William D. Evans

The case concerned a will containing a no-contest clause that forfeited legacies of any beneficiary who challenged the will's validity. The court addressed whether that clause could be enforced against beneficiaries who had contested the will on grounds of undue influence and lack of testamentary capacity. It held that the clause is unenforceable against a contestant who acts in good faith and with probable cause, thereby modifying prior precedent that had upheld such clauses without regard to the challenger's motives. The court found the record established good-faith, probable-cause contests by two beneficiaries and therefore reversed the forfeiture rulings as to them while affirming that two other beneficiaries were not subject to the clause.

family lawproperty

The case involved the trial of defendant Thomson for the armed robbery of a drug store owner, where the main evidence against him was an alleged oral confession to law enforcement that he denied making. The trial court convicted the defendant largely on that basis. On appeal, the court reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial because the county attorney improperly asserted in closing argument that he personally knew the confession occurred since he had been present, effectively becoming an unsworn witness, and the remaining evidence was of doubtful sufficiency to support the verdict.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a bank that had been appointed guardian for a minor ward and deposited trust funds into its own accounts in the form of a general deposit, despite lacking authority to do so. After the bank entered receivership, the receiver argued the account remained a trust, entitling the ward only to a pro rata share of the bank's limited cash on hand along with other trust claims, while the new guardian sought deposit status. The court held that the account was properly treated as a deposit. It reasoned that although the bank wrongfully appropriated title to the funds, the beneficiary could elect to ratify that act under equitable principles, thereby fixing the debtor-creditor relationship and allowing the ward to benefit from deposit priority.

business & regulatorypropertyfamily law

This case concerned whether cross-defendants acquired liens on real estate through attachment and garnishment proceedings begun in 1921 or through judgments entered in 1923. The court held that no liens were obtained and affirmed the district court's decree. The question of liens from the attachment proceedings had already been fully litigated and decided against the cross-defendants in the 1923 decree, which barred any further challenge. The 1923 judgments against Kavaney likewise created no lien on the property because he held no title or interest at that time, and an escrow theory advanced by the appellants did not alter that result.

propertyprocedure

The case McCrum v. Rubbert centered on disputes over the application of collections from foreclosure proceedings and executions related to two mortgages on 320 acres of land originally owned by Rubbert. McCrum purchased the land in 1918, assuming the first mortgage of $16,000 and giving a second mortgage to Rubbert; after Rubbert foreclosed the second mortgage in 1923 and acquired the property subject to the first mortgage, various collections were made under a deficiency judgment and applied to taxes and interest. McCrum sued to recover a balance from those collections after a court-ordered reapplication to the deficiency, while Rubbert raised a counterclaim seeking payment on the first mortgage. The court ruled that Rubbert, by taking the land subject to the first mortgage through his foreclosure, assumed primary liability for it under established mortgage law, preventing him from pursuing personal liability against McCrum. It affirmed the trial court's directed verdict for McCrum, finding the material facts undisputed and other defenses meritless.

property

The case involved a defendant convicted in Iowa of accepting deposits while knowing his bank was insolvent; he appealed the judgment, posted bail, and then died before the appeal was decided. The court was asked to determine whether the prosecution and underlying conviction, including any award of costs, survived the defendant's death or instead abated entirely. Following the near-universal rule in criminal cases, the court held that the death abated the action ab initio, rendering nonexistent both the pending appeal and the trial court proceedings, verdict, and judgment. The reasoning rested on the principle that criminal prosecutions aim at personal punishment rather than property rights, so that a fine or costs judgment cannot stand independently once the defendant is beyond the reach of punishment; costs are merely incidental to the conviction and fall with it. The court therefore dismissed the action in full rather than entering any judgment for costs against the estate.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a pedestrian plaintiff struck by the defendant's automobile at a street intersection while a switch engine and train cars were crossing, with a flagman directing traffic. The plaintiff sued for injuries, and the defendant argued on appeal that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law, that the trial court erred in denying a directed verdict, and that certain evidence (a volume) was improperly handled and identified. The court reviewed conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, found the defendant's high-speed veering maneuvers placed him in the wrong position with no basis to claim the plaintiff walked into the car, and concluded there was no evidence of contributory negligence by the plaintiff. The court also upheld the admission and identification of the exhibit as compliant with procedural requirements. The judgment below was affirmed.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a brokerage firm suing its former customer to recover funds advanced for grain trades executed on the Chicago Board of Trade. The court affirmed a directed verdict for the defendant, ruling that the plaintiff could not recover on the contracts. The opinion assumed the customer had placed the orders but found that the firm's practices—closing positions through offsetting marginal sales without any actual delivery of grain and without disclosing counterparties as required by statute—violated Iowa Code sections 9899 to 9905. Those provisions create a presumption that no actual delivery was intended unless rebutted by clear evidence; the brokerage's own testimony and records failed to overcome that presumption because they showed an intent to sell before delivery dates rather than to perform the contracts.

