Marsha K. Ternus

The case involved Ron Millbrook's appeal of his first-degree murder conviction for a drive-by shooting that killed an innocent bystander at an outdoor party in Davenport, Iowa. Millbrook argued that the trial court erred by giving a felony-murder instruction because the predicate felony of intimidation with a dangerous weapon was not independent of the shooting under the merger doctrine established in State v. Heemstra. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, ruling that Millbrook's aiding and abetting of the intimidation offense—by participating in the armed approach and firing—was sufficiently independent of the specific shots that caused the victim's death to support felony murder. The court noted that the evidence showed multiple shots from several guns, and the prior intimidation acts provided an adequate basis for the instruction without needing to rely solely on the fatal shots.

criminal law

The case concerned allegations by the Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board that attorney Stephen J. Lickiss violated multiple Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct in four probate matters involving guardianships and conservatorships. Lickiss admitted the facts due to his failure to respond, which included neglecting cases, failing to communicate with clients or the board, taking fees without court approval, and not notifying clients when he ceased representation. The court conducted a de novo review and found the violations proven by a convincing preponderance of the evidence. It imposed an indefinite three-month suspension of Lickiss's license, with conditions for reinstatement including a fitness evaluation, reasoning that the misconduct required this sanction to maintain professional standards.

procedureproperty

The case involved charges against attorney William Monroe for engaging in a sexual relationship with a client, Jane Doe, while representing her in divorce and criminal matters, which violated Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.8(j). The Iowa Supreme Court agreed that Monroe's conduct breached this rule but found insufficient evidence that it prejudiced the administration of justice under rule 32:8.4(d) without specific proof of impact on court functions. Despite this, the court imposed a thirty-day suspension of Monroe's law license, aligning with the grievance commission's recommendation based on factors like the client's vulnerability and Monroe's mitigating circumstances such as his pro bono work and clean record.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a workers' compensation claim by Debra Solland against the Second Injury Fund of Iowa, in which she sought benefits for successive injuries but initially lost before the agency and district court. After the court of appeals reversed on the merits in her favor and remanded for further proceedings, it split appellate costs equally between the parties, while the district court had taxed judicial review costs to Solland. On further review, the Iowa Supreme Court reversed those cost assessments, holding that Solland was the successful party on all substantive issues. The court relied on Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.1207 and Iowa Code section 625.1, which require costs to be taxed against the unsuccessful party unless otherwise ordered, and found the equal division an abuse of discretion given her full success on appeal. It directed that all appellate and judicial review costs be assessed to the Second Injury Fund and remanded for that purpose.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case concerned Andrew Russell Johnson's appeal from his second-degree murder conviction, focusing on whether he was competent to stand trial due to a borderline personality disorder and on preservation of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim alleging selective prosecution. The Iowa Supreme Court held that competency determinations require de novo review because they implicate due process, and upon that review it affirmed the district court's finding that Johnson was competent, as the evidence did not show he lacked the ability to assist counsel. The court also ruled that defendants need not raise ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal with specificity and that such claims must be preserved for post-conviction relief when the record is inadequate. It therefore vacated portions of the court of appeals decision on these issues but affirmed the district court's judgment.

criminal lawprocedure

The case was a declaratory judgment action to determine whether Nationwide Agri-Business Insurance Co. had a duty to defend or indemnify its insured, Jim Goodwin, for tort claims arising from a fatal car accident that occurred after Goodwin loaned a rented vehicle to his uncle. The district court granted summary judgment for Goodwin, finding he qualified as an insured and that the policy exclusion for using a vehicle without a reasonable belief of entitlement did not apply. On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court reversed, holding that the exclusion barred coverage because Goodwin admitted he knew the rental agreement prohibited lending the car and he did not believe he was authorized to do so. The court further ruled that Goodwin had no viable claim under the doctrine of reasonable expectations, as he identified no insurer conduct fostering such expectations and the policy language was clear.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

