Kay McFarland

In State v. Conley, the defendant, convicted by a jury of premeditated first-degree murder and sentenced to a hard 40 life term, filed a pro se motion under K.S.A. 22-3504(1) to correct an illegal sentence, claiming the sentence violated Apprendi v. New Jersey because it relied on facts not charged or found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The district court summarily denied the motion, and the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that res judicata bars relitigation of the Apprendi issue, which had been decided against Conley on direct appeal, and that the statutory language allowing correction "at any time" does not permit repeated challenges to previously rejected claims. The court further ruled that a preliminary examination to check for substantial legal or factual issues is proper before any hearing, and summary denial was appropriate here since no new issues were raised.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved John Kirkpatrick's appeal of his conviction for first-degree felony murder after he fired shots into the door of an occupied apartment, resulting in the death of Jacob Williams. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and life sentence. The court held that the defendant was not entitled to jury instructions on lesser included offenses of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter because the underlying felony of criminal discharge of a firearm precluded self-defense claims in this context, and rejected other claims regarding suppression of statements, trial procedures, and cumulative error.

criminal lawguns

The case involved Darrell L. Farmer's appeal of his convictions for first-degree felony murder, criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied vehicle, aggravated burglary, aggravated battery, and aggravated assault, arising from the 2002 shooting death of DeAundrey Neal inside his car in Coffeyville, Kansas, followed by a violent incident at another home. Farmer challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for the discharge conviction (and thus the felony-murder predicate), argued the convictions were multiplicitous, claimed his confession was involuntary, and contested the calculation of his criminal history score without jury findings. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the evidence supported the charges as filed and that the state's selection of the criminal discharge statute was permissible even if other charging options such as aggravated battery existed. A concurrence and dissent maintained that the discharge statute was not intended to cover conduct already punishable as aggravated assault or battery and would have reversed those convictions.

criminal lawguns

In Guillory v. State, the defendant, after pleading nolo contendere to first-degree murder and receiving a life sentence, filed a pro se K.S.A. 60-1507 postconviction motion alleging he was not informed of his appeal rights, received ineffective assistance of counsel, and was coerced into his plea; the district court summarily denied the motion. Guillory filed a notice of appeal more than four months later, outside the 30-day limit under K.S.A. 60-2103(a), and sought to invoke the Ortiz exceptions to permit the untimely appeal on grounds that he was not advised of his right to appeal the denial. The Kansas Supreme Court held that K.S.A. 60-1507 proceedings are civil actions governed by civil procedure rules, that the Ortiz exceptions apply only to direct criminal appeals where statutory rights to notice or counsel exist, and that no such statutory duty requires courts to advise 60-1507 movants of appeal rights; therefore the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Brown, the defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter while driving under the influence and DUI following a fatal car accident. He appealed on the ground that his statutory speedy trial rights under K.S.A. 22-3402 were violated, as more than 90 days had elapsed while he remained in custody after arraignment. The dispute centered on whether 19 days between the granting of his continuance motion and the original trial date should be attributed to the defendant or the state. The Kansas Supreme Court held that such delay is charged to the defendant from the date the continuance is granted, resulting in only 82 days chargeable to the state and no speedy trial violation.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Edwards, the defendant appealed the summary denial of his motion under K.S.A. 22-3504(1) to correct an allegedly illegal sentence, claiming that his two aggravated kidnapping convictions were multiplicitous with other rape, sodomy, and battery convictions because the bodily harm element overlapped. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dismissal, holding that the motion did not qualify under the statute's narrow definition of an illegal sentence, which covers only sentences imposed without jurisdiction, those not conforming to statutory punishment terms, or those ambiguous as to time and manner of service. The court reasoned that multiplicity claims raise constitutional double-jeopardy issues rather than statutory conformity problems and that prior precedent permits summary denial after a preliminary examination finds no substantial legal or factual questions, without requiring appointment of counsel or a hearing.

