The case concerned whether the City of Hammond could issue additional waterworks revenue bonds to expand its purification and distribution facilities without violating the contractual rights of holders of existing 1934 bonds. The trial court ruled for the city, authorizing the new bonds to be secured by unpledged revenues while preserving the 20% revenue allocation for existing bondholders, and permanently enjoining the bondholders from interference; the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that the governing ordinances and statutes (including Burns’ §§ 48-5305, 48-5315, 48-5319) permitted multiple bond issues and did not restrict new bonds to a depreciation fund, that the additional bonds would not encumber the protected 20% revenue stream or mortgage the system, and that no impairment of contract occurred under Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution or Article I, Section 24 of the Indiana Constitution. Evidence showed the existing bondholders’ rights remained intact.
This case involved an appeal by the Indiana Department of State Revenue from a trial court's decision sustaining a demurrer to the state's amended petition seeking reappraisement and redetermination of inheritance taxes owed by the Estate of Ernest L. Callaway. The estate had been appraised and taxed at $543.52 under a court order, but the state later sought a higher amount under a statute allowing it to petition for reappraisal within one or two years. The court held that the statute was unconstitutional because the initial tax determination constituted a final judicial judgment, and the law's mandatory reappraisal process improperly allowed the executive branch to override it, violating separation of powers under Articles 3 and 7 of the Indiana Constitution. The judgment sustaining the demurrer was affirmed.
In Sisk v. State, the appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment after a jury trial. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by sustaining a demurrer to his plea in abatement, which claimed violations of his rights to challenge grand jurors under Indiana statute and to a preliminary hearing, as well as errors in admitting evidence obtained from a warrantless search of his car. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the defendant had waived his statutory right to appear before the grand jury by failing to request it, that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments do not apply to state proceedings, and that the search was a valid incident to a lawful arrest based on probable cause. The court also found no merit in other evidentiary challenges.
The case involved two appellants charged under an Indiana statute with procuring a female as an inmate for a house of prostitution, as well as encouraging her through promises, threats, violence, or schemes to become or remain an inmate. Following a bench trial where the defendants were found guilty based on the woman's testimony about splitting earnings from acts of prostitution at a Gary location, the appellants challenged the sufficiency of the evidence. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the convictions and judgments, ruling that the evidence failed to prove any of the charged acts, particularly procurement, since the woman had initiated contact and sought the arrangement herself, with no proof of threats or inducements by the appellants and a total lack of evidence against one of them.
In Bowens v. State, the appellant was indicted for first-degree murder after fatally shooting Raymond Bowens but was convicted by a jury of manslaughter and sentenced to two to twenty-one years in prison. On appeal, he argued that the evidence conclusively established self-defense and that the verdict was not supported by sufficient evidence or was contrary to law. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, reasoning that self-defense is an issue of fact for the jury to determine after weighing the evidence and observing witnesses, that appellate courts cannot reweigh such evidence, and that the record contained probative evidence supporting the manslaughter verdict.
The case involved a defendant charged under an Indiana statute with keeping a house of ill fame, meaning a residence used for prostitution. She pleaded not guilty, waived a jury trial, and was convicted by the trial court on evidence that she owned the house, urged women to engage in prostitution there, summoned them for clients, and received money from the acts. On appeal, the defendant argued that the evidence failed to show she controlled the premises and was insufficient overall, but the court affirmed the conviction, ruling that substantial evidence of probative value supported each element of the offense and that conflicting evidence would not be reweighed on review.