Oliver Starr

In Pollard v. State, the appellant was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment for killing Leland Miller, whose dismembered and burned remains were found in a vacant house and under a bridge. The defendant argued on appeal that his confessions and testimony showed he acted in self-defense after the victim attacked him with a knife, and thus there was no evidence of a crime, while also challenging the trial court's handling of uncommunicated threats by the victim, the striking of certain witness testimony, and the refusal of a requested jury instruction. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the state's evidence—including witness accounts of the defendant's statements and actions, physical evidence like fusees and a blanket, and the confessions—supported the jury's finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, that any evidentiary errors did not prejudice the defendant, and that the given instructions adequately covered the relevant law.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned a second-degree burglary charge against the appellee for breaking and entering a building identified as the Loyal Order of the Moose lodge. The trial court granted a motion to quash the affidavit solely because it omitted any allegation of the building's owner or occupant. On the state's appeal, the court affirmed that ruling. It held that, under longstanding Indiana precedent and the majority view, an indictment must allege ownership both to show the premises were not the defendant's own and to identify the offense sufficiently to bar future prosecutions for the same act.

criminal lawprocedure

This case is an appeal from the Posey Circuit Court's denial of a petition for a writ of error coram nobis filed by appellant Schmittler, who had pleaded guilty to second-degree burglary in 1949 and was serving a sentence. The petition alleged inadequate representation by counsel, lack of advice on constitutional rights, an involuntary plea influenced by police threats and rumors, and other procedural irregularities surrounding his arrest and guilty plea. The court affirmed the denial, holding that the record supported the trial court's finding that Schmittler had been represented by competent counsel of his choosing and had entered a voluntary plea, thereby waiving claims of rights violations. The opinion distinguished this independent coram nobis action from motions to withdraw a plea, applying civil evidence standards and concluding that the evidence did not establish inadequate representation or misapprehension of rights.

criminal lawprocedure

In Becker v. Stanley, the petitioner filed an original action in the Indiana Supreme Court seeking a writ of mandate to compel a circuit court judge to hear his application for restoration of sanity. The court denied the petition because it was brought in the petitioner's personal capacity rather than in the name of the State of Indiana on relation, as required by statute. The petition also failed to show service on the Attorney General or include the certified copies of pleadings and orders mandated by court rule. These procedural defects required denial of the writ.

procedure

The case involved two consolidated appeals from trial court rulings quashing indictments that charged the defendants with violating a statute (§ 50-201) by conducting business under a fictitious name (State Distributing Company) without first filing a certificate listing their true names and residences with the county clerk. The indictments alleged only that the defendants engaged in business under the false name in Marion County but did not state they maintained an office or place of business there. The appellate court affirmed the quashing of the indictments, holding that the facts alleged failed to constitute a public offense because the statute requires the certificate to be filed in the county where the business's office or place of business is located, and the indictments omitted any such allegation.

criminal lawprocedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involves an original action in the Indiana Supreme Court where Prosecuting Attorney John K. Purcell sought a writ of prohibition against Circuit Judge Norval K. Harris to prevent the judge from appointing a special prosecutor and directing a grand jury to investigate Purcell's official and personal conduct. The judge had issued such an order on his own motion, citing complaints and his own knowledge of alleged misconduct, while admitting personal bias against Purcell and without prior charges, notice, or a hearing. The Supreme Court issued a temporary writ of prohibition but later found, after reviewing the judge's subsequent actions and statements to the grand jury, that the judge had willfully disobeyed the writ by attempting to influence the grand jury's investigation. The court concluded the judge was guilty of contempt and ordered him brought for sentencing. The core reasoning was that the judge's ex parte actions, driven by bias, improperly interfered with the prosecutor's duties and the grand jury's independence without any formal judicial process establishing disqualification or probable cause.

criminal lawprocedure

This case consolidated seventeen appeals from Marion County, Indiana, where defendants were indicted under a 1905 statute for unlawfully making and drawing various lottery schemes and gift enterprises, including a baseball lottery pool, for the division of money by chance. The trial court sustained the defendants' motions to quash each indictment on grounds that the facts did not constitute a public offense and lacked sufficient certainty. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed those rulings, holding that the indictments were adequate because they tracked the statutory language, the terms "lottery" and "gift enterprise" have established meanings that the court could judicially notice, and no further description of the schemes or prizes was required. The court reasoned that charging in the words of the statute is generally sufficient for such offenses and that "make" and "draw" have definite meanings in this context, referring to setting up and conducting the drawings.

