Floyd Stanley Draper

The case involved a taxpayer suing to block the Indianapolis Sanitary District from issuing $8.75 million in bonds (plus related tax levies) for sanitation facility upgrades, on grounds that the total outstanding bonds would exceed the two-percent debt limit in Article 13, Section 1 of the Indiana Constitution. The trial court ruled for the district, and the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that the Sanitary District is a special taxing district created for local public improvements rather than a political or municipal corporation subject to the constitutional cap, and that the legislature validly authorized bonds up to four percent of assessed valuation under a 1951 statute. All statutory prerequisites had been satisfied, and the bonds were needed to meet urgent population-driven needs and Stream Pollution Control Board requirements.

taxesenvironment

The case involved an appeal from a conviction for armed robbery, where the defendant challenged the trial court's handling of testimony from a court-appointed physician regarding his sanity. The court decided that the trial judge did not err in requiring the physician to testify after both the prosecution and defense had presented their evidence, in accordance with the relevant statute, and affirmed the judgment. The reasoning centered on the statutory requirement that court-appointed experts testify after the parties' evidence, the discretionary nature of the order of proof, and the lack of any demonstrated prejudice since the defendant had an opportunity to examine the witness but declined to do so.

criminal lawprocedure

This case is an appeal from a trial court judgment granting a wife a divorce from her husband on grounds of adultery and cruel and inhuman treatment, based primarily on the husband's admissions. The husband sought a new trial after the judgment, arguing that the trial court should have reopened the case to hear testimony from the alleged paramour, who had been unavailable due to military service but was prepared to deny both the adultery and any admission of it. A majority of the court held that the paramour's testimony denying the admission was not cumulative and was central to the close factual dispute, and that the state's interest as a third party required hearing it to ensure the truth was determined. The judgment was therefore reversed and the case remanded with instructions to grant a new trial.

family lawprocedure

This case involves relators, including the Treasurer of Gibson County and others, who filed an original action in the Indiana Supreme Court seeking a writ of mandate and prohibition against a lower court and judge. The relators did not comply with Rule 2-35, which requires petitioners to include or attach certified copies of all relevant pleadings, orders, and entries. The court emphasized that its procedural rules apply equally to all litigants and must be enforced consistently, leading it to deny relief based on the filing deficiency despite the respondents having supplied some omitted counter-claim documents. The alternative writ was dissolved and the permanent writ denied.

procedure

In Snider v. State, the appellant was charged with driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, tried by jury, and found guilty. He appealed after his motion for a new trial was overruled. The court affirmed the judgment because the record contained no bill of exceptions signed by the judge and filed with the clerk as required by Rule 2-3, meaning no alleged errors could be considered on appeal.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved charges against the appellant for kidnapping two nine-year-old children and raping one of them after luring them into his car from a park. Following a bench trial, the court convicted him of two counts of kidnapping and one count of assault with intent to rape, imposing life sentences on the kidnapping counts and one to ten years on the assault. On appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, reasoning that the trial court could infer fraudulent intent and the required elements from the appellant's conduct and inconsistent statements, which outweighed his testimony claiming he merely got lost while intending to take the children to another park.

criminal law

The case involved an appeal by Ray from his conviction for involuntary manslaughter after he drove while intoxicated at high speed on the wrong side of the road, striking another vehicle and causing the death of its driver. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, finding sufficient evidence that Ray's conduct was the proximate cause of the victim's death based on eyewitness accounts of the collision and injuries. The court also held that Ray had voluntarily consented to a drunkometer test, that no procedural errors occurred regarding the admission of test results or jury instructions, and that the indictment was legally sufficient. On rehearing, the court rejected arguments that the reckless homicide statute supplanted involuntary manslaughter, citing a statute that treats the offenses as distinct but allows them to be charged together.

