rested on the plain language of the reenacted statute covering all city courts of the first through fourth classes and the legislature's apparent intent to eliminate the practical problems created by the prior conflicting provisions on appeals and venue.

procedure