Harold E. Achor

The case involved appellant Shaw's convictions for second-degree burglary and being a habitual criminal, resulting in sentences of two to five years and life imprisonment, respectively. Shaw challenged the joint trial of the charges, the sufficiency of the evidence identifying him as a burglar, and whether a prior petit larceny conviction sentenced to the Indiana State Farm qualified under the habitual criminal statute requiring prior imprisonment in a penal institution for felonies. The court held that the joint trial did not violate constitutional rights and was not properly preserved for review, that conflicting witness testimony on identity was sufficient without reweighing on appeal, and that the state farm sentence did not meet the statutory requirements for a felony penal institution. It concluded there was no reversible error and affirmed the trial court's decision.

criminal lawprocedure

This case is an appeal from a first-degree murder conviction and death sentence in which the defendant, who had prior sex offense convictions, was found to have raped, killed, and dismembered an eleven-year-old girl before disposing of her body. The defendant pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity and challenged the trial court's denial of a continuance to obtain rebuttal expert testimony after court-appointed psychiatrists testified that he was legally sane, as well as other evidentiary rulings including the admission of photographs of the dismembered body. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that denial of the continuance was not an abuse of discretion because the defendant had extensively cross-examined the state's experts, presented his own medical witnesses, and failed to show surprise or prejudice that would require delay. It further reasoned that the challenged evidence was relevant to the defendant's state of mind and intent to conceal the crime, and that other asserted grounds were waived or unsupported.

criminal lawprocedure

In Pritchard v. State, the petitioner, after pleading guilty to robbery, sought a writ of certiorari to challenge the trial court's denial of his request to file a belated motion for new trial, claiming that his waiver of counsel was not knowing due to emotional stress, ignorance of the law, police pressure, and rushed arraignment, in violation of due process and equal protection under the Indiana and U.S. Constitutions. The Indiana Supreme Court denied the petition. The court reasoned that a motion for new trial is not available after a guilty plea because no trial occurred, making a petition to vacate the judgment and withdraw the plea the appropriate remedy instead, and further that the arraignment transcript contradicted the petitioner's factual allegations.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a petitioner convicted of first-degree burglary in 1960 based on an affidavit alleging he broke into a dwelling with intent to commit rape; a separate rape charge from the same facts was pending at filing but later dismissed in 1961. He petitioned for a writ of error coram nobis claiming the conviction was void under a statute barring a new affidavit for the same offense while another was pending, then sought mandamus to compel appointment of counsel and a transcript for appeal after denial. The court denied mandamus, holding that burglary and rape are distinct offenses not covered by the statute, that a plea in abatement at trial was the proper way to raise the issue, and that the public defender was the appropriate party to handle such claims. It tagged the matter with criminal law and procedure.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved an appellant who was twice tried on charges of involuntary manslaughter and reckless homicide arising from the same fatal incident; he was convicted of reckless homicide both times after the jury was silent on the manslaughter count, with the first conviction reversed on appeal leading to a retrial. The court held that the silence on one count did not constitute an acquittal and that retrying both charges did not violate double jeopardy protections under the Indiana Constitution. It reasoned that the reckless homicide verdict encompassed the elements of the other offense and that a granted new trial resets the parties to their pre-trial positions, vacating any prior results as provided by statute. The court therefore affirmed the second conviction after rejecting the appellant's claims of error.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether a defendant charged with violating a city ordinance in the Hammond City Court could obtain a change of venue from Lake County to a circuit or superior court in another county. The trial court granted mandamus ordering the change, but the Indiana Supreme Court reversed. The court held that the 1961 reenactment of the 1905 statute governing city courts expressly barred any change of venue from such courts (while allowing a change from the judge) and thereby impliedly repealed a 1951 amendment that had permitted transfers to adjoining counties. This conclusion rested on the plain language of the reenacted statute covering all city courts of the first through fourth classes and the legislature's apparent intent to eliminate the practical problems created by the prior conflicting provisions on appeals and venue.