criminal law

The case involved Stanley Gurecki, who was convicted by a jury in LaPorte Circuit Court of assault and battery with intent to commit a felony and found to be a habitual criminal based on two prior felony convictions, resulting in a life sentence without a separate term for the underlying offense. After his direct appeal was dismissed, Gurecki filed a habeas corpus petition in the same court, which declared the judgment void and ordered his release. The state then successfully moved to vacate the original judgment and sought a new trial, but the trial court later granted Gurecki's motion to dismiss the reinstated prosecution on former jeopardy grounds. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the habeas proceedings did not properly invalidate the judgment under the standards from prior cases like Slack v. Grigsby and Todd v. State, so the original conviction remained in effect as a bar to retrial.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved appellant Barrick, who was charged with automobile banditry under Burns’ 1942 Repl., §10-4710 for attempting to commit second-degree burglary while having a car nearby for escape. He was convicted after a trial and sentenced to ten years imprisonment. The court affirmed the conviction, finding the evidence sufficient to show an attempt to break and enter the business building with intent to commit a felony, based on the masked appellant trying doors, wearing a mask and rubber glove, possessing a nearby loaded pistol, and having an automobile with his identifying items parked a block and a half away. The court rejected arguments that the evidence showed only testing of doors or that the car was too distant, holding that factual inferences supported guilt under the statute.

criminal law

The case involved an appellant convicted of reckless homicide and leaving the scene of an accident after his car struck two pedestrians who had stepped into the street from between parked vehicles at night. The court reversed the convictions and remanded for further proceedings. It held that the evidence failed to establish the reckless conduct or conscious disregard required for reckless homicide, as the driver had no opportunity to observe or react to the pedestrians before impact. The court further held that police officers' warrantless entry into a garage to search and seize the appellant's car violated Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution because there was no probable cause, no valid consent, and no exigent circumstances, making the resulting evidence inadmissible and requiring reversal since its use could not be deemed harmless.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Daniel Franklin McCormick's conviction for issuing a fraudulent check, for which he received a one-to-ten-year prison sentence. McCormick appealed, challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to quash the affidavit and his motion for a new trial. The Indiana Supreme Court examined two statutes on fraudulent checks—one from 1905 covering the obtaining of money or property, and one from 1927 covering the obtaining of credit with knowledge of insufficient funds—and found that the affidavit improperly mixed elements from both without fully alleging the required knowledge element under the 1927 Act or fitting the 1905 Act. The court held that the charging document failed to state a public offense with sufficient certainty under either statute, violating requirements for precise statutory elements in criminal pleadings, and that the trial court had erroneously proceeded under the 1927 Act based on the imposed penalty. The judgment was reversed with instructions to sustain the motion to quash the affidavit.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a mother's petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking custody of her infant son from the appellees who had taken and raised him since he was five days old after she was unable to care for him due to hospitalization. The trial court ruled against the mother and for the caregivers, and the appellate court affirmed. The court reasoned that while a parent's natural rights deserve consideration, the child's welfare and happiness are paramount, and here the mother had voluntarily relinquished the child leading to interwoven affections with the foster parents that should not be severed; the trial judge's discretionary decision after observing the parties was upheld as not requiring reversal on the record.

family law

The case involved an Indianapolis police officer charged with second-degree burglary and grand larceny after he was accused of taking a garbage disposal unit from a store that had been broken into during his patrol shift. A jury convicted him of grand larceny, and the trial court denied his motions for a change of venue, continuance due to pretrial publicity, discharge for delay, and other claims. On appeal, the court held that the evidence supported the conviction for larceny rather than embezzlement because the officer lacked any special trust or employment relationship with the store owners that would support an embezzlement charge. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's handling of procedural motions and no violation of speedy trial rights under the Indiana Constitution, and it affirmed the judgment.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the Public Service Commission of Indiana ordering Geo. F. Alger Company to cease interstate motor vehicle transportation for hire in the state for one week in October 1953 and suspending its certificate of authority during that period. The company sued in trial court to set aside the order and obtained a temporary injunction barring enforcement. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the issuance of the temporary injunction, reasoning that the Commission's order had already expired by its own terms by the time the injunction was granted, making further injunctive relief unnecessary. The court remanded with instructions to vacate the temporary injunction.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved an appeal from a conviction in the Huntington Circuit Court for a second offense of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, resulting in a fine and one year of imprisonment. The appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court's refusal of certain jury instructions regarding compliance with arrest procedures under Burns’ §§47-2307 and 47-2308, as well as the definition of being under the influence and access to counsel. The court affirmed the judgment, finding the evidence from a drunkometer test, officer testimony, and prior conviction sufficient to support the verdict. It held that the cited statutes were impractical and unworkable in this context, that any procedural violation did not render the officers' testimony inadmissible absent evidence of coercion, and that the remaining instructions were either adequately covered by the court's own instructions or lacked supporting evidence in the record.