This case involved Frontier Leasing Corporation's suit against Links Engineering, LLC to recover damages after default on an equipment lease for a golf course beverage cart, following a chain of purported assignments of the lease. The district court granted summary judgment to Frontier, concluding the assignment was valid and that Links' employee had actual and apparent authority to bind the company. On further review, the Iowa Supreme Court held there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the employee's authority based on conflicting affidavits and industry practices, and therefore reversed the summary judgment. The court also modified the court of appeals' remand directions to require the district court to give Links an opportunity to resist substitution of the real party in interest before allowing any substitution.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved defendant Ritchie Lathrop's appeal from his conviction for third-degree sexual abuse based on sexual relations with a fifteen-year-old in 2005. The sentencing court imposed probation with a no-contact condition barring all interaction with anyone under eighteen without officer approval, plus lifetime parole under Iowa Code section 903B.1. The Iowa Supreme Court held that the lifetime-parole requirement violated the state constitution's ex post facto clause because the statute took effect after the offense, and that the no-contact condition was unduly broad because it prohibited even incidental or unintentional encounters without a sufficient link to the crime. The court therefore vacated those portions of the sentence and remanded for imposition of a narrower probation condition. Error-preservation rules did not bar review of the sentencing claims.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved disciplinary charges against attorney William Shaw Carpenter, who is licensed in Minnesota but practiced federal immigration law in Iowa, for violations of professional conduct rules in seventeen immigration matters, two misdemeanor convictions, and trust account issues. The Iowa Supreme Court, exercising jurisdiction over out-of-state lawyers providing services in the state, found the misconduct proven and ordered Carpenter to cease practicing law in Iowa indefinitely, with no opportunity to lift the order for at least two years. The court reasoned that such sanctions were appropriate given the extent of the violations and Carpenter's depression-related disability, requiring a professional fitness evaluation for any future reinstatement.

immigrationcriminal lawprocedure

This case is a workers' compensation dispute in which employee Amy Schutjer sought additional temporary total and partial disability benefits, permanent partial disability benefits, and penalty benefits from her employer Algona Manor Care Center following a December 2002 back injury sustained while transferring a resident. The workers' compensation commissioner ruled in favor of the employer on the rate calculation and denied the additional benefits, a decision largely upheld by the district court except for a remand on penalties. On further review, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the district court, holding that the commissioner properly denied temporary benefits after Schutjer voluntarily quit suitable employment on January 5, 2003, and provided a sufficiently detailed decision supported by substantial evidence showing that later medical expenses and disability were not causally connected to the work injury.

labor & employment

The case involved Christopher Spates' conviction for first-degree felony murder after a bystander was killed during a gunfight between rival groups in which Spates participated by driving and being armed. Spates appealed, arguing the trial court should have instructed the jury on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser-included offense and erred in giving a mutual combat instruction for aiding and abetting liability. The Iowa Supreme Court held that error was not preserved on the voluntary manslaughter issue and that the mutual combat instruction was properly given. Therefore, the court affirmed the conviction and sentence.

criminal law

The case involved buyers who sued sellers for breach of the covenant of title after the city successfully quieted title to a portion of the conveyed property that was actually a public street. The Iowa Supreme Court ruled that the buyers could not recover their attorney fees incurred in defending the quiet title action. The court reasoned that under longstanding common-law principles, a buyer must give the seller notice of the title challenge and an opportunity to defend before recovering such fees as damages. Without that notice, the sellers were not liable for the defense costs, though other damages for the breach remained recoverable. The court therefore vacated the fee award and remanded for entry of a reduced judgment.

propertyprocedure

The case involved charges by the Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board against attorney Brian L. Earley for multiple violations of professional conduct rules in his representation of four clients, primarily client neglect and misappropriation of client funds. Earley did not respond to the complaint, leading to the allegations being admitted, and after a hearing, the grievance commission recommended revoking his law license. The Iowa Supreme Court, conducting a de novo review, agreed with the findings and revoked Earley's license, reasoning that the misappropriation of client funds was a serious violation warranting revocation, especially in light of his prior disciplinary suspension for similar issues.