procedure

The case involved appellant Leroy Sims, who was charged and convicted of kidnapping and robbery after he flagged down an undercover police officer, offered to procure a prostitute, then produced a gun, forced the officer to drive, and stole his wallet and other items before fleeing in the officer's car. Sims appealed, arguing that the offenses resulted from police entrapment, that he was of unsound mind during trial and unable to understand the proceedings (despite not raising an insanity defense before trial), and that the trial court committed procedural errors including allowing a belated counter-affidavit. The court rejected the entrapment claim because the evidence showed Sims conceived and planned the crimes without inducement by trickery or persuasion from the officer. It also found insufficient evidence of insanity, noting Sims's statements during jury selection demonstrated awareness of the charges and potential life sentence, and held that other procedural issues did not constitute reversible error. The judgment of conviction was affirmed.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a father charged with both rape and incest for sexual intercourse with his ten-year-old daughter; the jury convicted him of rape but not incest. The defendant argued that the verdict was contrary to law because the offense against his own daughter could only constitute incest, not rape, and that the two crimes were mutually exclusive. The court affirmed the rape conviction, holding that a relative may be guilty of both rape and incest under Indiana law and that the evidence supported the rape charge. The court declined to consider a hearsay objection to hospital records because it had not been raised in the motion for new trial.

criminal lawfamily law

The case involved a pro se petition by a prisoner convicted of armed robbery after a guilty plea, requesting that the court order the public defender to represent him in post-conviction proceedings to vacate the judgment. The petitioner alleged that the public defender improperly refused representation and that his plea had been involuntary because he was under the influence of drugs and pressured by an attorney. The court denied the petition, holding that the public defender may decline representation after finding no meritorious grounds for relief, subject to judicial review. The record showed the plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily after the petitioner discussed it with counsel, the court explained the rights involved, and sufficient evidence supported the conviction.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved an appeal from a robbery conviction and 10-to-25-year sentence, where the defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient because it rested solely on the testimony of two alleged accomplices whose statements were allegedly influenced by hopes of leniency and prior discussions with prosecutors, while his wife's uncontradicted alibi placed him out of state. The court affirmed the conviction, ruling that the jury's verdict must stand because it alone weighs the credibility of all witnesses, including both the accomplices and the defendant's wife. The court further held that accomplice testimony is competent and can sustain a conviction even without corroboration, with any questions of bias or consistency going only to the weight the jury assigns to it rather than its legal sufficiency.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed in the Indiana Supreme Court by a petitioner who had pleaded guilty to second-degree burglary and sought to challenge the validity of his commitment based on alleged issues with the presentence investigation. The court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition. The reasoning rested on established precedent holding that the Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction to grant writs of habeas corpus, which must instead be sought in other courts. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed. All justices concurred in the decision.

criminal lawprocedure

In Haverstock v. Haverstock, the wife filed for divorce on grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment, which the trial court granted despite the husband's contest. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding that the doctrine of recrimination barred the divorce because the wife's uncontroverted extramarital affair over several years provided the husband with grounds for divorce as a matter of law. The court examined evidence of the husband's alleged failures to support the family and arguments but found it did not justify the wife's misconduct, and rejected claims of condonation. It emphasized that the recrimination principle is a firm legal standard in divorce cases, not subject to discretionary override by courts.

