Paul G. Jasper

The case concerned whether the City of Hammond could issue additional waterworks revenue bonds to expand its purification and distribution facilities without violating the contractual rights of holders of existing 1934 bonds. The trial court ruled for the city, authorizing the new bonds to be secured by unpledged revenues while preserving the 20% revenue allocation for existing bondholders, and permanently enjoining the bondholders from interference; the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that the governing ordinances and statutes (including Burns’ §§ 48-5305, 48-5315, 48-5319) permitted multiple bond issues and did not restrict new bonds to a depreciation fund, that the additional bonds would not encumber the protected 20% revenue stream or mortgage the system, and that no impairment of contract occurred under Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution or Article I, Section 24 of the Indiana Constitution. Evidence showed the existing bondholders’ rights remained intact.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case involved an appeal by the Indiana Department of State Revenue from a trial court's decision sustaining a demurrer to the state's amended petition seeking reappraisement and redetermination of inheritance taxes owed by the Estate of Ernest L. Callaway. The estate had been appraised and taxed at $543.52 under a court order, but the state later sought a higher amount under a statute allowing it to petition for reappraisal within one or two years. The court held that the statute was unconstitutional because the initial tax determination constituted a final judicial judgment, and the law's mandatory reappraisal process improperly allowed the executive branch to override it, violating separation of powers under Articles 3 and 7 of the Indiana Constitution. The judgment sustaining the demurrer was affirmed.

taxesprocedure

In Sisk v. State, the appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment after a jury trial. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by sustaining a demurrer to his plea in abatement, which claimed violations of his rights to challenge grand jurors under Indiana statute and to a preliminary hearing, as well as errors in admitting evidence obtained from a warrantless search of his car. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the defendant had waived his statutory right to appear before the grand jury by failing to request it, that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments do not apply to state proceedings, and that the search was a valid incident to a lawful arrest based on probable cause. The court also found no merit in other evidentiary challenges.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved two appellants charged under an Indiana statute with procuring a female as an inmate for a house of prostitution, as well as encouraging her through promises, threats, violence, or schemes to become or remain an inmate. Following a bench trial where the defendants were found guilty based on the woman's testimony about splitting earnings from acts of prostitution at a Gary location, the appellants challenged the sufficiency of the evidence. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the convictions and judgments, ruling that the evidence failed to prove any of the charged acts, particularly procurement, since the woman had initiated contact and sought the arrangement herself, with no proof of threats or inducements by the appellants and a total lack of evidence against one of them.

criminal law

In Bowens v. State, the appellant was indicted for first-degree murder after fatally shooting Raymond Bowens but was convicted by a jury of manslaughter and sentenced to two to twenty-one years in prison. On appeal, he argued that the evidence conclusively established self-defense and that the verdict was not supported by sufficient evidence or was contrary to law. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, reasoning that self-defense is an issue of fact for the jury to determine after weighing the evidence and observing witnesses, that appellate courts cannot reweigh such evidence, and that the record contained probative evidence supporting the manslaughter verdict.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a defendant charged under an Indiana statute with keeping a house of ill fame, meaning a residence used for prostitution. She pleaded not guilty, waived a jury trial, and was convicted by the trial court on evidence that she owned the house, urged women to engage in prostitution there, summoned them for clients, and received money from the acts. On appeal, the defendant argued that the evidence failed to show she controlled the premises and was insufficient overall, but the court affirmed the conviction, ruling that substantial evidence of probative value supported each element of the offense and that conflicting evidence would not be reweighed on review.

criminal law

This case is an appeal from the denial of a petition for a writ of error coram nobis challenging a 1947 guilty plea to forgery in the Daviess Circuit Court, where the defendant was sentenced to two to fourteen years in prison. The petitioner claimed the plea was involuntary due to intoxication, confusion, lack of counsel, and misunderstanding of the charges, asserting violations of state and federal constitutional rights. The trial court denied the petition after a hearing, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that the evidence was conflicting and would not be reweighed, that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioner's request to be returned for the hearing, and that coram nobis is not a criminal prosecution requiring the petitioner's presence or triggering the cited constitutional protections. The court concluded that no constitutional rights were violated during the original arraignment or the coram nobis proceeding.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

