James W. Kindig

This case involved a personal injury lawsuit arising from a 1927 car accident at an intersection in Des Moines, Iowa, where plaintiff Ray Pettijohn was struck by defendant J.B. Weede's automobile. After an initial trial on general negligence resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff that was reversed on appeal due to contributory negligence, the plaintiff amended the petition to focus solely on the last clear chance doctrine. The defendant argued the amendment stated a new cause of action barred by the statute of limitations, but the trial court rejected that claim, submitted the last clear chance issue to the jury, and entered judgment for the plaintiff. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the original petition alleged general negligence—which encompasses the last clear chance doctrine—the amendment did not introduce a new cause of action and was not time-barred. The court further found sufficient evidence to support liability under last clear chance and no reversible errors in the trial proceedings.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved Sylvia Neidigh suing American Finance System over shares of corporate stock she purchased, with one count seeking rescission based on alleged fraudulent misrepresentations and the other seeking damages for breach of an alleged agreement to repurchase the stock. The defendant moved to require the plaintiff to elect between the two counts on grounds that they were inconsistent and improperly joined. The district court overruled the motion, and the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Iowa Code sections 10960 and 10963 require objections to misjoinder of causes of action to be raised by a motion to strike, not a motion to elect, and that failure to follow the statutory procedure waives such objections.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved an attorney hired by Cherokee County to assist in prosecuting criminal cases who submitted an itemized claim for $675 in fees. The county board of supervisors allowed only $50 of the unliquidated claim, which the attorney accepted by cashing the warrant. He then sued the county for the balance, but the district court directed a verdict for the county on the defense of accord and satisfaction. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that when a board allows a partial amount on an entirely unliquidated claim and the claimant accepts it with knowledge of the rejection of the rest, that acceptance satisfies the full claim under Iowa statutes and precedent on county claims procedure.

procedure

This case involved holders of drainage warrants issued by Drainage District No. 71 in Sac County, Iowa, who sought a writ of mandamus to compel the board of supervisors to levy an additional assessment on district lands to cover a deficiency after initial assessments proved insufficient. The plaintiffs alleged that assessments were structured to run over ten years and that a new levy was needed when collections fell short, but the defendants raised the statute of limitations as a defense, noting that a 1925 tax sale of land in the district had already shown the deficiency. The district court dismissed the petition on the ground that the three-year limitations period had expired, and the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the action was time-barred because the deficiency became apparent well before the suit was filed in 1930 and no valid extension applied to these warrants.

propertyproceduretaxes

This case involved a dispute over redemption of a homestead after foreclosure of a small mechanic's lien. The plaintiff obtained a judgment and foreclosure against the defendant homeowner for unpaid work, and the defendant attempted to redeem the property by tendering the required amount near the end of the redemption period. A deputy clerk erroneously advised the defendant she could not redeem because the foreclosure decree did not explicitly mention redemption rights, prompting the defendant to file suit to enforce redemption and obtain a temporary injunction against eviction. The trial court permitted redemption but conditioned it on payment of an additional $250 in attorney fees; the defendant appealed only that condition. The Iowa Supreme Court modified the judgment to eliminate the attorney-fee condition, holding that the injunction was merely collateral and had not been dissolved, so there was no basis to award fees, and equity did not require the defendant to pay them given that the litigation arose from the clerk's error and was necessary to protect her property rights.

propertyprocedure

The case concerned a 1933 automobile collision at an intersection in Webster City, Iowa, in which plaintiff T. F. Desmond sued driver William C. Smith and Smith's employer, Stacy Fruit Company, alleging negligence and seeking damages for personal injuries. A jury returned a verdict for Desmond, and the district court entered judgment after overruling the defendants' motion for a new trial. On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial solely on the ground that the trial court's instructions permitted the jury to award damages for loss of earnings and other items without limiting recovery to the specific amounts stated in the plaintiff's amended petition. The court relied on prior decisions holding that such omissions constitute reversible error because the jury might award more than claimed on individual elements even if the total verdict stays within the overall demand.

torts & liabilityprocedure