Nicholas John Bua

In Stewart v. Roe, plaintiff Michael Stewart sued Aurora police officers Kary Roe and Robin Trettenero, the mayor, and the city under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force during an arrest and detention on April 4, 1990, when Roe allegedly attacked and kicked him in a holding cell while Trettenero either assisted or failed to intervene, along with claims that the city sanctioned a pattern of brutality causing physical, mental, and economic harm. Defendants moved to dismiss multiple counts. The court denied the motions, finding the complaint sufficiently pled the time, place, participants, and events with a constitutional basis; that excessive force claims by a pretrial detainee could proceed under Fourth Amendment reasonableness or Due Process standards; that battery allegations stated a claim through physical contact; and that punitive damages were not barred by double jeopardy or res judicata in private civil litigation.

civil rightscriminal lawproceduretorts & liability

This case involves a contract dispute between Sky Valley Limited Partnership, an Illinois entity formed to develop a real estate project in California, and ATX Sky Valley, Ltd., a Texas entity that manages the project. Sky Valley sued ATX in Illinois federal court for declaratory relief and damages alleging that ATX had ceased performing under their September 1989 agreement. The court denied ATX's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding that ATX had transacted business in Illinois by initiating the deal and conducting multiple negotiation meetings there, which satisfied both the Illinois long-arm statute and due process. The court granted ATX's alternative motion to transfer the case to the Northern District of California, concluding that the project's location, related pending California lawsuits, witness convenience, and access to evidence made that forum substantially more appropriate.

procedurebusiness & regulatoryproperty

This case is an appeal from the bankruptcy court's denial of a motion for preliminary injunctive relief and grant of abstention in a dispute arising from a 1980 stock sale agreement and promissory note between Gary Williams and L&S Industries, Inc., which was later guaranteed by the Stefans. After L&S filed for bankruptcy and its counterclaims against Williams were abandoned and dismissed with prejudice by the trustee, Williams sought to enjoin the Stefans' similar affirmative defenses and counterclaims in a parallel state court action based on res judicata. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's rulings, finding no privity between the trustee and the Stefans that would support res judicata, thus no substantial likelihood of success on the injunction, and determining that discretionary abstention was appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) because the bankruptcy case was nearly closed, state law issues predominated, and forum shopping concerns were present.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involves a wrongful death and products liability action brought by Margaret Milligan, as administrator of her son's estate, against Kershaw Manufacturing Company and Soo Line Railroad after Douglas Milligan, an Illinois resident employed by Soo Line, was fatally struck by a tie injector machine manufactured by Kershaw while working near Crane, Indiana. Kershaw moved to dismiss for improper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(3), contending it was not subject to personal jurisdiction in the Northern District of Illinois. The court denied the motion to dismiss, finding that Kershaw's continuous and systematic contacts with Illinois—including regular sales, solicitation by marketing and sales representatives, and post-sale service and training—established jurisdiction under the Illinois common-law "doing business" doctrine, and that these purposeful contacts satisfied due process minimum contacts requirements.

proceduretorts & liability

In this case, Ulwyn Pierre sued United Parcel Service (UPS) in Illinois state court after several boxes of her personal property were lost or mishandled during an interstate shipment from New York to Chicago, alleging state common law claims for negligence in bailment, negligence, and breach of contract, plus violations of Illinois statutes based on UPS's failure to allow her to increase the declared value. UPS removed the action to federal court and moved to dismiss on grounds that the Carmack Amendment preempts state remedies for claims against interstate carriers. The court granted UPS's motion to dismiss without prejudice, permitting Pierre to refile under the federal Carmack Amendment, and denied her motion to remand. The core reasoning was that the Carmack Amendment completely preempts inconsistent state and common law claims involving interstate shipments, including disputes over a carrier's failure to provide a choice of liability levels, making the action federal in nature and subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction.

business & regulatoryfederal powerproceduretorts & liability

This case involved plaintiff Farr's claims against his former employer, Continental White Cap, for age discrimination under federal law and for breach of an alleged oral promise of continued employment under state law, arising from a company reorganization that resulted in his demotion. On reconsideration, the court found that Farr's EEOC charge was timely filed within the 300-day limit because his claim accrued on September 23, 1988, when he first learned the details of the demotion during a meeting with company president Peter Browning. The court vacated its prior grant of summary judgment on the age discrimination claim, determining that statistical evidence of older employees being disproportionately selected for termination raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the employer's stated reasons were pretextual. However, the court granted summary judgment to the defendant on the breach of contract claim, holding that the alleged oral promise lacked sufficient consideration and mutuality under Illinois law, even though it was not barred by the Statute of Frauds.

labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure

The case concerned plaintiff Dana Henry’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against DuPage County officials, the sheriff, a private medical contractor (CMS), and its employees after Henry, never a suspect or charged in a murder investigation, was subpoenaed for blood and saliva samples, held in contempt and jailed for refusal, stripped naked, and placed on suicide watch for hours even after complying. The court addressed multiple motions to dismiss, focusing on whether CMS and its staff qualified as state actors potentially entitled to qualified immunity, whether the county could be liable for the independent sheriff’s actions, and the constitutional standards governing grand-jury subpoenas for bodily samples. It reasoned that private contractors performing governmental functions under contract may receive qualified immunity when acting pursuant to presumptively valid authority, that the sheriff is not a county policymaker, and that intrusive biological sampling requires individualized suspicion rather than the minimal scrutiny applied in certain administrative drug-testing contexts.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

