Mark McCormick

The case involved Donald Lee McVey, who was charged with second-degree theft for exercising control over a stolen motor vehicle in violation of Iowa Code section 714.1(4) and with attempting to elude law enforcement. Before trial, McVey sought to introduce evidence of diminished responsibility to negate the knowledge element of the theft offense, but the trial court struck the defense, and the court of appeals affirmed his conviction. The Iowa Supreme Court held that the diminished responsibility defense is unavailable because the offense is a general intent crime. The court reasoned that the crime requires only voluntary exercise of control over property the defendant knows or has reason to believe is stolen, without proof of any further specific intent, and prior precedents limit the defense to crimes requiring specific intent.

criminal law

In Guyton v. Irving Jensen Co., a worker sought permanent disability benefits under Iowa workers' compensation law after injuring his back on the job in 1978, following an initial award of temporary benefits. The industrial commissioner determined a 20 percent industrial disability based on physical impairment and activities shown in surveillance evidence, the district court affirmed, and the court of appeals reversed by holding total disability as a matter of law. The Iowa Supreme Court adopted the odd-lot doctrine for the first time in workers' compensation cases, ruling that a worker who makes a prima facie showing of total disability through inability to obtain suitable employment due to the injury shifts the burden to the employer to prove available work, while other factors like age, education, and experience must also be considered beyond physical limitations alone. The court held that the evidence raised a factual dispute rather than compelling total disability as a matter of law, vacated the court of appeals decision, reversed the district court, and remanded to the commissioner for further proceedings with opportunity for additional evidence on employment availability.

labor & employment

The case was a wrongful death action brought by the estate of Roger Hildenbrand against police officer Jerry Cox and the city of Corydon. Hildenbrand had been involved in a minor accident, where Cox suspected intoxication but issued only a citation rather than arresting him or taking him into protective custody; Hildenbrand died shortly afterward in a second collision. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants, and the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that the statutes governing intoxication (Iowa Code sections 125.91, 123.46, and 125.34) use permissive language allowing officers to arrest or take persons into custody but do not impose a mandatory duty. Because Cox owed no duty of protection to Hildenbrand, no tort was committed and the city could not be held liable.

torts & liabilityprocedurecriminal law

The case involved two banks, Hornick Bank and Onawa Bank, both claiming priority over proceeds from the sale of a mutual debtor's construction equipment based on their security interests and financing statements. The Iowa Supreme Court held that Hornick Bank had priority because Onawa Bank's security interest lapsed after five years when it failed to file a continuation statement with the Secretary of State, even though its initial improper filing was effective against Hornick due to actual knowledge under Iowa Code section 554.9401(2). The court reasoned that under Iowa Code section 554.9403(2), the lapse rendered Onawa's interest unperfected as to all parties, advancing the junior perfected interest of Hornick to priority, and rejected arguments that actual knowledge extended the effectiveness beyond the statutory period or that error preservation barred the claim.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case involved Edward R. Osborn, convicted after a bench trial on four counts of fraudulent practice in the second degree for willfully failing to file Iowa state income tax returns and pay taxes for 1978 and 1979, despite stipulations that he owed between $500 and $5,000 per year and evidence of his severe depression. The trial court found that Osborn lacked any intent to defraud or evil motive but convicted him anyway, ruling that the term 'willfully' in Iowa Code section 422.25(5) requires only an intentional violation of a known legal duty. On appeal, Osborn argued that labeling the offenses as fraudulent practices made intent to defraud an essential element and that willfulness demanded more than a knowing omission. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the statutory change was only for penalty purposes and did not add an intent-to-defraud element, and that willfulness is satisfied by proof of a voluntary and intentional violation of a known duty without requiring proof of bad motive or deceit.

criminal lawtaxes

The case involved defendant Jerald C. Steuk, who was convicted by jury of second-offense operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol under Iowa Code section 321.281. He challenged his sentence of one year in county jail with all but sixty days suspended, followed by two years of probation, arguing that the split sentence was unlawful and that the combined duration exceeded the maximum permitted punishment for an aggravated misdemeanor. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the sentence, holding that it was authorized by statute. The court reasoned that section 356.47 permits a sentencing judge to suspend part of a county jail sentence and impose probation after the unsuspended portion is served, and that the maximum length of probation for a misdemeanor is governed separately by section 907.7, which allows up to two years.

