James W. Kindig

This case involved a personal injury lawsuit arising from a 1927 car accident at an intersection in Des Moines, Iowa, where plaintiff Ray Pettijohn was struck by defendant J.B. Weede's automobile. After an initial trial on general negligence resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff that was reversed on appeal due to contributory negligence, the plaintiff amended the petition to focus solely on the last clear chance doctrine. The defendant argued the amendment stated a new cause of action barred by the statute of limitations, but the trial court rejected that claim, submitted the last clear chance issue to the jury, and entered judgment for the plaintiff. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the original petition alleged general negligence—which encompasses the last clear chance doctrine—the amendment did not introduce a new cause of action and was not time-barred. The court further found sufficient evidence to support liability under last clear chance and no reversible errors in the trial proceedings.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved Sylvia Neidigh suing American Finance System over shares of corporate stock she purchased, with one count seeking rescission based on alleged fraudulent misrepresentations and the other seeking damages for breach of an alleged agreement to repurchase the stock. The defendant moved to require the plaintiff to elect between the two counts on grounds that they were inconsistent and improperly joined. The district court overruled the motion, and the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Iowa Code sections 10960 and 10963 require objections to misjoinder of causes of action to be raised by a motion to strike, not a motion to elect, and that failure to follow the statutory procedure waives such objections.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved an attorney hired by Cherokee County to assist in prosecuting criminal cases who submitted an itemized claim for $675 in fees. The county board of supervisors allowed only $50 of the unliquidated claim, which the attorney accepted by cashing the warrant. He then sued the county for the balance, but the district court directed a verdict for the county on the defense of accord and satisfaction. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that when a board allows a partial amount on an entirely unliquidated claim and the claimant accepts it with knowledge of the rejection of the rest, that acceptance satisfies the full claim under Iowa statutes and precedent on county claims procedure.

procedure

This case involved holders of drainage warrants issued by Drainage District No. 71 in Sac County, Iowa, who sought a writ of mandamus to compel the board of supervisors to levy an additional assessment on district lands to cover a deficiency after initial assessments proved insufficient. The plaintiffs alleged that assessments were structured to run over ten years and that a new levy was needed when collections fell short, but the defendants raised the statute of limitations as a defense, noting that a 1925 tax sale of land in the district had already shown the deficiency. The district court dismissed the petition on the ground that the three-year limitations period had expired, and the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the action was time-barred because the deficiency became apparent well before the suit was filed in 1930 and no valid extension applied to these warrants.

propertyproceduretaxes

This case involved a dispute over redemption of a homestead after foreclosure of a small mechanic's lien. The plaintiff obtained a judgment and foreclosure against the defendant homeowner for unpaid work, and the defendant attempted to redeem the property by tendering the required amount near the end of the redemption period. A deputy clerk erroneously advised the defendant she could not redeem because the foreclosure decree did not explicitly mention redemption rights, prompting the defendant to file suit to enforce redemption and obtain a temporary injunction against eviction. The trial court permitted redemption but conditioned it on payment of an additional $250 in attorney fees; the defendant appealed only that condition. The Iowa Supreme Court modified the judgment to eliminate the attorney-fee condition, holding that the injunction was merely collateral and had not been dissolved, so there was no basis to award fees, and equity did not require the defendant to pay them given that the litigation arose from the clerk's error and was necessary to protect her property rights.

propertyprocedure

The case concerned a 1933 automobile collision at an intersection in Webster City, Iowa, in which plaintiff T. F. Desmond sued driver William C. Smith and Smith's employer, Stacy Fruit Company, alleging negligence and seeking damages for personal injuries. A jury returned a verdict for Desmond, and the district court entered judgment after overruling the defendants' motion for a new trial. On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial solely on the ground that the trial court's instructions permitted the jury to award damages for loss of earnings and other items without limiting recovery to the specific amounts stated in the plaintiff's amended petition. The court relied on prior decisions holding that such omissions constitute reversible error because the jury might award more than claimed on individual elements even if the total verdict stays within the overall demand.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved the administrator of an estate suing the executors of a deceased director of an insolvent trust company that had commingled estate trust funds with its general funds, leading to untraceable losses upon the company's failure. The plaintiff claimed the director was liable for failing to object to the commingling practice, which allegedly aided the breach of trust duties. The district court directed a verdict for the defendants, and the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed that ruling. The court reasoned that a director is not liable for mere nonfeasance absent fraud, conspiracy, or specific statutory obligations creating liability, especially since one director could not control corporate policy without majority acquiescence by the board.