This case involves plaintiff Mark Markarian's claims against defendants Zakar Garoogian and Dr. Jack Wilkinson for common law fraud and breach of an oral contract arising from an alleged investment of $1,650,000 in a cold fusion invention. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing lack of personal jurisdiction, failure to adequately plead fraud, and unenforceability of the contract under the Statute of Frauds. The court denied the motion in full. It held that personal jurisdiction existed over all defendants under a conspiracy theory because one co-conspirator performed acts in Illinois. The fraud claim was sufficiently stated because the complaint alleged misrepresentations with knowledge of falsity, materiality, and reasonable reliance, with liability extending to co-conspirators. The contract claim survived because, although the agreement could not be performed within one year, the plaintiff's complete performance by paying the initial sum rendered the Statute of Frauds inapplicable.

procedurebusiness & regulatorytorts & liability

The case involved defendants Kenneth Thomas Hayward and William Bradford Krause, who were convicted by a jury of federal offenses including conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 241, civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 3631(b), and using fire to commit a felony under 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(1), stemming from two cross-burning incidents targeting a home to intimidate residents and interfere with their right to associate with persons of another race. The court denied the defendants' joint motions for judgment of acquittal or a new trial, to dismiss the indictment for alleged prosecutorial misconduct, and (for Hayward) to reconsider pretrial detention. The court reasoned that the statutory language of § 844(h)(1) unambiguously covers the use of fire in any federal felony without limiting it to arson-type offenses, that sufficient evidence linked the incidents as part of a single conspiracy, that there was no basis for suppression or multiplicity claims, and that government actions toward witnesses did not constitute misconduct. Additional challenges, such as to the pistol seizure, were rejected on standing and other grounds.

criminal lawcivil rights

This case involves a breach-of-contract lawsuit brought by plaintiff Michael Corrigan against his former employer, Cactus International Trading Co., after Corrigan was terminated less than a month into his role as regional manager. Corrigan alleged that Cactus breached the employment agreement by terminating him without cause, failing to supply promised tile samples and materials, and violating an implied duty of good faith. The court granted Cactus's motion to dismiss in part, ruling that the contract created at-will employment terminable at any time because it lacked a specified duration and that salary increments or length-of-service benefits did not imply a guaranteed term of employment; the implied good-faith claim was also rejected as inapplicable to at-will relationships. The court denied dismissal of the claim based on Cactus's failure to provide job materials, finding it stated a viable breach, and denied Rule 11 sanctions because the suit was not entirely frivolous. The decision applied Illinois employment law precedents holding that periodic pay and benefits alone do not convert at-will employment into a contract for a fixed period.

labor & employmentprocedure

In United States v. Livingston, defendant Bruce G. Livingston, convicted on sixty-five counts of mail fraud and false statements in applications for payments, moved under Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(a) to reduce the $100,000 restitution ordered as part of his sentence, claiming it was excessive under Hughey v. United States. The district court denied the motion, finding that 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(2) permits restitution for losses to all victims directly harmed by the scheme charged in Count I of the indictment, including Medicare, private insurers, and a physician who purchased a fraudulent business. The court calculated that these victims suffered at least $100,000 in total losses based on estimates from medical records and the indictment allegations, concluding the restitution amount complied with the statute and Supreme Court precedent.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Jose Soler suing Arlington Heights police officer Charles Waite for alleged excessive force during an arrest for disorderly conduct, claiming violations of his civil rights. After a jury verdict in favor of Waite, Soler moved for a new trial, arguing that Waite's peremptory challenge excluding the only Black juror on the venire violated Batson v. Kentucky by discriminating on the basis of race. The court denied the motion, finding that Waite offered a race-neutral explanation tied to the juror's occupation as a cardiology technologist, which could affect her impartiality given Soler's claimed heart condition, and also awarded costs to Waite. On reconsideration, the court upheld both the denial of a new trial and the cost award, concluding there was no evidence of purposeful discrimination and that the costs for depositions and other expenses were properly taxable.