criminal lawprocedure

Sheldon K. Nash, convicted in 1995 of felony murder and aggravated robbery, filed a pro se motion under K.S.A. 22-3504(1) to correct an illegal sentence, asserting that the aggravated robbery count in the complaint was defective because it charged taking property from the 'presence' of another rather than the 'person or presence' and because it referenced inflicting bodily harm without the full statutory language on being armed with a dangerous weapon. The district court denied the motion, and the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the denial. The court held that a motion to correct an illegal sentence is available only to address sentences imposed without jurisdiction, nonconforming sentences, or ambiguous sentences, not to collaterally attack or reverse a conviction, so the requested relief was unavailable under the statute.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Gayden, the defendant filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that his consecutive sentences for multiple felony convictions arising from a single shooting incident violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. The district court denied the motion on the merits, finding no double jeopardy violation. On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court held that a claim of constitutional double jeopardy violation does not qualify as an illegal sentence under K.S.A. 22-3504(1), which is limited to sentences imposed without jurisdiction, that fail to conform to statutory provisions, or that are ambiguous. The court explained that the statute's narrow definition covers only statutory nonconformance, not constitutional challenges, distinguishing prior cases involving invalidated sentencing schemes. It affirmed the denial of relief on this procedural ground rather than the merits.

criminal lawprocedure

In 1987, Jose Rojas pleaded guilty to two counts of second-degree murder and one count of aggravated kidnapping in connection with two deaths and received consecutive sentences of life imprisonment plus 15 years to life. In 2004, he filed a pro se motion under K.S.A. 22-3504 to correct an illegal sentence, claiming the trial court failed to consider the factors in K.S.A. 21-4606(b) when imposing sentence. The district court dismissed the motion, and the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Rojas had not properly preserved challenges to the murder sentences and that the failure to consider those statutory factors does not render a sentence illegal under K.S.A. 22-3504 because an illegal sentence is limited to cases involving lack of jurisdiction, nonconformance to authorized punishment, or ambiguity in the time or manner of service. The court reasoned that the definition of illegal sentence does not encompass mere procedural omissions in applying sentencing guidelines.

criminal lawprocedure

This case was a wrongful death and survivorship action brought by the family of Felicia Bland, who was killed when 16-year-old Sean Scott lost control of his car after consuming alcohol and crossed the highway median. The district court dismissed claims against the Phi Gamma Delta fraternity entities and the University of Kansas for failure to state a claim, and the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed those dismissals as final judgments. The court held that, under longstanding precedent from Ling v. Jan’s Liquors, Kansas follows the common-law rule that providers of alcohol have no liability to third parties injured by an intoxicated person absent a dram shop statute, which the state does not have. Claims based on an assumption of duty under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A resulted in an evenly divided court, so the trial court’s dismissal on those grounds was left standing as a matter of constitutional procedure. The court noted that any change to impose such liability is a public-policy matter for the legislature.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a criminal prosecution in which the defendant, while on probation, fired multiple gunshots into the pavement outside a crowded bar, injuring eleven people with metal fragments. He was charged with eleven counts of aggravated battery and one count of unlawful firearm possession, all level 8 felonies, plus a misdemeanor. At the scheduled preliminary hearing, the defendant waived that hearing and sought to plead guilty to all counts as filed; the State requested time to amend some charges to higher-level felonies based on injury severity or to consider dismissal but was denied by the district court, which accepted the pleas. The State appealed on a question reserved, arguing error in refusing amendment or dismissal. The Kansas Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the issues were fact-specific to this case and did not present questions of statewide interest important to the uniform administration of criminal law.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a defendant convicted of reckless driving under K.S.A. 8-1566(a) after running a stop sign on a rural road, colliding with another vehicle, and causing it to roll into a ditch and catch fire. The defendant admitted to police that he had been inattentive and failed to see the stop sign or the other vehicle. The Kansas Supreme Court reversed the conviction, finding the evidence insufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The court reasoned that reckless driving requires proof of a realization of imminent danger to others and a conscious and unjustifiable disregard of that danger, which mere inattentiveness or failure to pay attention does not establish absent additional aggravating circumstances such as speeding or erratic driving.

criminal law

In State v. Legero, the defendant appealed a district magistrate judge's revocation of his probation after he pled guilty to misdemeanors and was placed on probation, which the district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 22-3609a. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the statute's provision for appeals from "any judgment" of a district magistrate judge applies only to convictions, defined as pronouncements of guilt and imposition of sentence, not to post-conviction probation revocation orders. The Court reasoned that the right to appeal is purely statutory, prior cases limited appealable judgments to convictions or similar final adjudications of guilt, and allowing de novo review of revocations would lead to inconsistent procedural results under the statute's trial de novo provisions. The decision reversed the Court of Appeals and upheld the district court's ruling that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved Keith Hanson, who was convicted in a bench trial of three counts of permitting a dangerous animal to be at large under K.S.A. 21-3418 after his three pit bull mix dogs escaped and attacked a neighbor's Labrador retriever, causing fatal injuries. The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed challenges to the admission of evidence about the dogs' aggression at an animal shelter, the sufficiency of the evidence for the convictions, and the restitution amount. The court reversed the convictions, holding that the evidence was insufficient to prove the defendant knew of the dogs' dangerous or vicious propensities before the attack, as a prior incident where the dogs chased a horse without causing injury did not establish such knowledge. The issues of evidence admissibility and restitution were not dispositive given the reversal on sufficiency grounds.