criminal law

In State v. Morrison, the defendant was convicted of third-degree theft and appealed, challenging a uniform jury instruction cautioning the jury against drawing inferences from his decision not to testify. The court of appeals had reversed the conviction in part, finding error both in giving any such instruction without the defendant's request and in the specific wording using "should" rather than "can." On further review, the Iowa Supreme Court held that any error under prior precedent regarding submission without a request was not preserved because the defendant's objection at trial addressed only the instruction's wording. The court further concluded that the uniform instruction's language was a correct statement of law that adequately protected the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination, as juries are presumed to follow instructions and arguments about potential misinterpretation were too speculative. The court vacated the court of appeals' rulings on these issues while affirming the reversal of the conviction on other grounds.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerns a workers' compensation claim by employee Clifford Dillinger against his employer, the City of Sioux City, for a back injury sustained in a 1975 workplace fall. After an initial denial and remand, the Industrial Commissioner found the claim timely under the discovery rule for the two-year limitation period in Iowa Code section 85.26 but denied benefits for failure to provide the required 90-day notice under section 85.23 from the date of discovery. The district court reversed, holding that the employer's actual knowledge from the employee's 1975 injury report satisfied the notice requirement. On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that the discovery rule governs the start of both the limitation and notice periods, that actual knowledge excused formal notice, and that substantial evidence supported the Commissioner's finding on the timing of discovery.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case involved a defendant charged with involuntary manslaughter after a fatal car accident, where the State sought to introduce blood-alcohol test results obtained through implied consent procedures. The trial court suppressed the evidence, ruling that habit testimony from a colleague about the deceased nurse's blood-drawing procedures was insufficient to establish the necessary foundation for admissibility. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to give appropriate weight to the admissible habit evidence under Iowa Rule of Evidence 406, which allows such testimony to prove routine practices. The court remanded for a new suppression hearing, noting that the proper statutory foundation requirements should apply despite a stipulation to the contrary.

criminal lawprocedure

Homeowners sued the City of New Hampton after a sanitary sewer line backed up and flooded their basements with sewage. They initially claimed negligence but amended their petition to allege breach of an implied contract for utility services, aiming to avoid the notice and timing requirements of Iowa Code § 613A.5. The trial court granted summary judgment for the city on both theories, and the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the second ruling. The court held that a municipality's duty to maintain its sewer system is governed by tort principles, under which the city is not an insurer and is liable only for negligence, rather than by any implied contractual obligation arising from residents' payments for services. It rejected the contract theory as unsupported by precedent and equivalent to imposing strict liability.

torts & liabilitypropertyprocedure

This case involved a pipeline company's challenge to the Iowa director of revenue's $37.5 million valuation of its in-state property for tax purposes under Iowa Code chapter 438. The Iowa State Board of Tax Review upheld the valuation after a contested case hearing, the district court affirmed on judicial review, and the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that the burden of proof remained on the petitioner to show the valuation was excessive, that the director's stock-and-debt valuation method was a permissible indicator of actual value and did not improperly tax intangibles or out-of-state property, and that the petitioner failed to prove any intentional or systematic discrimination violating equal protection or due process. The court emphasized that factual disputes over valuation methods and judgment calls were for the agency to resolve.

taxespropertyprocedure

The case involved Gospel Assembly Church challenging the Iowa Department of Revenue's planned sales and use tax audit and request for extensive records, alleging violations of the church's constitutional rights under the First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief via 42 U.S.C. section 1983. The district court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, citing failure to exhaust administrative remedies and that the agency action was not ripe for review. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the controversy was not ripe because the Department had not yet issued a formal subpoena or taken enforceable action defining the exact scope of the records request, which could potentially be narrowed to avoid constitutional issues, and no sufficient hardship to the church justified immediate judicial intervention.

taxesreligious libertycivil rightsprocedure

This case involves a claim of employment discrimination under the Cedar Rapids civil rights ordinance, where employee Willard Wright alleged he was discharged by Consolidated Freightways upon returning from 30 days of residential treatment for alcoholism. The Cedar Rapids Civil Rights Commission found that the employer violated the ordinance by discriminating on the basis of a disability unrelated to Wright's ability to perform his job as a sales representative. The district court reversed the commission's decision on judicial review, concluding that the finding of discrimination was not supported by substantial evidence. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the district court, holding that the commission's determination was supported by substantial evidence and remanding the case to the commission for a hearing on damages.