civil rightsprocedure

The case involved a dispute over a 1988 settlement agreement between Thomas Pasant and Jackson National Life Insurance Company that ended prior employment-related claims, including a covenant not to compete; in exchange for $100,000 and the waiver, Pasant relinquished claims for commissions and incentive compensation. After Jackson Life filed and then dismissed an Illinois lawsuit against Pasant, he sued in federal court alleging breach of the settlement and seeking consequential damages plus the previously waived commissions and pay. Jackson Life moved for partial summary judgment on the commissions and incentive compensation requests in Count I. The court granted the motion, holding that Michigan law requires a plaintiff seeking to repudiate a settlement and pursue original claims to first tender back the consideration received, which Pasant had not done, and that this rule barred recovery regardless of alternative pleading under Rule 8.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In United States v. Hayward, the defendant was convicted by a jury of violating 18 U.S.C. § 241, 42 U.S.C. § 3631(b), and 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(1) for conduct involving the use of fire. The government moved to detain Hayward pending sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2), which requires detention for crimes of violence unless there is a substantial likelihood that a motion for acquittal or new trial will be granted and clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is not likely to flee or pose a danger. The court granted the motion, finding that Hayward's planned argument—that his conduct was expressive and protected by the First Amendment—did not establish a substantial likelihood of success on post-trial motions, citing the pending R.A.V. case and United States v. Lee. The court also ruled that time spent in house arrest while on bond did not qualify as official detention for credit toward any sentence.

criminal lawfree speechprocedure

In this case, Business Communications, Inc., a Chapter 11 debtor, sued its former accountants in bankruptcy court for breach of contract, malpractice, gross negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and conversion, seeking damages for alleged failures in providing accounting services. The defendants requested a jury trial and moved to withdraw the adversary proceeding from the bankruptcy court to the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 157(d), arguing that the bankruptcy court lacked authority to conduct a jury trial in this noncore proceeding. The district court denied the motion without prejudice, holding that withdrawal was not required at the pretrial stage because the bankruptcy court could properly handle interlocutory matters and issue proposed findings on dispositive motions, subject to de novo review. The court reasoned that the bankruptcy judge was best positioned to manage the case efficiently in connection with the overall bankruptcy estate and that defendants had shown no prejudice from delaying withdrawal until the matter was trial-ready.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involves Continental Bank seeking to enforce guaranty agreements against the Modanskys to recover over $9 million in loans extended to four lumber companies that later became insolvent. The Modanskys asserted counterclaims and affirmative defenses alleging misconduct by the bank toward the borrowers, including breach of fiduciary duties, duress, and lack of good faith. The court granted in part and denied in part the bank's motion to dismiss, dismissing all seven counterclaims because the guarantors lacked standing to assert injuries to the principal debtors, as those claims belonged to the bankruptcy estate under federal law, and striking most affirmative defenses for insufficient pleading or inapplicability, while allowing two defenses related to material changes in the loan dealings and breach of the covenant of good faith owed directly to the guarantors.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In Geder v. Roth, a pro se prisoner incarcerated at Stateville Correctional Center sued prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that limited access to the law library (five visits totaling ten hours) and lack of a law clerk while in segregation denied him meaningful access to the courts and prevented preparation of pretrial orders in two pending federal cases. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, holding that the plaintiff received adequate library access under Bounds v. Smith and failed to show prejudice, as the other courts granted multiple extensions, no sanctions were imposed, and his non-compliance stemmed from refusal to cooperate rather than library restrictions. The court further reasoned that prison officials need only provide either adequate library access or legal assistance—not both—and that the plaintiff had not established a violation warranting relief.

civil rightscriminal law

The case involved plaintiff Markarian's claims that defendants, including Donald Alloian, participated in a conspiracy to defraud him by making false representations about a nonexistent cold fusion invention to induce a $1.65 million investment and further payments. Alloian filed a motion to dismiss, primarily contesting personal jurisdiction under Illinois law. The court denied the motion, holding that the complaint's allegations of conspiracy and Alloian's statements, taken as true, along with resolving conflicts in affidavits in the plaintiff's favor, sufficiently supported jurisdiction and a claim for relief based on material misrepresentations.

proceduretorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

John-Tyronne Martin, an inmate at Stateville Correctional Center, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging violations of due process and equal protection by Department of Corrections officials through practices such as racially discriminatory investments and hiring, restricted law library access, lockdowns affecting showers and religious activities, and a retaliatory transfer. Defendants moved for summary judgment, which the court granted in part after liberally construing the pro se filings and applying standing requirements under Valley Forge and summary judgment standards under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. The court dismissed claims against Thompson and Consentino, eliminated official-capacity and injunctive relief claims, and found insufficient standing or legal basis for taxpayer and certain investment-related allegations, but determined that factual disputes on personal involvement precluded summary judgment on the religious activities, showers, and transfer claims against Lane and O’Leary individually, leaving qualified immunity unresolved. The remaining actionable claims are thus limited to damages against those two defendants in their personal capacities.

criminal lawcivil rightsreligious libertyprocedure

This case involves a dispute between McKay Nissan, Ltd., a Nissan vehicle dealer, and Nissan Motor Corporation in U.S.A., its distributor, regarding compensation for warranty services under the Illinois Motor Vehicle Franchise Act. McKay sought an accounting for warranty claims submitted between 1987 and 1989, alleging violations of the Act's requirements for full compensation. The court granted Nissan's motion to dismiss in part, holding that the Act does not apply to the original 1979 franchise agreement or its minor amendments because they predated the Act's effective date and did not create a new contract. However, the court denied the motion for claims arising after the April 3, 1989 renewal agreement, which was executed after the Act took effect, allowing those claims to proceed under the statute.

business & regulatory