This case was an original action in the Indiana Supreme Court in which the New York Central Railroad and other relators sought a writ of prohibition to prevent eight circuit courts from organizing as a single court to establish the Kankakee Valley Conservancy District under the Conservancy Act of Indiana. The relators contended that the multi-county proceeding exceeded the jurisdiction of the circuit courts. The court determined that the statute creates a new, specialized conservancy court distinct from the circuit courts listed in the statute authorizing writs of prohibition. Because the legislature had not extended the Supreme Court's prohibition authority to this new court, the court held it lacked jurisdiction to issue the writ. The temporary writ was dissolved and the request for a permanent writ was denied.

procedure

The case involved a challenge to the constitutionality of Chapter 281 of the Acts of 1951, which created the Indiana Toll Road Commission, authorized construction of toll road projects, and permitted financing through toll revenue bonds. The plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment and injunction, arguing that the act's title was too narrow to cover provisions on reimbursing pre-bond expenses and that the financing structure violated sections of the Indiana Constitution on legislative titles and state debt. The trial court upheld the act, and the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the title adequately expressed the subject matter and that the bonds were payable only from personal property revenues and tolls without encumbering state real estate.

business & regulatory

This case is an appeal from a trial court judgment denying a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The appellant argued he was being illegally detained as a parole violator from North Carolina and raised three procedural objections: that the court lacked jurisdiction, that his motion for a change of venue from the county should have been granted, and that his request for special findings of fact and conclusions of law should have been allowed. The court rejected all three contentions, holding that the special judge was properly selected under court rules, that habeas corpus proceedings are not subject to the statute allowing a change of venue from the county in civil actions, and that the statute requiring special findings does not apply to habeas corpus cases. The judgment denying the petition was therefore affirmed.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves an appeal from the denial of a petition for a writ of error coram nobis filed by Ernest Sells, who had pleaded guilty to first-degree murder in 1949 and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Sells claimed that his constitutional rights were violated because he lacked counsel at key stages, was held without prompt judicial review, was coerced into confessing after sleep deprivation and threats, and received inadequate representation from appointed counsel. The trial court had appointed an attorney, fully advised Sells of his rights including the option for a jury trial, confirmed his understanding on the record, and later heard evidence on the coram nobis petition. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the denial, holding that the trial court adequately protected the defendant's rights, that conflicting evidence on the claims was resolved against Sells by the trial court, and that he failed to overcome the presumption that the judgment was obtained lawfully. The court declined to reweigh the evidence or disturb the factual findings.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

Property Owners, Inc. sued the City of Anderson seeking to enjoin the issuance of $6.5 million in Electric Revenue Bonds authorized by city ordinance to fund extensions and additions to the municipal electric plant, which the city had operated since 1896. The trial court sustained demurrers to two paragraphs of the complaint, denied a permanent injunction after trial on the remaining claims, and the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed that judgment. The court held that the revenue bonds did not violate the constitutional debt limit in Article 13, Section 1 because they were payable only from utility revenues and did not create general municipal indebtedness. It further concluded that no new election was required for plant extensions or replacements, that the ordinance was properly enacted and approved by the Public Service Commission, and that prior unappealed orders barred relitigation of certain issues.

propertybusiness & regulatory

This case involved two defendants who in 1933 were indicted for first-degree murder in Indiana, appointed counsel they claimed never consulted them, and pleaded guilty without being informed of their constitutional rights, resulting in life sentences. Decades later, they filed petitions for writs of error coram nobis alleging the pleas were not knowing or voluntary and that their rights to counsel and due process had been violated. The trial court consolidated the cases, found the allegations supported by evidence, and granted the writs. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that the trial court's factual findings on the conflicting evidence were conclusive, that violations of the right to counsel rendered the judgments void ab initio, and that no procedural rules such as lack of diligence could bar relief from void judgments.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case McConnell v. Fulmer involved an appeal from a trial court's interlocutory order appointing a receiver pendente lite over real estate owned by appellant McConnell, who had an agreement to provide lifetime living quarters in the home to appellee Fulmer. The Indiana Supreme Court first overruled the motion to dismiss the appeal, holding that the court's rules permitted an extension of time to file the transcript despite the ten-day statutory deadline under § 3-2603. On the merits, the court reversed the receiver appointment, finding insufficient evidence of a reasonable probability of ultimate recovery by the appellee, no showing of insolvency or risk of waste by the appellant, and adequate maintenance and accounting of the property during the parties' long-term relationship.