business & regulatorypropertytorts & liability

This case involved a property owner's challenge to the assessed value of 265 acres of land in Des Moines for tax purposes, where the assessor set the value at $23,800; the owner objected that the value was excessive and the assessment inequitable compared to similar properties, but the local board of review and district court upheld it. The Iowa Supreme Court first addressed jurisdiction, concluding that an appeal from the board of review to the district court was available under the original 1927 Code provisions despite a failed 1929 amendment. On the merits, the court found the actual value was $13,500 but determined the assessment must be reduced for equity because other properties in the district were assessed at only 60 percent of actual value; it therefore modified the valuation to the $10,000 requested by the owner and affirmed the judgment as modified.

taxesproperty

The case involved a dispute between the City of Osceola and Middle States Utilities Co. over the enforceability of a contract establishing utility rates. The dissenting opinion maintained that the contract for rates should remain valid until the legislature affirmatively exercises its authority to set rates through a commission, board, or other mechanism. The reasoning centered on the principle that rate-making constitutes a police power vested in the legislature, but contractual agreements between parties may govern rates until that power is invoked.

business & regulatory

This case involved a lawsuit by the administrator of William Sutcliffe's estate against Fort Dodge Gas & Electric Company for personal injuries Sutcliffe sustained as a restaurant employee when a gas heater exploded in 1933, propelling him into the street and causing severe pain; Sutcliffe died months later, possibly from cancer. After a jury trial, a verdict was returned for the plaintiff, and the district court entered judgment on it, which the gas company appealed along with the denial of its motion for a new trial. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the gas company had control and management over the relevant gas appliances before the meter, allowing the jury to apply res ipsa loquitur to infer negligence, that the company remained responsible for the gas until delivery through the meter, and that the evidence sufficiently supported the award of damages for injuries, medical expenses, and lost time despite the preexisting health condition.

torts & liability

The case concerned a mortgage foreclosure suit brought by plaintiff Tusha against the Scotts and the Eberharts, who had purchased the mortgaged farmland and assumed the debt on two promissory notes. After the notes went unpaid, the Eberharts moved for a continuance of the action under chapter 182 of the Iowa Acts of the 45th General Assembly. The district court denied the continuance, finding the statute unconstitutional under the U.S. and Iowa Constitutions. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed, relying on its prior holdings in Craig v. Waggoner and Des Moines Joint Stock Land Bank v. Nordholm that upheld the constitutionality of the mortgage-extension legislation, and concluded that the defendants were therefore entitled to the requested continuance.

propertyprocedure

The case involved the First National Bank seeking to set aside a 1932 conveyance of 280 acres of land in Warren County, Iowa, from John F. Currier to his wife Rilla Currier after the bank obtained a deficiency judgment on a foreclosed second mortgage that John had guaranteed. The bank argued the transfer was fraudulent because John was insolvent at the time and the deed recited only nominal or indefinite consideration, claiming the burden shifted to the defendants to prove adequate consideration or sufficient remaining assets. The district court ruled for the defendants, and the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the bank failed to prove either actual or constructive fraud: the deed's stated consideration meant it was not presumptively voluntary, so the burden never shifted and the bank offered no other evidence of fraud or inadequate consideration.

property

The case concerned whether the Incorporated Town of Coon Rapids had complied with statutory bidding requirements when seeking to construct a municipal electric light and power plant authorized by a February 1934 public vote. Plaintiffs sought an injunction to prevent the town from considering bids, arguing that the invitation was deficient because it failed to solicit separate bids on items such as used or new generating and distribution systems, wholesale and retail electric energy, and related facilities. The district court denied the injunction, and the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that the relevant statutes (sections 6134-d4 to 6134-d7 of the 1931 Code) required bids only on the specific contract authorized by the electorate under sections 6131 and 6134-d3—namely, establishing the plant and distribution system—rather than on additional items not approved by voters, and that the provisions for competitive bids on energy must be read in harmony with the authorized project.

electionsbusiness & regulatory

The case concerned whether an Iowa court could exercise personal jurisdiction over New York resident Henry L. Doherty, who conducted business in Iowa through an agent, by serving process on that agent under Iowa Code section 11079. The majority held that jurisdiction was proper, following its prior decision in Davidson v. Henry L. Doherty & Co. under the doctrine of stare decisis. In dissent, Justice Kindig argued that the statute could not constitutionally authorize such service on a nonresident individual because it did not involve police-power regulation, attachment of property, or valid consent, and that Iowa lacked power to require appointment of an agent for service as a condition of doing business. He distinguished the situation from cases involving foreign corporations or nonresident motorists and concluded that a resulting in personam judgment would violate the federal Constitution, citing Flexner v. Farson.

