Floyd Stanley Draper

The case involved a taxpayer suing to block the Indianapolis Sanitary District from issuing $8.75 million in bonds (plus related tax levies) for sanitation facility upgrades, on grounds that the total outstanding bonds would exceed the two-percent debt limit in Article 13, Section 1 of the Indiana Constitution. The trial court ruled for the district, and the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that the Sanitary District is a special taxing district created for local public improvements rather than a political or municipal corporation subject to the constitutional cap, and that the legislature validly authorized bonds up to four percent of assessed valuation under a 1951 statute. All statutory prerequisites had been satisfied, and the bonds were needed to meet urgent population-driven needs and Stream Pollution Control Board requirements.

taxesenvironment

The case involved an appeal from a conviction for armed robbery, where the defendant challenged the trial court's handling of testimony from a court-appointed physician regarding his sanity. The court decided that the trial judge did not err in requiring the physician to testify after both the prosecution and defense had presented their evidence, in accordance with the relevant statute, and affirmed the judgment. The reasoning centered on the statutory requirement that court-appointed experts testify after the parties' evidence, the discretionary nature of the order of proof, and the lack of any demonstrated prejudice since the defendant had an opportunity to examine the witness but declined to do so.

criminal lawprocedure

This case is an appeal from a trial court judgment granting a wife a divorce from her husband on grounds of adultery and cruel and inhuman treatment, based primarily on the husband's admissions. The husband sought a new trial after the judgment, arguing that the trial court should have reopened the case to hear testimony from the alleged paramour, who had been unavailable due to military service but was prepared to deny both the adultery and any admission of it. A majority of the court held that the paramour's testimony denying the admission was not cumulative and was central to the close factual dispute, and that the state's interest as a third party required hearing it to ensure the truth was determined. The judgment was therefore reversed and the case remanded with instructions to grant a new trial.

family lawprocedure

This case involves relators, including the Treasurer of Gibson County and others, who filed an original action in the Indiana Supreme Court seeking a writ of mandate and prohibition against a lower court and judge. The relators did not comply with Rule 2-35, which requires petitioners to include or attach certified copies of all relevant pleadings, orders, and entries. The court emphasized that its procedural rules apply equally to all litigants and must be enforced consistently, leading it to deny relief based on the filing deficiency despite the respondents having supplied some omitted counter-claim documents. The alternative writ was dissolved and the permanent writ denied.

procedure

In Snider v. State, the appellant was charged with driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, tried by jury, and found guilty. He appealed after his motion for a new trial was overruled. The court affirmed the judgment because the record contained no bill of exceptions signed by the judge and filed with the clerk as required by Rule 2-3, meaning no alleged errors could be considered on appeal.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved charges against the appellant for kidnapping two nine-year-old children and raping one of them after luring them into his car from a park. Following a bench trial, the court convicted him of two counts of kidnapping and one count of assault with intent to rape, imposing life sentences on the kidnapping counts and one to ten years on the assault. On appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, reasoning that the trial court could infer fraudulent intent and the required elements from the appellant's conduct and inconsistent statements, which outweighed his testimony claiming he merely got lost while intending to take the children to another park.

criminal law