criminal law

This case involves an original action where the relator sought a writ of mandate to require a lower court to consider his petition for a writ of error coram nobis following a conviction. The court denied the petition because the relator failed to serve a copy on the Attorney General as required by statute and did not include certified copies of relevant pleadings and orders as mandated by court rule. Additionally, the proceedings were initiated more than five years after the conviction, which deprived the court of jurisdiction under the applicable law from 1947.

criminal lawprocedure

The case was a wrongful death action brought by a father after his 11-year-old son drowned in a water-filled excavation on the defendant's property in Hammond, Indiana. The complaint alleged the excavation created an attractive nuisance because it had an uneven bottom with hidden deep drop-offs, was visible from a nearby sidewalk in a residential area, and lacked warnings. The trial court sustained a demurrer dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, and the appellate court affirmed. The court held that under Indiana law an artificial pond or pool does not qualify as an attractive nuisance if it merely duplicates natural bodies of water without adding new dangers, as risks like drowning and uneven bottoms are common in nature and children are presumed to understand them. The ruling distinguished cases involving public streets and rejected reliance on contrary precedents from other jurisdictions.

torts & liabilityproperty

The case involved an appeal from a conviction for first-degree burglary and habitual criminal status after a jury trial in which the defendant pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of unsound mind. The defendant argued that the evidence, including expert testimony on pathological intoxication and psychopathic personality, compelled a finding of insanity and that the state failed to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the jury as the sole judge of credibility could disregard the defense evidence on sanity if it found it unworthy of belief when considered against all the circumstances, including police testimony that the defendant was not intoxicated and acted knowingly during the offense. The court further noted that the defendant did not tender instructions on the insanity issue and that the burden of proof on sanity remained with the state throughout but could be met without direct contradictory evidence in every instance.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a foreign corporation licensed in Indiana seeking a refund of gross income taxes paid under the state's Gross Income Tax Act for 1941-1942 on receipts from printing and binding books for out-of-state publishers and from selling bookcases shipped out of state. The trial court ruled for the corporation on the ground that all transactions constituted interstate commerce exempt from state taxation under the Commerce Clause. The appellate court reversed in part, holding that the printing and binding income was taxable because it arose from purely local manufacturing and service activities performed in Indiana, with the customers retaining control over any subsequent shipments; however, the bookcase sales were not taxable because they involved goods sold and shipped to out-of-state buyers as part of the contracts. The court directed entry of judgment for the tax division on the manufacturing claims and for the corporation on the bookcase claims.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

This case is an appeal by Lake Motor Freight Line, Inc. challenging rulings on jury instructions, evidence admission, and the striking of portions of its complaint against the New York Central Railroad. The Indiana Supreme Court took the case on transfer after noting errors in the Appellate Court's opinion but found that the appellant's brief omitted required elements such as the complaint, motion to strike, answer, counterclaim, and objections to instructions, in violation of appellate briefing rules. Because the brief failed to present any reviewable questions and the court will not search the record to identify errors, the judgment below was affirmed without addressing the merits of the underlying dispute.

procedure

This case is an original action in which relator William Watkins sought a writ of mandate compelling the Lake Criminal Court judge to hear his motion to modify the 1939 judgment sentencing him for second-degree burglary and as a habitual criminal under Indiana law. The motion claimed the two prior felony convictions supporting the habitual-criminal finding were void because Watkins had been denied counsel and due process in those cases, though he did not challenge the burglary conviction itself. The court held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the motion, as Watkins had a full opportunity to contest any infirmities in the prior convictions when they were used against him in 1939 but failed to do so, precluding a later collateral attack. Relying on precedents such as State ex rel. Taylor v. Reeves and Grayes v. State of New York, the court denied the petition for mandate.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved an original action for a writ of mandate in the Indiana Supreme Court, where relators sought to compel the Adams Circuit Court to grant a change of venue from the county in a pending mechanic's lien foreclosure action and to expunge subsequent orders. The court decided that the special judge erred by not granting the venue change for the entire case to all parties and by making further orders after the application was filed, directing the judge to grant the change and remove post-application entries. The reasoning was that a timely filed affidavit for change of venue divests the court of jurisdiction except to grant the change, which must apply to the whole proceeding, and rules about serving copies apply only to changes of judge, not venue from the county.

