Elma G. Albert

This case involves a dispute over ownership of land along the Little Sioux River in Harrison County, Iowa, specifically regarding accretions to certain parcels in section 27. The trial court quieted title in the plaintiff for the east half of the northeast quarter south of the river's center line along with its accretions, and in the intervener for the lands described in the intervention petition along with accretions. On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court observed that essential plats referenced in the evidence were absent from the record submitted, preventing full de novo review, but concluded after examining the available materials that the district court had reached the proper result on the claims and cross-petitions. The decree was therefore affirmed.

propertyprocedure

The case involved the prosecution of defendant Murray for breaking and entering a state highway commission warehouse in Avoca, Iowa, where he and companions took several gallons of gasoline from a pump after drinking and driving from Omaha. Murray testified that he pushed open a partially ajar door to access the pump with intent to take the gas, though a witness reported hearing hammering that broke the padlock and a light. The trial court convicted him under the breaking-and-entering statute, and the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, holding that pushing the door farther constituted sufficient breaking even if partially open, that the nighttime element was immaterial surplusage, and that the evidence did not warrant an intoxication instruction given Murray's own admissions that he knew what he was doing.

criminal law

The case involved a 1934 automobile collision on an Iowa highway where the plaintiff's truck, driven by his employee, attempted a left turn onto a side road at an intersection without first passing to the right of and beyond the center of the intersection, as required by statute. The defendant's sedan, traveling in the same direction and attempting to pass, struck the truck, which was positioned crosswise on the pavement. The sole issue was whether the plaintiff's statutory violation constituted contributory negligence as a matter of law that barred recovery. The court held that the violation was negligence per se, that the admitted facts showed it contributed to the accident with no room for reasonable disagreement, and that the defendant was therefore entitled to a directed verdict. It reversed the judgment in favor of the plaintiff, relying on prior precedents applying the same rule to left-turn violations.

torts & liability

The case involved a dispute over a contract for the sale of 240 acres of land in Greene County, Iowa, where the buyer sought specific performance from the seller, a nonresident land bank. The plaintiff initially filed a petition for specific performance and later substituted it with one seeking broader equitable relief. The defendant challenged the court's jurisdiction, arguing that the substituted petition introduced a new in personam cause of action, but the court overruled this special appearance. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that both petitions sought specific performance of the contract and equitable relief without substantially changing the cause of action, thus maintaining jurisdiction.

procedureproperty

This case involves a divorce action between Albert Tennigkeit and his wife, where the lower court granted a divorce and ordered the husband to pay $175 per month in child support for their three children. The court also addressed attorney fees. On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court modified the decree by striking the child support allowance, reasoning that the wife held all accumulated marital property and had inherited substantial assets, while the husband was in poor health, had limited earning capacity, and few remaining assets. The court increased the attorney's fee allowance to $100, finding the prior amount insufficient, and affirmed the decree as modified.

family lawproperty

This case involved a dispute over property from the estate of Cornelius Powell, where his widow Elizabeth and son Clifford entered a 1930 contract in which Clifford conveyed his remainder interest in certain Iowa real estate to Elizabeth in exchange for her promise to execute a will leaving all her property at death to him; Elizabeth later deeded the real estate to her niece Corrine McBlain in 1934 and executed a new will that did not leave everything to Clifford’s heirs. After Elizabeth’s death, Clifford’s widow and minor children sued for specific performance of the contract, seeking to invalidate the deed and claim interests in the real estate and certain personal property like a mortgage note. The court reversed the trial court’s ruling in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that the 1930 contract did not restrict Elizabeth’s ability to sell or convey the real estate during her lifetime and that the deed conveyed fee simple title to McBlain. The reasoning was that under the contract’s terms and general principles of law, the agreement applied only to property owned at death, leaving the promisor free to dispose of assets beforehand absent fraud, and the plaintiffs had no claim to property Elizabeth did not own at death such as the Smith note.

propertyfamily law

The case involved a claim on a life insurance policy issued in 1909 by the Bagmen Emergency Fund Association, a fraternal benefit society, to Seymore J. Smith, who died in 1934. The Bagmen policy and bylaws conditioned coverage on continuous good standing in a separate fraternal organization, the United Commercial Travelers of America; Smith was suspended from the Travelers in November 1932 for nonpayment of dues under its constitution, which the court held automatically triggered his suspension from the Bagmen association under its self-executing bylaws. The court found that all procedural requirements for the Travelers suspension were met, that the Bagmen association lacked knowledge of the suspension when it later accepted payments (precluding waiver), and that the beneficiary therefore had no enforceable claim. The equity action was reversed with directions to deny recovery.

