Marsha K. Ternus

The case involved Ron Millbrook's appeal of his first-degree murder conviction for a drive-by shooting that killed an innocent bystander at an outdoor party in Davenport, Iowa. Millbrook argued that the trial court erred by giving a felony-murder instruction because the predicate felony of intimidation with a dangerous weapon was not independent of the shooting under the merger doctrine established in State v. Heemstra. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, ruling that Millbrook's aiding and abetting of the intimidation offense—by participating in the armed approach and firing—was sufficiently independent of the specific shots that caused the victim's death to support felony murder. The court noted that the evidence showed multiple shots from several guns, and the prior intimidation acts provided an adequate basis for the instruction without needing to rely solely on the fatal shots.

criminal law

The case concerned allegations by the Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board that attorney Stephen J. Lickiss violated multiple Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct in four probate matters involving guardianships and conservatorships. Lickiss admitted the facts due to his failure to respond, which included neglecting cases, failing to communicate with clients or the board, taking fees without court approval, and not notifying clients when he ceased representation. The court conducted a de novo review and found the violations proven by a convincing preponderance of the evidence. It imposed an indefinite three-month suspension of Lickiss's license, with conditions for reinstatement including a fitness evaluation, reasoning that the misconduct required this sanction to maintain professional standards.

procedureproperty

The case involved charges against attorney William Monroe for engaging in a sexual relationship with a client, Jane Doe, while representing her in divorce and criminal matters, which violated Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.8(j). The Iowa Supreme Court agreed that Monroe's conduct breached this rule but found insufficient evidence that it prejudiced the administration of justice under rule 32:8.4(d) without specific proof of impact on court functions. Despite this, the court imposed a thirty-day suspension of Monroe's law license, aligning with the grievance commission's recommendation based on factors like the client's vulnerability and Monroe's mitigating circumstances such as his pro bono work and clean record.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a workers' compensation claim by Debra Solland against the Second Injury Fund of Iowa, in which she sought benefits for successive injuries but initially lost before the agency and district court. After the court of appeals reversed on the merits in her favor and remanded for further proceedings, it split appellate costs equally between the parties, while the district court had taxed judicial review costs to Solland. On further review, the Iowa Supreme Court reversed those cost assessments, holding that Solland was the successful party on all substantive issues. The court relied on Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.1207 and Iowa Code section 625.1, which require costs to be taxed against the unsuccessful party unless otherwise ordered, and found the equal division an abuse of discretion given her full success on appeal. It directed that all appellate and judicial review costs be assessed to the Second Injury Fund and remanded for that purpose.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case concerned Andrew Russell Johnson's appeal from his second-degree murder conviction, focusing on whether he was competent to stand trial due to a borderline personality disorder and on preservation of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim alleging selective prosecution. The Iowa Supreme Court held that competency determinations require de novo review because they implicate due process, and upon that review it affirmed the district court's finding that Johnson was competent, as the evidence did not show he lacked the ability to assist counsel. The court also ruled that defendants need not raise ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal with specificity and that such claims must be preserved for post-conviction relief when the record is inadequate. It therefore vacated portions of the court of appeals decision on these issues but affirmed the district court's judgment.

criminal lawprocedure

The case was a declaratory judgment action to determine whether Nationwide Agri-Business Insurance Co. had a duty to defend or indemnify its insured, Jim Goodwin, for tort claims arising from a fatal car accident that occurred after Goodwin loaned a rented vehicle to his uncle. The district court granted summary judgment for Goodwin, finding he qualified as an insured and that the policy exclusion for using a vehicle without a reasonable belief of entitlement did not apply. On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court reversed, holding that the exclusion barred coverage because Goodwin admitted he knew the rental agreement prohibited lending the car and he did not believe he was authorized to do so. The court further ruled that Goodwin had no viable claim under the doctrine of reasonable expectations, as he identified no insurer conduct fostering such expectations and the policy language was clear.

business & regulatorytorts & liability