family law

The case involved an appeal from a conviction in Vanderburgh Circuit Court for the offense of entering a house to commit a felony, with the transcript and errors filed in January 1964. After full briefing and argument, it was shown through a verified statement and death certificate that the appellant died in January 1965. The court determined that the appeal had become moot because affirming the judgment would render it impossible to execute, while reversing it would leave the appellant unavailable for any retrial, consistent with prior Indiana precedents such as Neville v. State. The appeal was therefore dismissed.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a challenge to a town ordinance regulating boat speeds on a lake, with the Indiana Supreme Court initially dismissing the appeal as moot after the ordinance was repealed. Appellants petitioned for reconsideration, arguing that pending prosecutions for violations and potential res judicata effects from the lower court decision required the court to address the ordinance's validity. The court denied the petition, holding that the repeal without a saving clause terminated all prosecutions under common law principles and that the lower court judgment lost effect because it depended on the repealed ordinance. The majority declined to reach constitutional or preemption issues, following the principle of avoiding such questions when other grounds resolve the case.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a petitioner convicted of driving under the influence as a second offense who sought to compel the public defender to represent him in post-conviction proceedings by alleging ineffective assistance from his trial counsel. The court reviewed the petitioner's claims of errors by trial counsel, including challenges to the statute's constitutionality, prejudice from alleging prior convictions, jury instructions, and the verdict's imposition of sentence. Finding no merit in these claims, the court concluded that trial counsel had no obligation to file a motion for new trial or appeal, thereby upholding the public defender's refusal to represent the petitioner and denying the petition.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a pro se petition for a writ of mandate filed by a convicted murderer seeking to compel the Boone Circuit Court either to appoint counsel or to reinstate his dismissed petitions for a writ of error coram nobis challenging his 1950s conviction and sentence. The Indiana Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that the public defender had properly declined representation after finding no meritorious grounds for relief and that the coram nobis petitions had been correctly dismissed for want of prosecution due to the petitioner's own failure to file supporting affidavits or pursue the case. The court examined the underlying claims of denial of speedy trial and right to counsel, concluding they lacked merit because any delays resulted from the petitioner's inaction and the public defender's decision was based on a good-faith assessment of the record rather than arbitrariness. It further noted that issues not properly preserved at trial or on direct appeal could not be raised for the first time in coram nobis proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

This case is an appeal from the denial of a petition for writ of error coram nobis in the Clark Circuit Court, following the appellant's 1961 jury convictions for automobile banditry and second-degree burglary. The appellant, proceeding pro se initially, claimed he received incompetent representation from court-appointed counsel at trial and was denied counsel during the coram nobis proceedings and at his arraignment. The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the public defender's report and the trial record, finding that the appellant had requested counsel at arraignment but was denied it, which violated his constitutional right to counsel under Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution. The court held that this denial vitiated the subsequent proceedings and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to grant a new trial, while addressing but not deciding other alleged errors such as the sufficiency of the charging affidavit and issues with evidence and sentencing.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

This case involved an original action in the Indiana Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition and mandate arising from guardianship proceedings in the Vanderburgh Probate Court for the estate of Minnie F. Koch in Indiana, which were initiated alongside similar proceedings in Florida where a guardian had already been appointed for her person and estate. The probate court denied the appearance of attorneys Bates & Hancock on behalf of Koch, based on the Florida court's finding of incompetence and the attorneys' lack of authorization from the Florida guardian, instead directing representation by the county prosecutor and an attorney selected by the Florida guardian. The Supreme Court held that the attorneys' appearance constituted a prima facie showing of authority, that policy favored allowing a defense on behalf of the alleged incompetent, and that full faith and credit did not apply due to differences in parties and subject matter between the proceedings, thus making permanent the writ to vacate the probate court's order denying the attorneys' right to appear.

family lawprocedure

This case arose from a personal injury lawsuit following an automobile accident, in which the plaintiff appealed a defense verdict after the trial court gave a mandatory jury instruction that incorrectly placed on the plaintiff the burden of proving both the defendant's negligence as the proximate cause and the plaintiff's own freedom from contributory negligence. The Supreme Court of Indiana first addressed a motion to dismiss the petition to transfer from the Appellate Court, finding that the petition satisfied Rule 2-23's separation requirement because the asserted errors and supporting arguments were presented in distinct rhetorical paragraphs. On the merits, the court acknowledged the instruction was erroneous under Harper v. James but held that it did not require reversal, because other instructions correctly assigned the burden of proving contributory negligence to the defendant and the charge as a whole fairly informed the jury; accordingly, the petition to transfer was denied.

proceduretorts & liability

This case was a personal injury action arising from an automobile collision, in which the trial court entered judgment for the defendant. On appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court reversed the judgment because of error in the trial court's jury Instruction No. 10. The instruction wrongly required the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's misconduct was the sole proximate cause of the collision and that she herself was free from contributory negligence. Indiana law does not place the burden on the plaintiff to prove freedom from contributory negligence, and the court held that other instructions correctly stating the burden could not cure the contradictory instruction.

proceduretorts & liability