family lawpropertyprocedure

This case concerned a dispute over the validity of a lost or destroyed will of Amy Jane Roberts, with the appellee seeking to establish it under Indiana statute §7-601 after alleging it existed at her death but was destroyed by the appellants. The trial court overruled a demurrer challenging jurisdiction and the complaint's sufficiency, then found the will was conditionally revoked under the doctrine of dependent relative revocation based on the testatrix's intent to make a new will. The appellate court reversed, holding that the evidence showed an unconditional revocation through deliberate destruction of the original will, without proof that revocation depended on immediately executing a replacement, and that the special findings were unsupported. The court distinguished prior precedent and emphasized that a mere future intent to create a new will does not invoke dependent relative revocation. Judgment was reversed with instructions for a new trial.

family lawproperty

This case is an appeal from the denial of a petition to file a belated motion for a new trial after Barrett was convicted of first-degree arson by a jury in February 1951. The time to file a motion for new trial expired in March 1951, and Barrett filed his petition in October 1951; after a hearing on conflicting evidence, the trial court denied permission. The appellate court affirmed, holding that under Indiana statute and precedent a litigant must show diligence and that events outside his control made timely filing impossible, that diligence is a factual question for the trial court, and that Barrett failed to carry his burden of proof.

criminal lawprocedure

The case was an appeal by Robert Beeler from his conviction, along with co-conspirators, for conspiracy to commit a felony under Indiana law involving the forgery and passing of bad checks. The trial court admitted testimony regarding a co-conspirator's statements and other evidence of the scheme, found the defendants guilty after a bench trial, and imposed sentence. On appeal, Beeler challenged the admission of evidence and the sufficiency of the proof, but the court ruled that specific objections to the evidence had not been timely or properly made at trial and therefore could not be raised, while the remaining evidence was sufficient to support the findings on each element of the offense. The judgment was affirmed.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a father charged under Indiana criminal law with willfully neglecting to provide necessary home care, food, and clothing for his minor children after a divorce decree awarded custody to the mother and ordered support payments through the Decatur Circuit Court. The father challenged the jurisdiction of the Rush Circuit Court, where the children resided and the criminal affidavit was filed, arguing it constituted a collateral attack on the Decatur court's ongoing civil contempt proceedings for unpaid support. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling sustaining demurrers to the pleas in abatement, holding that the Rush Circuit Court had proper jurisdiction over the criminal offense because the venue for an omission to act lies where the children resided and the support should have been provided. The court reasoned that the civil contempt action, which could be purged by compliance, was distinct from the criminal charge, which carried penalties not subject to purging, and thus the criminal prosecution did not interfere with or attack the divorce court's authority over support orders.

criminal lawfamily law

In Dennison v. State, the appellant was convicted of second-degree burglary after police found him hiding inside a tavern that had been broken into, with a pried door, damaged safe, missing cash, and liquor stacked near the exit. He appealed the denial of a new trial, arguing that the evidence failed to prove a breaking and entering or the required intent to commit a felony. The court affirmed the conviction, concluding that the direct and circumstantial evidence, viewed favorably to the state, provided substantial proof of each element and that determinations of credibility and inferences of guilt were matters for the trial court.

criminal law

In Goldstine v. State, the appellant was charged by affidavit with five counts including entering to commit a felony, possession of burglar tools, automobile banditry, robbery while armed, and second-degree burglary, plus a verdict for grand larceny; he moved to quash the affidavit on grounds that certain counts lacked essential statutory elements. The court held that counts two, three, and four were defective because they omitted required allegations such as the taking of property for automobile banditry and robbery, the defendant's age over sixteen for armed robbery, and sufficiently specific descriptions of tools for the possession charge, while count five adequately alleged ownership and entry into a structure. The jury's grand larceny verdict could not stand without proper robbery elements in the underlying count. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the judgment with instructions to sustain the motion to quash the defective counts and grant a new trial, finding that the errors allowed inadmissible evidence and prejudiced the defendant's substantial rights.

criminal lawprocedure