procedureproperty

The case involved a jury conviction for operating a motor vehicle on a public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, based in part on results from a drunkometer test administered shortly after arrest. The defendant moved to suppress the test results, arguing they were obtained through denial of counsel, coercion, intimidation, and illegal detention without prompt presentment before a magistrate. The court affirmed the conviction, finding sufficient evidence that the defendant submitted to the test voluntarily without coercion or denial of rights, that failure to object at trial waived other challenges to the evidence, and that any unlawful detention did not render the voluntarily given results inadmissible as a matter of law.

criminal lawprocedure

This case is an appeal from a trial court's interlocutory order in a divorce action requiring the husband to pay temporary child support of $90 per week and $1,500 in partial attorney fees to the wife's attorneys, while granting the wife temporary custody of the children. The appellate court reversed the attorney fees portion of the order, holding that the wife possessed sufficient assets—including stocks valued over $300,000, other investments generating at least $6,200 in annual income, and adequate credit—to cover her litigation expenses, making such an award improper under both statute and precedent. The court affirmed the child support order, concluding that the trial court had authority under the divorce statute to direct payments for the minor children's support pendente lite regardless of the wife's financial resources, and that the evidence supported this provision.

family lawprocedure

The case involved a defendant who in 1936 pleaded guilty to forgery and being an habitual criminal and was sentenced directly to life imprisonment in the Indiana State Prison without the trial court first imposing a specific term of imprisonment for the forgery offense as required by statute. In 1947 the State petitioned for and obtained a nunc pro tunc order that purported to add the missing specific-term sentence retroactively, relying solely on the original court's minutes. The Indiana Supreme Court held that the nunc pro tunc order was erroneous because those minutes contained no indication that the trial court had ever pronounced a specific-term sentence on the forgery count and no other written memorial supported the correction. The court therefore directed that the nunc pro tunc order be expunged from the record.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute over a contract for the sale of a hotel property in Indianapolis. Clara Navin agreed to sell the hotel to William Fuller, who then assigned his interest in the contract to a newly formed corporation, The New Colonial Hotel, Inc. The corporation sued for specific performance after Navin refused to proceed with the sale to the corporation instead of Fuller. The court reversed the lower court's judgment in favor of the corporation, reasoning that rights coupled with liabilities under a contract cannot be assigned without the consent of the other party, as this would improperly substitute a new obligor.

propertybusiness & regulatory

This case involved an original action by the State of Indiana seeking a writ of prohibition to prevent the Hancock Circuit Court from considering a petition by two convicted defendants, Donald Joseph and Paul Pierce, for permission to file a motion for a new trial after the statutory deadline had passed. The defendants had been sentenced in 1936 and claimed that prison officials had prevented them from filing their motion on time. The court denied the writ, holding that prior precedent permits such equitable proceedings in the trial court based on post-trial events not caused by the defendants' own fault, such as interference by prison officials. It further ruled that the circuit court had jurisdiction to hear the petition and that questions like the defendants' diligence in filing were matters for the trial court's discretion rather than for prohibition.

criminal lawprocedure

In Yelton v. Plantz, resident taxpayers of Aubbeenaubbee Township sued the township trustee to enjoin performance of contracts for constructing a schoolhouse, alleging that the contracts were awarded without proper re-advertising after altering plans and specifications, and that they would exceed the township's debt limit. The trial court ruled in favor of the trustee. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that although the initial bidding process violated statutory requirements, a subsequent curative statute enacted by the legislature validly ratified the contracts. The court further reasoned that the contracts did not violate constitutional debt limits or appropriation requirements, as the evidence showed compliance with available funds and no excess indebtedness.

business & regulatorytaxes