In Stewart v. Roe, plaintiff Michael Stewart sued Aurora police officers Kary Roe and Robin Trettenero, the mayor, and the city under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force during an arrest and detention on April 4, 1990, when Roe allegedly attacked and kicked him in a holding cell while Trettenero either assisted or failed to intervene, along with claims that the city sanctioned a pattern of brutality causing physical, mental, and economic harm. Defendants moved to dismiss multiple counts. The court denied the motions, finding the complaint sufficiently pled the time, place, participants, and events with a constitutional basis; that excessive force claims by a pretrial detainee could proceed under Fourth Amendment reasonableness or Due Process standards; that battery allegations stated a claim through physical contact; and that punitive damages were not barred by double jeopardy or res judicata in private civil litigation.
This case involves a contract dispute between Sky Valley Limited Partnership, an Illinois entity formed to develop a real estate project in California, and ATX Sky Valley, Ltd., a Texas entity that manages the project. Sky Valley sued ATX in Illinois federal court for declaratory relief and damages alleging that ATX had ceased performing under their September 1989 agreement. The court denied ATX's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding that ATX had transacted business in Illinois by initiating the deal and conducting multiple negotiation meetings there, which satisfied both the Illinois long-arm statute and due process. The court granted ATX's alternative motion to transfer the case to the Northern District of California, concluding that the project's location, related pending California lawsuits, witness convenience, and access to evidence made that forum substantially more appropriate.
This case is an appeal from the bankruptcy court's denial of a motion for preliminary injunctive relief and grant of abstention in a dispute arising from a 1980 stock sale agreement and promissory note between Gary Williams and L&S Industries, Inc., which was later guaranteed by the Stefans. After L&S filed for bankruptcy and its counterclaims against Williams were abandoned and dismissed with prejudice by the trustee, Williams sought to enjoin the Stefans' similar affirmative defenses and counterclaims in a parallel state court action based on res judicata. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's rulings, finding no privity between the trustee and the Stefans that would support res judicata, thus no substantial likelihood of success on the injunction, and determining that discretionary abstention was appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) because the bankruptcy case was nearly closed, state law issues predominated, and forum shopping concerns were present.
This case involves a wrongful death and products liability action brought by Margaret Milligan, as administrator of her son's estate, against Kershaw Manufacturing Company and Soo Line Railroad after Douglas Milligan, an Illinois resident employed by Soo Line, was fatally struck by a tie injector machine manufactured by Kershaw while working near Crane, Indiana. Kershaw moved to dismiss for improper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(3), contending it was not subject to personal jurisdiction in the Northern District of Illinois. The court denied the motion to dismiss, finding that Kershaw's continuous and systematic contacts with Illinois—including regular sales, solicitation by marketing and sales representatives, and post-sale service and training—established jurisdiction under the Illinois common-law "doing business" doctrine, and that these purposeful contacts satisfied due process minimum contacts requirements.
In this case, Ulwyn Pierre sued United Parcel Service (UPS) in Illinois state court after several boxes of her personal property were lost or mishandled during an interstate shipment from New York to Chicago, alleging state common law claims for negligence in bailment, negligence, and breach of contract, plus violations of Illinois statutes based on UPS's failure to allow her to increase the declared value. UPS removed the action to federal court and moved to dismiss on grounds that the Carmack Amendment preempts state remedies for claims against interstate carriers. The court granted UPS's motion to dismiss without prejudice, permitting Pierre to refile under the federal Carmack Amendment, and denied her motion to remand. The core reasoning was that the Carmack Amendment completely preempts inconsistent state and common law claims involving interstate shipments, including disputes over a carrier's failure to provide a choice of liability levels, making the action federal in nature and subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction.
business & regulatoryfederal powerproceduretorts & liability
This case involved plaintiff Farr's claims against his former employer, Continental White Cap, for age discrimination under federal law and for breach of an alleged oral promise of continued employment under state law, arising from a company reorganization that resulted in his demotion. On reconsideration, the court found that Farr's EEOC charge was timely filed within the 300-day limit because his claim accrued on September 23, 1988, when he first learned the details of the demotion during a meeting with company president Peter Browning. The court vacated its prior grant of summary judgment on the age discrimination claim, determining that statistical evidence of older employees being disproportionately selected for termination raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the employer's stated reasons were pretextual. However, the court granted summary judgment to the defendant on the breach of contract claim, holding that the alleged oral promise lacked sufficient consideration and mutuality under Illinois law, even though it was not barred by the Statute of Frauds.