business & regulatory

The case involved a salesman who sued his employer, Pointer Brewing Co., for additional compensation for the use of his personal car while working outside Des Moines after his transfer to other parts of Iowa. The plaintiff claimed an implied contract arose from the company's repeated promises to work out extra pay for car use, separate from his salary and reimbursed expenses. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the lower court's judgment for the plaintiff, holding that the evidence showed no mutual meeting of the minds on any definite modification of the original employment contract, which already covered car use. The court found the company's statements were only indefinite future promises rather than an agreement, the plaintiff had certified and accepted payments without claiming car-use compensation, and the jury instructions failed to address the pleadings or the defendant's satisfaction and counterclaim defenses.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

This case concerned whether Woodbury County was required to pay Iowa motor fuel taxes on gasoline purchased from out-of-state refineries and used in county trucks and power maintainers for highway construction and maintenance between 1934 and 1936. The Iowa Supreme Court held that the county was liable for the stipulated tax amount of $4,235.25 but not the penalty, relying on its recent decisions in State v. City of Des Moines and Scott v. State Board of Assessment and Review. The court reasoned that the statute applied to counties absent a specific exemption, even for governmental uses, because the act's definition of motor vehicles expressly included equipment used to construct or repair highways; it also rejected constitutional challenges to the law's enactment under Article III, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution.

taxes

The case involved a criminal charge against the defendant for uttering a forged "PAID" stamp on a cattle sale contract during a civil replevin action brought by a bank receiver, where the defendant and his wife claimed the contract had been paid in full. The court held that the defendant's production of the document in court—handing it to counsel for introduction as evidence—constituted uttering under the forgery statute, as it was offered as genuine to support the defense. However, the conviction was reversed because the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that the defendant bore the burden of proof on an alibi-like transaction in St. Louis, when the state actually carried that burden. The opinion also addressed permissible cross-examination of character witnesses but found no error there.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved whether George M. Paradise became a stockholder in a bank that failed in 1931, making him subject to a 100% super-added liability assessment under Iowa statute when the bank's assets proved insufficient to cover debts. The court reversed the trial court's judgment against Paradise, holding that he never became a stockholder. The core reasoning was that no valid contract for the stock purchase existed due to the absence of a mutual meeting of the minds: Paradise understood he was buying newly issued shares directly from the bank, while the seller (Nelson) intended to transfer his own existing shares without disclosure, and the stock certificate was never delivered to Paradise.

business & regulatory

The case concerned whether the Delaware County district court had jurisdiction to vacate its prior order dismissing a personal injury lawsuit for lack of prosecution and to reinstate the case. The underlying action, Iletha Sehlumbohm v. Workman and Jarvis, arose from an automobile accident; the petition was filed in 1932, service occurred in 1933, and the court dismissed the case in December 1934 under a local rule requiring dismissal of cases pending over two years without prosecution. In August 1935 the plaintiff sought reinstatement via application and mailed notice, and the court granted reinstatement after finding good cause; the defendants then petitioned for certiorari. The Iowa Supreme Court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction because Chapter 552 of the Code exclusively governs procedures to vacate or modify judgments, section 10801 could not be used instead, and the plaintiff had not followed Chapter 552's requirements; therefore the reinstatement order was invalid and the writ was sustained.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved a dispute between W. Theo Woodward and his stepmother Carrie Woodward over assets from the estate of W. J. Woodward, with the plaintiff claiming rights based on an alleged pre-death settlement agreement dividing Florida property to him and Iowa assets to the defendant, plus a gift of certain mortgages and notes. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the petition for an accounting, finding no valid gift due to lack of definite subject matter, intent, or delivery, and no enforceable contract because correspondence showed no meeting of the minds amid ongoing proposed changes. Additional claims regarding specific mortgages were rejected as unsupported or outside the scope, with the court noting that probate of the father's will and involvement of other heirs precluded further determinations on the widow's obligations.