business & regulatory

The case concerned a dispute over the enforcement of a lease and accompanying rent notes for a 160-acre farm. The defendant had executed the documents as part of a scheme, involving a sham conveyance to his brother, intended to defraud creditors including a mortgage holder by preventing appointment of a receiver in foreclosure proceedings. The trial court found that both the plaintiff and defendant had participated in the fraud and were in pari delicto. It therefore dismissed the plaintiff's action to collect on the notes and the defendant's counterclaim, refusing to enforce the contract. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that parol evidence was admissible to show fraud in the procurement of the contract and that courts will not aid either party when both are equally culpable.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved a plaintiff suing two sister corporations for alleged false representations made by their shared president in a single transaction selling shares of stock in both companies. The court considered motions to strike the petition for misjoinder of the corporate defendants. It held that joinder was proper because the facts disclosed one joint transaction with identical false representations made by the same officer acting for both corporations, which shared promoters, officers, and purposes. The court therefore affirmed the order appealed from without addressing the sufficiency of the pleading or an unrelated statutory interpretation issue.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

In Union Mutual Life Co. v. Waddell, a mortgage lender foreclosed on the homestead of defendant borrowers after they made no payments on a 1931 loan for principal, interest, or insurance, leading to a decree and sale; the borrowers then moved for an extension of the redemption period under a statute permitting the court to set equitable rent and preservation conditions during the extension. The trial court fixed rent at $35 per month payable to the mortgagee but did not expressly make timely payments a condition of the extension. The appellate court modified the decree to require that payment of the rent be a continuing condition, with default terminating the extension right, while affirming the rent amount as a reasonable factual determination by the trial court based on the evidence presented. The court reasoned that an express condition was necessary to guarantee the mortgagee's protection on future payments without prejudicing the parties where payments had already been made.

propertyprocedure

The case involved a contract between spouses Henry and Eleanor Poole that provided for a property settlement, including cash payments and monthly alimony-like support from the husband to the wife, in the event of divorce, along with the wife's waiver of other marital claims. After the divorce, the husband stopped payments and defended against the wife's enforcement action by alleging fraud, claiming the wife had concealed prior adultery and falsely represented her fidelity, which induced him to sign. The trial court directed a verdict for the wife, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that even assuming fraud, the contract was voidable rather than void, requiring the husband either to rescind and restore benefits received (such as the house title and waiver of alimony rights) or to claim damages via counterclaim, neither of which he did. The court noted that the husband had retained the contract's benefits while attempting to repudiate its obligations without proper election of remedies.