criminal law

The case involved Javier Santos-Garza, who pled guilty to aggravated battery under a plea agreement stipulating that a jury would have found the aggravating factor of excessive brutality, leading to an upward durational departure sentence of 48 months instead of the presumptive 38-43 months. The sole issue was whether this sentence was constitutionally permissible under Apprendi v. New Jersey and State v. Gould despite the stipulation and agreement. The Kansas Supreme Court held that K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 21-4716's upward departure scheme is unconstitutional on its face because it allows a court to impose a sentence beyond the statutory maximum based on findings made by a preponderance of the evidence rather than by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Following precedents such as State v. Cullen, the court ruled that the defendant's stipulation and plea agreement did not cure the facial defect or allow waiver of the constitutional requirement. The sentence was vacated and the case remanded for resentencing within the statutory range.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Gerry A. Burden's appeal of his convictions for aggravated kidnapping, rape, aggravated criminal sodomy, and criminal threat based on an incident in which he allegedly assaulted his partner in their home. The Court of Appeals had reversed the aggravated kidnapping conviction, finding insufficient evidence of a taking or confinement under K.S.A. 21-3420(c). The Kansas Supreme Court granted review on that issue and held that the three-pronged test from State v. Buggs applies only to kidnappings charged as facilitating another crime under subsection (b), not to those charged under subsection (c) for inflicting bodily injury or terrorizing the victim. The court concluded that the evidence of the defendant catching the victim at the door, forcing her down the hall, and beating and threatening her in the bedroom was sufficient to support the taking element, and therefore affirmed the district court's aggravated kidnapping conviction.

criminal law

The case involved Donell Williams, who at age 16 pled guilty to two counts of first-degree murder as part of a plea agreement after being charged with additional felonies. Prior to sentencing, he sought to withdraw his pleas on grounds including inadequate notice and ineffective assistance of counsel, but the trial court denied the motion. On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court addressed a claim not raised below—that the trial court had incorrectly advised him during the plea hearing that the maximum punishment was up to 25 years in prison with no parole, rather than life imprisonment with parole eligibility after 25 years. The court determined that the interests of justice and prevention of denial of fundamental rights required consideration of the belated claim, and because the error was undisputed, it reversed and remanded to allow withdrawal of the pleas.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Hurla, the State appealed the district court's dismissal of a criminal complaint charging burglary of a nondwelling, felony theft, and criminal damage to property after the defendant entered a 24-month diversion agreement. The district court granted the defendant's motion for early discharge and dismissed the complaint over the State's objection before the diversion term ended. The Kansas Supreme Court held that it had jurisdiction over the appeal, as the State's notice of appeal complied with the applicable Supreme Court rules for appeals to the Court of Appeals. On the merits, the court reversed, ruling that the district court lacked authority to dismiss the complaint prematurely because the diversion agreement permitted early termination only to demand trial and contained no provision for early successful discharge, and the State had not consented. The case was remanded to reinstate the diversion agreement and determine whether its term had been successfully completed.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Tanner L. Green's appeal of his first-degree murder conviction, challenging the trial court's admission of eight autopsy photographs depicting the victim's blunt force head injuries and near-decapitation wounds. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the images. The court reasoned that the photographs were relevant to establish the cause and manner of death, the extent and nature of the wounds, and to assist the medical examiner's testimony, and were not unduly repetitious or admitted solely to prejudice the defendant. The court noted that the gruesome character of the photos stemmed from the violent crime itself rather than any improper purpose.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Rice, the defendant appealed the denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence following his 1994 conviction for first-degree murder, for which he received a hard 40 sentence. The sole issue was whether the jury's verdict form, which found the crime was committed in a "Heinous, Atrocious; & Cruel" manner but omitted the word "especially," rendered the sentence illegal under the statutory requirement for an "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating circumstance. The court affirmed the denial, reasoning that the jury was properly instructed on the aggravating factor, is presumed to have followed those instructions, and the verdict and record clearly showed the jury found the required circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. Additionally, the trial court had reviewed the jury's recommendation as required by statute, and the omission on the verdict form did not invalidate the sentence.

criminal lawprocedure