family lawproperty

The case concerned whether four children of a coal miner family living in a county-provided building within the Carbon Independent School District qualified as actual residents entitled to free public schooling under Iowa Code section 4273. The court held that the children were residents of the plaintiff district and that the district therefore could not charge Adams County for their tuition. The core reasoning was that the father's undisputed testimony established the location as the family's sole home and residence during the relevant period, the family had never been inmates of the county home, and statutes addressing tuition for poor children in county care or charitable institutions did not apply.

civil rights

The case concerned two plaintiffs who separately pleaded guilty in 1934 to violating Iowa Code section 13002 by entering a bank with intent to rob; the district court sentenced each to thirty years in the penitentiary, but prison officials recorded the sentences as life imprisonment, prompting this action to compel correction of the record to reflect a term not exceeding thirty years. The Iowa Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to no relief, regardless of whether the proceeding was proper. Under the indeterminate sentence law (Code section 13960), which applies to this felony because it is not among the statutory exceptions for murder, treason, or rape, a sentencing court may not fix a definite term; any such specification in the judgment is surplusage, and the warden must instead apply the statutory range of life or not less than ten years. Prior precedents confirmed that the board of parole, not the court, determines the actual duration within the statutory bounds, so the prison record was accurate and no writ would issue.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a mortgage foreclosure on the defendants' city property, after which the defendants sought and received extensions of the redemption period under state moratorium statutes, with the court setting monthly rental at $35. The plaintiff, holder of the sheriff's certificate, presented evidence on rental value and made a conditional offer of $55 per month but introduced no evidence against granting the second extension. The court approved the extension and $35 rental amount based on reviewed evidence, while canceling the portion of the order that waived rental payments if the plaintiff appealed, as no statutory authority supported penalizing an appeal. The original order was modified accordingly and affirmed.

propertyprocedure

In Bobst v. Hoxie Truck Line, the plaintiff sought damages for injuries sustained in a highway collision when the defendant's truck passed her car and collided with an oncoming vehicle, which was then deflected into the plaintiff's path. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, which the trial court reduced, but the Iowa Supreme Court reversed the judgment. The court held that jury instruction No. 8 was fatally defective because it summarized the elements of the plaintiff's recovery without requiring proof that she was free from contributory negligence and because it treated a statutory violation regarding yielding half the traveled way as negligence rather than prima facie evidence of negligence. The court further found that instruction No. 7 improperly narrowed the plaintiff's burden by requiring contributory negligence to be the proximate cause of the injury rather than any act that directly contributed in any degree. These errors in the instructions required reversal despite other general instructions on contributory negligence.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a dispute over ownership of a lot in Sioux City, Iowa. Plaintiff Lockie claimed title through a sheriff’s deed from an execution sale on a 1930 judgment against John Hunter, alleging that Hunter held the beneficial interest while defendant A. L. White held legal title in trust. White asserted absolute ownership based on a 1908 warranty deed and later tax purchases, and counterclaimed to quiet title. The district court ruled for White, and the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that Lockie bore the burden to prove Hunter’s interest on the strength of his own title but presented insufficient evidence of any trust or beneficial ownership, with all relevant transactions predating the judgment.

propertyprocedure

The case concerned a dispute over the scope of a guaranty contract signed by stockholders of the Farmers Union Exchange corporation in favor of the West Branch State Bank. The bank sought to enforce the guaranty against the individual defendants for outstanding loans and renewals made to the corporation both before and after the February 1921 execution date, while the defendants contended that the guaranty covered only preexisting indebtedness. After the corporation confessed judgment, a jury returned a verdict for the individual defendants. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the guaranty was ambiguous as to its temporal scope and that intent should be determined from surrounding circumstances and the parties' conduct, and that the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence and refusing requested instructions on inferences from non-testimony.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned a declaration of trust holding title to 327 acres of land in Harrison County, Iowa, with the Titus Management Company as trustee and specified beneficiaries retaining management rights; the beneficiaries later served notice to terminate the trust and demanded conveyance to a new trustee, but the company refused, prompting an equity action in Muscatine County for specific performance of the trust termination and a deed. The sole issue was whether venue properly lay in Muscatine County or had to be changed to Harrison County under Iowa Code section 11034. The court held that the statute required the action to be brought in the county where the real property was situated because the suit sought determination of rights or interests in that land, including enforcement of a contractual obligation to convey title. It reviewed prior precedents interpreting the venue statute and concluded that the legislative purpose was to ensure county land records reflect all title-affecting matters, so the motion for change of venue should have been granted.

propertyprocedure