civil rightslabor & employment

The case concerned a dispute over whether a provision in the City of Des Moines' 1982-83 collective bargaining agreement with the police union created an illegal retirement system under Iowa Code section 20.9. The City filed a declaratory judgment action in district court, which ruled in its favor after rejecting the union's challenge to jurisdiction. On its own motion, the Iowa Supreme Court held that the district court lacked authority to decide the case because an exclusive administrative remedy existed through a declaratory ruling proceeding before the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB). The court reasoned that Iowa law requires parties to exhaust such administrative procedures before seeking judicial relief when the agency is tasked with initial resolution of issues within its expertise, and no exception to the exhaustion doctrine applied here. It therefore vacated the district court's judgment and remanded for dismissal without prejudice to pursuing relief before PERB.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case involved disciplinary proceedings against Iowa attorney Morris C. Hurd for allegedly making false statements in a motion to change the presiding judge in a criminal assault case. The Iowa Supreme Court, after de novo review, determined that Hurd violated the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers by including inaccurate allegations about the judge's prior threats and prejudice. The court reasoned that the statements in the verified motion were not supported by the record and constituted unethical conduct. As a result, the court suspended Hurd's law license indefinitely with no possibility of reinstatement for at least six months.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned an Iowa attorney who was a party in his own marriage dissolution action and knowingly violated a temporary injunction by writing checks on a joint money market account without his wife's consent or court approval. The Iowa Supreme Court upheld the grievance commission's finding of unethical conduct and imposed an indefinite suspension of the attorney's license with no possibility of reinstatement for three months. The court reasoned that the attorney's actions breached his oath and multiple provisions of the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers, including ethical considerations requiring obedience to law and respect for judicial orders as well as disciplinary rules prohibiting illegal, dishonest, or prejudicial conduct, even when the misconduct occurred outside the practice of law. Mitigation evidence regarding stress and subsequent treatment was acknowledged but deemed insufficient to override the primary goals of protecting the public, maintaining confidence in the justice system, and deterring similar violations.

family lawprocedure

The case concerned whether individual governmental members of the Emmet County Council of Governments (ECCOG), formed under Iowa Code chapter 28E as a separate public corporate entity, could be held jointly and severally liable for breach of a contract that ECCOG alone signed with Allis-Chalmers for a trash shredder system. The Iowa Supreme Court answered the certified question in the negative, holding that the member cities and counties were not liable. The court reasoned that the chapter 28E agreement created a distinct legal entity with powers to contract, sue, and be sued, and that general corporate-law principles apply equally to public and private corporations, shielding members from personal liability on entity debts unless a statute or the agreement expressly imposes it.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a negligence lawsuit by a nursing home employee and her husband against the property's record owners (the landlord) for injuries from slipping on ice near the building's entrance; the employee had already settled a workers' compensation claim with her employer, the tenant operator. The trial court found the landlord liable and in control of the premises as a matter of law because the lease and assignments were unrecorded under Iowa Code section 558.41, and it awarded damages for the slip-and-fall and loss of consortium. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed and ordered dismissal, holding that recording status does not determine factual control of the premises, the lease assigned maintenance and snow removal duties to the tenant, and evidence showed the tenant performed all repairs. The court declined to consider the plaintiffs' alternative theories of extending the implied warranty of habitability to commercial leases or eliminating the control requirement for landlord tort liability because those arguments were not raised in the trial court or pretrial filings.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

Dunlap Care Center, an Iowa intermediate care facility serving both private-pay and Medicaid patients, appealed an agency decision ordering it to repay $11,171.38 in supplemental payments received from relatives of three Medicaid patients for private rooms that were not medically necessary. The Iowa Department of Social Services determined that these payments violated its regulations because Medicaid reimbursements already covered the full cost of room services under the state plan implementing federal Medicaid law, treating room accommodations as a covered service for which no supplementation was permitted. The district court affirmed the agency ruling after applying deferential standards of review to the department's statutory interpretation and rule-making authority. The Iowa Supreme Court upheld the decision, holding that the regulations were consistent with Iowa Code sections 249A.4 and 249A.9 and that the costs of private rooms had already been factored into the facility's Medicaid reimbursement rate.

healthcarebusiness & regulatory

This case concerned whether State Farm's automobile liability insurance policy issued to Kathryn Pflibsen provided coverage for an accident in which her estranged husband Clay was driving his father's Oldsmobile and injured Dean Boeckholt. The trial court granted summary judgment to State Farm, finding that the Oldsmobile did not qualify as a non-owned car under the policy because it had been furnished or available for Clay's regular or frequent use. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the summary judgment record contained genuine issues of material fact about the extent of Clay's permission to use the vehicle and whether it met the policy's exclusion criteria. The court noted that reasonable minds could differ on inferences from deposition testimony regarding blanket authority and frequency of use, making summary judgment improper under Iowa rules.

torts & liabilityprocedurebusiness & regulatory