procedurefederal power

The case arose when a plaintiff sued an estate executor for an unpaid $5,000 bequest under a will, prompting the executor to seek contribution from a minor who had already received an over-distribution from the estate; the executor attempted to bring the minor into the suit via additional notice to obtain a personal judgment against her. The minor specially appeared to challenge the court's jurisdiction due to allegedly defective service of that notice, but the district court overruled the objection. The minor appealed that ruling without standing on the special appearance or allowing judgment to be entered against her, leading the executor to move to dismiss the appeal as premature. The Iowa Supreme Court overruled the motion to dismiss, holding that under Code section 11088 the jurisdictional issue raised by special appearance is a final, separately appealable order distinct from later proceedings after a general appearance, so no further election or judgment was required before appealing.

procedure

The case involved Pat Griffin, who was tried and convicted as a principal for first-degree murder after aiding and abetting Elmer Brewer in shooting and killing Deputy Sheriff William F. Dilworth during an arrest attempt near Waterloo, Iowa, in December 1932. Under Iowa Code provisions that eliminated the distinction between accessories and principals, the state proved Griffin's guilt by showing he knowingly assisted Brewer, including by watching for officers and providing false information. On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and death sentence, holding that the record contained ample evidence of willful, deliberate, and premeditated conduct by both men and that the district court's jury instructions were sufficient despite not being more detailed.

criminal law

In this case, the Des Moines Joint Stock Land Bank sued to foreclose a mortgage on Iowa farmland after the Nordholms defaulted on their $12,000 amortized note; the bank obtained a judgment, purchased the property at a sheriff's sale for $11,000, and held a deficiency judgment, with the one-year redemption period set to expire in May 1933. While redemption was pending, the Iowa legislature enacted a 1933 moratorium statute (chapter 179) that allowed courts to extend the redemption period until March 1, 1935, provided income from the property was applied equitably to taxes and preservation costs. The district court granted the extension, and on appeal the Iowa Supreme Court upheld the statute's constitutionality under the contract clause and due process provisions, relying on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell; the court affirmed the extension but noted it would terminate earlier if the emergency ended. The judgment was modified and affirmed.

propertybusiness & regulatoryprocedure

In Isaacs v. Bruce, a minor passenger was injured in a nighttime collision between a Packard automobile and a Ford truck at a highway intersection; the truck, owned by defendant George Bruce, was driven by his son who attempted a left turn onto a side road. The plaintiff sued the owner on a consent theory, alleging three negligence grounds including failure to signal before slowing or turning, lack of a tail light, and absence of required corner reflectors. A jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, but the Iowa Supreme Court reversed, holding there was no substantial evidence to support submitting the signal-failure claim and that doing so created prejudice despite the lights issue presenting a jury question. The core reasoning focused on the statutory duty to signal under the 1931 Iowa Code and the insufficiency of proof that any violation proximately caused the accident.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case arose from a 1932 nighttime car-pedestrian collision on a paved Iowa highway where Charles Taylor, walking northward on the right side with his back to traffic and after cresting a hill that limited visibility, was struck and killed by defendant Lloyd Wistey's south-to-north vehicle traveling 45-50 mph. The administratrix of Taylor's estate sued for wrongful death, alleging negligence in speed, control, and failure to warn; the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and judgment was entered. On appeal the Iowa Supreme Court reversed, holding that a jury instruction on contributory negligence was prejudicially erroneous because it told the jury the decedent need only look both ways "as often as ordinary care under the circumstances required" rather than leaving the jury free to decide whether due care demanded more continuous rearward observation given the hill, oncoming headlights, and road conditions.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a workers' compensation claim by the widow of Luther Almquist, who died after suffering a perforated stomach ulcer while employed pulling and separating heavy barberry bushes at Shenandoah Nurseries. The industrial commissioner denied benefits, finding no accident or unusual strain arising out of the employment, but the district court reversed and awarded compensation. On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the award, holding that the evidence showed the employee's heavy physical labor caused the perforation of his pre-existing ulcer, satisfying the requirement that the injury arose out of and in the course of employment. The court modified the judgment to reduce the weekly compensation rate from $13.50 to 60 percent of the employee's average weekly earnings and to disallow recovery for medical services because no request was made as required by statute.

labor & employmentprocedure