procedure

This case concerned whether an Iowa inmate could challenge the Department of Corrections' revocation of his work release through a postconviction-relief action under Iowa Code chapter 822, or whether he was required to seek judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act in chapter 17A. The district court dismissed the inmate's petition, holding that chapter 17A provided the exclusive remedy. After the inmate died during the appeal, the court addressed whether the action abated or became moot. It held that Iowa's survival statutes prevent abatement upon death, the appeal was moot, and the public-interest exception to mootness permitted review of the procedural question. The court concluded that postconviction relief was the proper vehicle, reversed the dismissal, but declined to remand because the underlying revocation issue was moot.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned whether a 2007 Iowa statute capping finance charges on car title loans at 21% applied to post-July 1, 2007 cash advances made under open-end credit agreements executed before that date, which had permitted much higher contracted rates. The district court ruled that the new limit in Iowa Code section 537.2403(1) governed such advances, but the Iowa Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute operates only prospectively and does not impair rights under preexisting loan contracts. The court reasoned that applying the cap to future advances would constitute an impermissible retroactive alteration of contractual obligations that vested before the effective date, consistent with precedents interpreting amendments to the consumer credit code and general rules of statutory construction favoring prospective application absent clear legislative intent to the contrary.

business & regulatory

The case involved Kale and Stephanie Swainston seeking uninsured motorist benefits from their American Family insurance policy after being injured in a collision with an uninsured driver. They had already received benefits from the State Farm policy on the vehicle they were passengers in, which had higher limits. The district court and court of appeals ruled that Iowa Code section 516A.2(3) prevented recovery under the American Family policy because its limits were lower than those already paid. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute allows the Swainstons to recover up to the American Family policy limits, subject to the highest applicable limit from the policies, and remanded for further proceedings.

business & regulatory

The case involved James Effler’s conviction for first-degree kidnapping after he took a two-year-old girl to a library bathroom and sexually abused her. Effler appealed, arguing that the district court should have suppressed statements he made during police questioning after requesting counsel and that his trial counsel was ineffective for not raising a state constitutional claim. The Iowa Supreme Court split 3-3 on whether the motion to suppress should have been granted, leaving the court of appeals reversal and the district court ruling in conflict. Under Iowa Code § 602.4107, when the supreme court is equally divided the judgment of the court below is affirmed; the majority interpreted “judgment” to mean the district court’s decision, not the court of appeals decision, based on the statutory text, civil-procedure definitions, and Iowa’s deflective appellate structure. The court therefore vacated the court of appeals decision and affirmed the district court judgment.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Dudley, an indigent defendant acquitted of criminal charges challenged post-acquittal court orders under Iowa Code section 815.9 that required him to reimburse the State for the costs of appointed counsel and related expenses, including a payment plan and judgment for unpaid amounts. The Iowa Supreme Court held that the statute and orders violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel because the court failed to consider his ability to pay before imposing the reimbursement obligation. The court also found equal protection violations, as the repayment plan deprived the defendant of statutory exemptions available to other civil judgment debtors and treated acquitted indigent defendants differently from convicted ones regarding repayment limits. Additionally, the court ruled that the district court had improperly included a court reporter fee in the amount owed, but found no due process violation on the facts presented. The decision vacated the court of appeals ruling, reversed the district court, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings.

criminal lawcivil rights

In State v. Sluyter, the plaintiff challenged the district court's use of contempt proceedings to enforce a judgment for court-appointed attorney fees and costs after his acquittal in a criminal trial. The court held that Iowa statutes do not authorize the use of contempt to collect such costs from acquitted defendants, making it unnecessary to reach the constitutional claim regarding imprisonment for civil debts. The writ of certiorari was sustained, and the case was remanded for dismissal of the contempt proceedings. The decision was based on statutory interpretation of provisions like Iowa Code section 815.9, which specifies judgment entry but not contempt enforcement for acquitted persons.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved taxpayers challenging the assessed value of a McDonald's restaurant property in Charles City, Iowa, for property tax purposes, with disputes over the property's market value and whether franchise-to-franchise sales should be considered as comparable transactions. The district court upheld the county board of review's assessed value of $352,990 for 2003-2005, finding it neither excessive nor inequitable compared to similar properties. The court of appeals reversed and lowered the value to $230,000 based on the taxpayers' expert testimony, but the Iowa Supreme Court, after de novo review, vacated that decision and affirmed the district court. The court's reasoning centered on Iowa Code chapter 441 requirements for determining actual market value using present use and normal transactions, concluding that the board's valuation was supported by the record and that the taxpayers had not met their burden to prove excessiveness.

taxesproperty