William D. Evans

The case concerned a will containing a no-contest clause that forfeited legacies of any beneficiary who challenged the will's validity. The court addressed whether that clause could be enforced against beneficiaries who had contested the will on grounds of undue influence and lack of testamentary capacity. It held that the clause is unenforceable against a contestant who acts in good faith and with probable cause, thereby modifying prior precedent that had upheld such clauses without regard to the challenger's motives. The court found the record established good-faith, probable-cause contests by two beneficiaries and therefore reversed the forfeiture rulings as to them while affirming that two other beneficiaries were not subject to the clause.

family lawproperty

The case involved the trial of defendant Thomson for the armed robbery of a drug store owner, where the main evidence against him was an alleged oral confession to law enforcement that he denied making. The trial court convicted the defendant largely on that basis. On appeal, the court reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial because the county attorney improperly asserted in closing argument that he personally knew the confession occurred since he had been present, effectively becoming an unsworn witness, and the remaining evidence was of doubtful sufficiency to support the verdict.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a bank that had been appointed guardian for a minor ward and deposited trust funds into its own accounts in the form of a general deposit, despite lacking authority to do so. After the bank entered receivership, the receiver argued the account remained a trust, entitling the ward only to a pro rata share of the bank's limited cash on hand along with other trust claims, while the new guardian sought deposit status. The court held that the account was properly treated as a deposit. It reasoned that although the bank wrongfully appropriated title to the funds, the beneficiary could elect to ratify that act under equitable principles, thereby fixing the debtor-creditor relationship and allowing the ward to benefit from deposit priority.

business & regulatorypropertyfamily law

This case concerned whether cross-defendants acquired liens on real estate through attachment and garnishment proceedings begun in 1921 or through judgments entered in 1923. The court held that no liens were obtained and affirmed the district court's decree. The question of liens from the attachment proceedings had already been fully litigated and decided against the cross-defendants in the 1923 decree, which barred any further challenge. The 1923 judgments against Kavaney likewise created no lien on the property because he held no title or interest at that time, and an escrow theory advanced by the appellants did not alter that result.

propertyprocedure

The case McCrum v. Rubbert centered on disputes over the application of collections from foreclosure proceedings and executions related to two mortgages on 320 acres of land originally owned by Rubbert. McCrum purchased the land in 1918, assuming the first mortgage of $16,000 and giving a second mortgage to Rubbert; after Rubbert foreclosed the second mortgage in 1923 and acquired the property subject to the first mortgage, various collections were made under a deficiency judgment and applied to taxes and interest. McCrum sued to recover a balance from those collections after a court-ordered reapplication to the deficiency, while Rubbert raised a counterclaim seeking payment on the first mortgage. The court ruled that Rubbert, by taking the land subject to the first mortgage through his foreclosure, assumed primary liability for it under established mortgage law, preventing him from pursuing personal liability against McCrum. It affirmed the trial court's directed verdict for McCrum, finding the material facts undisputed and other defenses meritless.

property

The case involved a defendant convicted in Iowa of accepting deposits while knowing his bank was insolvent; he appealed the judgment, posted bail, and then died before the appeal was decided. The court was asked to determine whether the prosecution and underlying conviction, including any award of costs, survived the defendant's death or instead abated entirely. Following the near-universal rule in criminal cases, the court held that the death abated the action ab initio, rendering nonexistent both the pending appeal and the trial court proceedings, verdict, and judgment. The reasoning rested on the principle that criminal prosecutions aim at personal punishment rather than property rights, so that a fine or costs judgment cannot stand independently once the defendant is beyond the reach of punishment; costs are merely incidental to the conviction and fall with it. The court therefore dismissed the action in full rather than entering any judgment for costs against the estate.

criminal lawprocedure