criminal lawprocedure

In Brandenburg v. Buchta, the plaintiff sued truck driver Fields and semitrailer owner Buchta for personal injuries and property damage from a collision on an Indiana highway. Fields defaulted, and the trial court directed a verdict for Buchta at the close of the plaintiff's case. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed, holding that Buchta, a licensed common carrier authorized to operate the equipment, could be liable for Fields's conceded negligence. The court reasoned that the semitrailer was operating under Buchta's permit in the normal course of events, that statutes impose responsibility on carriers for unauthorized operation of their vehicles, and that the plaintiff need not prove the precise agency or employment arrangement between Buchta and Fields, as that information is within Buchta's knowledge.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved the conviction of appellant Myers for second-degree arson in connection with a fire at a commercial building in Bourbon, Indiana. The State relied entirely on circumstantial evidence of opportunity and statements made during the investigation, which the court found consistent with innocence and insufficient to support a guilty verdict. Although the jury deliberated for twenty hours and recommended leniency, the Indiana Supreme Court agreed with the Attorney General that the evidence did not point surely and unerringly to guilt. The judgment was therefore reversed and the cause remanded with instructions to grant a new trial.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned whether an Indiana prisoner was entitled to release on habeas corpus after serving what he claimed was the full term of a 1947 burglary sentence. The prisoner had been on parole from earlier convictions when he committed the burglary, leading to a new two-to-five-year sentence; after revocation of parole he served additional time on the old sentences before beginning the burglary term. The court held that a 1947 statute required the new sentence to commence only after the prior sentences were served or annulled, so the term did not begin until June 1952 and had not expired by October 1952. It reasoned that the specific parole-violation statute created an exception to the general rule that a sentence runs from the date of conviction and was mandatory and self-executing. The judgment granting the writ was therefore reversed.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved an original action in the Indiana Supreme Court seeking a writ of prohibition to prevent the Jay Circuit Court from proceeding with contempt charges against relator McClellan for violating a temporary restraining order. The order had been issued by the Jay court (an adjoining circuit) to halt proceedings in a Grant Circuit Court case while a related injunction matter was pending in the Blackford Circuit Court, where a change of judge had been granted but no successor appointed. The court held that the Jay Circuit Court had jurisdiction to issue the restraining order and enforce it via contempt proceedings. The reasoning centered on interpreting the relevant statute (Burns’ Stat. §3-210.1) to allow an adjoining circuit judge to act when the regular judge is disqualified by a change of judge, treating such disqualification as rendering the judge 'incompetent' by 'other cause' to prevent a procedural gap that would block emergency relief. The temporary writ was dissolved and a permanent writ denied.

procedure

The case involved the appellant being charged and convicted of reckless homicide after his loaded tractor-trailer collided with stopped vehicles on a highway under construction, killing a passenger. The court affirmed the conviction and sentence of six months imprisonment. It held that the affidavit did not need to specify the defendant's speed or the applicable speed limit, as that statutory requirement applies only to prosecutions for speed regulation violations and not to reckless homicide charges. The court further reasoned that references to negligence in the affidavit were mere surplusage that did not invalidate the reckless homicide allegations, that the open and obvious road conditions need not be alleged as known to the defendant, and that any evidentiary errors did not affect the appellant's substantial rights.

criminal lawprocedure