Elma G. Albert

This case involves a dispute over ownership of land along the Little Sioux River in Harrison County, Iowa, specifically regarding accretions to certain parcels in section 27. The trial court quieted title in the plaintiff for the east half of the northeast quarter south of the river's center line along with its accretions, and in the intervener for the lands described in the intervention petition along with accretions. On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court observed that essential plats referenced in the evidence were absent from the record submitted, preventing full de novo review, but concluded after examining the available materials that the district court had reached the proper result on the claims and cross-petitions. The decree was therefore affirmed.

propertyprocedure

The case involved the prosecution of defendant Murray for breaking and entering a state highway commission warehouse in Avoca, Iowa, where he and companions took several gallons of gasoline from a pump after drinking and driving from Omaha. Murray testified that he pushed open a partially ajar door to access the pump with intent to take the gas, though a witness reported hearing hammering that broke the padlock and a light. The trial court convicted him under the breaking-and-entering statute, and the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, holding that pushing the door farther constituted sufficient breaking even if partially open, that the nighttime element was immaterial surplusage, and that the evidence did not warrant an intoxication instruction given Murray's own admissions that he knew what he was doing.

criminal law

The case involved a 1934 automobile collision on an Iowa highway where the plaintiff's truck, driven by his employee, attempted a left turn onto a side road at an intersection without first passing to the right of and beyond the center of the intersection, as required by statute. The defendant's sedan, traveling in the same direction and attempting to pass, struck the truck, which was positioned crosswise on the pavement. The sole issue was whether the plaintiff's statutory violation constituted contributory negligence as a matter of law that barred recovery. The court held that the violation was negligence per se, that the admitted facts showed it contributed to the accident with no room for reasonable disagreement, and that the defendant was therefore entitled to a directed verdict. It reversed the judgment in favor of the plaintiff, relying on prior precedents applying the same rule to left-turn violations.

torts & liability

The case involved a dispute over a contract for the sale of 240 acres of land in Greene County, Iowa, where the buyer sought specific performance from the seller, a nonresident land bank. The plaintiff initially filed a petition for specific performance and later substituted it with one seeking broader equitable relief. The defendant challenged the court's jurisdiction, arguing that the substituted petition introduced a new in personam cause of action, but the court overruled this special appearance. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that both petitions sought specific performance of the contract and equitable relief without substantially changing the cause of action, thus maintaining jurisdiction.

procedureproperty

This case involves a divorce action between Albert Tennigkeit and his wife, where the lower court granted a divorce and ordered the husband to pay $175 per month in child support for their three children. The court also addressed attorney fees. On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court modified the decree by striking the child support allowance, reasoning that the wife held all accumulated marital property and had inherited substantial assets, while the husband was in poor health, had limited earning capacity, and few remaining assets. The court increased the attorney's fee allowance to $100, finding the prior amount insufficient, and affirmed the decree as modified.

family lawproperty

This case involved a dispute over property from the estate of Cornelius Powell, where his widow Elizabeth and son Clifford entered a 1930 contract in which Clifford conveyed his remainder interest in certain Iowa real estate to Elizabeth in exchange for her promise to execute a will leaving all her property at death to him; Elizabeth later deeded the real estate to her niece Corrine McBlain in 1934 and executed a new will that did not leave everything to Clifford’s heirs. After Elizabeth’s death, Clifford’s widow and minor children sued for specific performance of the contract, seeking to invalidate the deed and claim interests in the real estate and certain personal property like a mortgage note. The court reversed the trial court’s ruling in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that the 1930 contract did not restrict Elizabeth’s ability to sell or convey the real estate during her lifetime and that the deed conveyed fee simple title to McBlain. The reasoning was that under the contract’s terms and general principles of law, the agreement applied only to property owned at death, leaving the promisor free to dispose of assets beforehand absent fraud, and the plaintiffs had no claim to property Elizabeth did not own at death such as the Smith note.

propertyfamily law