Oliver Starr

In Pollard v. State, the appellant was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment for killing Leland Miller, whose dismembered and burned remains were found in a vacant house and under a bridge. The defendant argued on appeal that his confessions and testimony showed he acted in self-defense after the victim attacked him with a knife, and thus there was no evidence of a crime, while also challenging the trial court's handling of uncommunicated threats by the victim, the striking of certain witness testimony, and the refusal of a requested jury instruction. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the state's evidence—including witness accounts of the defendant's statements and actions, physical evidence like fusees and a blanket, and the confessions—supported the jury's finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, that any evidentiary errors did not prejudice the defendant, and that the given instructions adequately covered the relevant law.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned a second-degree burglary charge against the appellee for breaking and entering a building identified as the Loyal Order of the Moose lodge. The trial court granted a motion to quash the affidavit solely because it omitted any allegation of the building's owner or occupant. On the state's appeal, the court affirmed that ruling. It held that, under longstanding Indiana precedent and the majority view, an indictment must allege ownership both to show the premises were not the defendant's own and to identify the offense sufficiently to bar future prosecutions for the same act.

criminal lawprocedure

This case is an appeal from the Posey Circuit Court's denial of a petition for a writ of error coram nobis filed by appellant Schmittler, who had pleaded guilty to second-degree burglary in 1949 and was serving a sentence. The petition alleged inadequate representation by counsel, lack of advice on constitutional rights, an involuntary plea influenced by police threats and rumors, and other procedural irregularities surrounding his arrest and guilty plea. The court affirmed the denial, holding that the record supported the trial court's finding that Schmittler had been represented by competent counsel of his choosing and had entered a voluntary plea, thereby waiving claims of rights violations. The opinion distinguished this independent coram nobis action from motions to withdraw a plea, applying civil evidence standards and concluding that the evidence did not establish inadequate representation or misapprehension of rights.

criminal lawprocedure

In Becker v. Stanley, the petitioner filed an original action in the Indiana Supreme Court seeking a writ of mandate to compel a circuit court judge to hear his application for restoration of sanity. The court denied the petition because it was brought in the petitioner's personal capacity rather than in the name of the State of Indiana on relation, as required by statute. The petition also failed to show service on the Attorney General or include the certified copies of pleadings and orders mandated by court rule. These procedural defects required denial of the writ.

procedure

The case involved two consolidated appeals from trial court rulings quashing indictments that charged the defendants with violating a statute (§ 50-201) by conducting business under a fictitious name (State Distributing Company) without first filing a certificate listing their true names and residences with the county clerk. The indictments alleged only that the defendants engaged in business under the false name in Marion County but did not state they maintained an office or place of business there. The appellate court affirmed the quashing of the indictments, holding that the facts alleged failed to constitute a public offense because the statute requires the certificate to be filed in the county where the business's office or place of business is located, and the indictments omitted any such allegation.

criminal lawprocedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involves an original action in the Indiana Supreme Court where Prosecuting Attorney John K. Purcell sought a writ of prohibition against Circuit Judge Norval K. Harris to prevent the judge from appointing a special prosecutor and directing a grand jury to investigate Purcell's official and personal conduct. The judge had issued such an order on his own motion, citing complaints and his own knowledge of alleged misconduct, while admitting personal bias against Purcell and without prior charges, notice, or a hearing. The Supreme Court issued a temporary writ of prohibition but later found, after reviewing the judge's subsequent actions and statements to the grand jury, that the judge had willfully disobeyed the writ by attempting to influence the grand jury's investigation. The court concluded the judge was guilty of contempt and ordered him brought for sentencing. The core reasoning was that the judge's ex parte actions, driven by bias, improperly interfered with the prosecutor's duties and the grand jury's independence without any formal judicial process establishing disqualification or probable cause.

criminal lawprocedure