family lawproperty

The case involved a car accident on a gravel road where two vehicles met at the top of a hill, locked wheels, and collided; the plaintiff sued the defendant driver alleging negligence in operating at a reckless speed without due regard for other highway users. The majority reversed the judgment for the plaintiff on the ground that the trial court failed to submit recklessness as a distinct claim to the jury. In dissent, Justice Evans contended that the petition pleaded only negligence, using the word reckless merely descriptively, and that no evidence supported a separate recklessness claim as defined in prior guest cases, since the vehicles were not traveling at high speed and the collision resulted from obstructed views. He would have affirmed the lower court judgment, finding the jury instructions adequate without prejudicial error.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a criminal prosecution of a bank director for allegedly attesting a false year-end report to the state banking department on the liabilities owed by directors to the bank. The disputed item reported $51,500 in director liabilities as borrowers, but the state claimed it should have included two additional $20,000 notes signed by the defendant and another director. The trial court submitted only that item to the jury, which convicted the defendant, but the Iowa Supreme Court reversed. The court held that the notes were accommodation notes given for the bank's benefit without creating enforceable liability for the signers, as supported by uncontradicted testimony and bank records showing they were never used or treated as assets. Because the report accurately reflected the directors' actual legal liabilities, the evidence did not support the verdict, which was against the clear weight of the evidence and the court's instructions.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatory

The case involved a dispute over an oral contract concerning the value of drilling records provided in connection with the defendant's acquisition of land for mining purposes. The lower court had apparently ruled against the plaintiff, but the appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. The court determined that the evidence was sufficient to present a question for the jury on whether the defendant's promise was supported by valid consideration rather than being a mere gratuity. Although the agreement lacked formality, the facts permitted an inference that the records held substantial value to the defendant as a prospector who developed the land.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case was about a plaintiff's claim for damages due to alleged malicious prosecution by a company, its president, a detective, and others, stemming from an investigation into employee theft that implicated the plaintiff as a customer who confessed and paid money before the charges were dropped. The trial court had entered judgments based on jury verdicts against the defendants. The appellate court reversed the judgments against the appealing defendants, holding that the jury instructions were inconsistent and erroneous because they improperly stated that good faith was no defense while also placing the burden on the plaintiff to prove the absence of good faith in the prosecution, contrary to the established requirements of proving want of probable cause and malice.

torts & liabilitycriminal law

The case involved a murder charge against defendant Grattan, who shot and killed Claude Meade in a barn and claimed the act was in defense of his grandson, whom Meade was chasing with a pitchfork. The trial court instructed the jury that all matters for determination, including reasonable doubt, must be decided from the evidence before them. Following precedent from State v. Anderson, the Iowa Supreme Court held that this instruction was inadequate because it failed to inform the jury that reasonable doubt could arise from a lack or want of evidence. The state conceded the instructional error but urged the court to overrule Anderson; the court declined, reasoning that a 5-4 precedent remains binding and that constitutional protections for defendants require adherence to the rule. The judgment was therefore reversed and the case remanded.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerns a dispute over the scope of an administrator's bond in probate proceedings, specifically whether it covers an individual's personal contractual obligations separate from his official duties. The majority held that the administrator's failure to perform a personal contract breached the bond and exposed the surety to liability. In dissent, Justice Evans contended that the administrator's official duties do not extend to paying personal debts or contract damages, leaving the probate court without authority to assist the objector and giving the objector no standing to oppose exoneration of the bond. The dissent further reasoned that a lower court ruling should be affirmed if correct on any ground, even if the stated basis was flawed.

procedure

The case involved a challenge by the niece of Mary J. Johnson to two deeds conveying real estate from Mary to her husband, A.B. Johnson, executed in 1921 and 1922 but recorded after her death in 1925. The plaintiff alleged lack of consideration, undue influence due to the marital relationship and alleged weakened capacity of the grantor, and nondelivery of the deeds. The court affirmed the district court's ruling upholding the validity of the deeds, finding the evidence of undue influence or other defects insufficient, noting the presumption of delivery from possession by the grantee, and determining that the conveyances were the free and voluntary acts of the grantor.

propertyfamily law

The case concerned whether Iowa courts could exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who conducted business in the state, including by maintaining an office there, even though the defendant had never been physically present in Iowa. The parties agreed that the outcome was controlled by the prior decision in Davidson v. Henry L. Doherty & Co., which had addressed an identical issue and upheld jurisdiction under Iowa statutes. The court declined to overrule Davidson despite acknowledging it was a close question, reasoning that precedents should not be lightly disturbed to preserve stability for litigants and lower courts, and that any change should come from higher authority if warranted. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

procedurebusiness & regulatory