Kay McFarland

In State v. Conley, the defendant, convicted by a jury of premeditated first-degree murder and sentenced to a hard 40 life term, filed a pro se motion under K.S.A. 22-3504(1) to correct an illegal sentence, claiming the sentence violated Apprendi v. New Jersey because it relied on facts not charged or found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The district court summarily denied the motion, and the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that res judicata bars relitigation of the Apprendi issue, which had been decided against Conley on direct appeal, and that the statutory language allowing correction "at any time" does not permit repeated challenges to previously rejected claims. The court further ruled that a preliminary examination to check for substantial legal or factual issues is proper before any hearing, and summary denial was appropriate here since no new issues were raised.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved John Kirkpatrick's appeal of his conviction for first-degree felony murder after he fired shots into the door of an occupied apartment, resulting in the death of Jacob Williams. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and life sentence. The court held that the defendant was not entitled to jury instructions on lesser included offenses of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter because the underlying felony of criminal discharge of a firearm precluded self-defense claims in this context, and rejected other claims regarding suppression of statements, trial procedures, and cumulative error.

criminal lawguns

The case involved Darrell L. Farmer's appeal of his convictions for first-degree felony murder, criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied vehicle, aggravated burglary, aggravated battery, and aggravated assault, arising from the 2002 shooting death of DeAundrey Neal inside his car in Coffeyville, Kansas, followed by a violent incident at another home. Farmer challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for the discharge conviction (and thus the felony-murder predicate), argued the convictions were multiplicitous, claimed his confession was involuntary, and contested the calculation of his criminal history score without jury findings. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the evidence supported the charges as filed and that the state's selection of the criminal discharge statute was permissible even if other charging options such as aggravated battery existed. A concurrence and dissent maintained that the discharge statute was not intended to cover conduct already punishable as aggravated assault or battery and would have reversed those convictions.

criminal lawguns

In Guillory v. State, the defendant, after pleading nolo contendere to first-degree murder and receiving a life sentence, filed a pro se K.S.A. 60-1507 postconviction motion alleging he was not informed of his appeal rights, received ineffective assistance of counsel, and was coerced into his plea; the district court summarily denied the motion. Guillory filed a notice of appeal more than four months later, outside the 30-day limit under K.S.A. 60-2103(a), and sought to invoke the Ortiz exceptions to permit the untimely appeal on grounds that he was not advised of his right to appeal the denial. The Kansas Supreme Court held that K.S.A. 60-1507 proceedings are civil actions governed by civil procedure rules, that the Ortiz exceptions apply only to direct criminal appeals where statutory rights to notice or counsel exist, and that no such statutory duty requires courts to advise 60-1507 movants of appeal rights; therefore the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Brown, the defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter while driving under the influence and DUI following a fatal car accident. He appealed on the ground that his statutory speedy trial rights under K.S.A. 22-3402 were violated, as more than 90 days had elapsed while he remained in custody after arraignment. The dispute centered on whether 19 days between the granting of his continuance motion and the original trial date should be attributed to the defendant or the state. The Kansas Supreme Court held that such delay is charged to the defendant from the date the continuance is granted, resulting in only 82 days chargeable to the state and no speedy trial violation.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Edwards, the defendant appealed the summary denial of his motion under K.S.A. 22-3504(1) to correct an allegedly illegal sentence, claiming that his two aggravated kidnapping convictions were multiplicitous with other rape, sodomy, and battery convictions because the bodily harm element overlapped. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dismissal, holding that the motion did not qualify under the statute's narrow definition of an illegal sentence, which covers only sentences imposed without jurisdiction, those not conforming to statutory punishment terms, or those ambiguous as to time and manner of service. The court reasoned that multiplicity claims raise constitutional double-jeopardy issues rather than statutory conformity problems and that prior precedent permits summary denial after a preliminary examination finds no substantial legal or factual questions, without requiring appointment of counsel or a hearing.

criminal lawprocedure