Mark McCormick

The case involved Donald Lee McVey, who was charged with second-degree theft for exercising control over a stolen motor vehicle in violation of Iowa Code section 714.1(4) and with attempting to elude law enforcement. Before trial, McVey sought to introduce evidence of diminished responsibility to negate the knowledge element of the theft offense, but the trial court struck the defense, and the court of appeals affirmed his conviction. The Iowa Supreme Court held that the diminished responsibility defense is unavailable because the offense is a general intent crime. The court reasoned that the crime requires only voluntary exercise of control over property the defendant knows or has reason to believe is stolen, without proof of any further specific intent, and prior precedents limit the defense to crimes requiring specific intent.

criminal law

In Guyton v. Irving Jensen Co., a worker sought permanent disability benefits under Iowa workers' compensation law after injuring his back on the job in 1978, following an initial award of temporary benefits. The industrial commissioner determined a 20 percent industrial disability based on physical impairment and activities shown in surveillance evidence, the district court affirmed, and the court of appeals reversed by holding total disability as a matter of law. The Iowa Supreme Court adopted the odd-lot doctrine for the first time in workers' compensation cases, ruling that a worker who makes a prima facie showing of total disability through inability to obtain suitable employment due to the injury shifts the burden to the employer to prove available work, while other factors like age, education, and experience must also be considered beyond physical limitations alone. The court held that the evidence raised a factual dispute rather than compelling total disability as a matter of law, vacated the court of appeals decision, reversed the district court, and remanded to the commissioner for further proceedings with opportunity for additional evidence on employment availability.

labor & employment

The case was a wrongful death action brought by the estate of Roger Hildenbrand against police officer Jerry Cox and the city of Corydon. Hildenbrand had been involved in a minor accident, where Cox suspected intoxication but issued only a citation rather than arresting him or taking him into protective custody; Hildenbrand died shortly afterward in a second collision. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants, and the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that the statutes governing intoxication (Iowa Code sections 125.91, 123.46, and 125.34) use permissive language allowing officers to arrest or take persons into custody but do not impose a mandatory duty. Because Cox owed no duty of protection to Hildenbrand, no tort was committed and the city could not be held liable.

torts & liabilityprocedurecriminal law

The case involved two banks, Hornick Bank and Onawa Bank, both claiming priority over proceeds from the sale of a mutual debtor's construction equipment based on their security interests and financing statements. The Iowa Supreme Court held that Hornick Bank had priority because Onawa Bank's security interest lapsed after five years when it failed to file a continuation statement with the Secretary of State, even though its initial improper filing was effective against Hornick due to actual knowledge under Iowa Code section 554.9401(2). The court reasoned that under Iowa Code section 554.9403(2), the lapse rendered Onawa's interest unperfected as to all parties, advancing the junior perfected interest of Hornick to priority, and rejected arguments that actual knowledge extended the effectiveness beyond the statutory period or that error preservation barred the claim.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case involved Edward R. Osborn, convicted after a bench trial on four counts of fraudulent practice in the second degree for willfully failing to file Iowa state income tax returns and pay taxes for 1978 and 1979, despite stipulations that he owed between $500 and $5,000 per year and evidence of his severe depression. The trial court found that Osborn lacked any intent to defraud or evil motive but convicted him anyway, ruling that the term 'willfully' in Iowa Code section 422.25(5) requires only an intentional violation of a known legal duty. On appeal, Osborn argued that labeling the offenses as fraudulent practices made intent to defraud an essential element and that willfulness demanded more than a knowing omission. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the statutory change was only for penalty purposes and did not add an intent-to-defraud element, and that willfulness is satisfied by proof of a voluntary and intentional violation of a known duty without requiring proof of bad motive or deceit.

criminal lawtaxes

The case involved defendant Jerald C. Steuk, who was convicted by jury of second-offense operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol under Iowa Code section 321.281. He challenged his sentence of one year in county jail with all but sixty days suspended, followed by two years of probation, arguing that the split sentence was unlawful and that the combined duration exceeded the maximum permitted punishment for an aggravated misdemeanor. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the sentence, holding that it was authorized by statute. The court reasoned that section 356.47 permits a sentencing judge to suspend part of a county jail sentence and impose probation after the unsuspended portion is served, and that the maximum length of probation for a misdemeanor is governed separately by section 907.7, which allows up to two years.

criminal law