Moore v. Commonwealth
Kentucky Supreme Court · 2006-05-18 · cited 14×
The case consolidated appeals from two defendants, Moore and Hawkins, whose RCr 11.42 motions collaterally attacking their criminal convictions and sentences were denied by trial courts. Moore, proceeding pro se, filed an untimely notice of appeal and sought a belated appeal after missing the 30-day deadline under RCr 12.04; Hawkins's appointed counsel mailed the notice to the wrong circuit clerk, causing it to be untimely. The Kentucky Supreme Court addressed whether appellate courts may grant belated appeals from denials of collateral post-conviction relief and under what circumstances, including the impact of counsel ineffectiveness or docket errors. The court held that pro se litigants must strictly comply with filing deadlines and affirmed the dismissal of Moore's appeal, but permitted a belated appeal for Hawkins due to counsel's error and reinstated his right to appeal. The core reasoning centered on enforcing CR 73.02(2)'s requirement of strict compliance with timeliness rules while recognizing limited exceptions tied to the right to effective assistance of counsel in post-conviction matters of right.
criminal lawprocedure
Schrimsher v. Commonwealth
Kentucky Supreme Court · 2006-04-20 · cited 33×
The case involved Joseph Michael Schrimsher's convictions by a McCracken Circuit Court jury on three counts of first-degree wanton assault, one count of second-degree wanton assault, and one count of first-degree criminal abuse for injuries inflicted on his six-month-old daughter, including multiple skull fractures, rib fractures, leg fractures, a lacerated liver, and severe malnutrition. Schrimsher was sentenced to a total of thirty years in prison, with the assault sentences concurrent and the abuse sentence consecutive. On appeal, he raised issues including denial of severance from his co-defendant's trial, improper redaction of statements, insufficiency of evidence, denial of full use of his interrogation video, and refusal to instruct on extreme emotional disturbance. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the redacted statements did not violate confrontation rights, the evidence was sufficient, the jury instructions were proper, and no extreme emotional disturbance instruction was warranted based on the facts presented.
criminal law
Edmonds v. Commonwealth
Kentucky Supreme Court · 2006-04-20 · cited 118×
In Edmonds v. Commonwealth, the appellant entered a conditional Alford guilty plea to multiple felony counts including rape, sodomy, burglary, kidnapping, and robbery arising from attacks on two separate victims, after the trial court denied his motions to sever the counts by victim, to continue the trial due to his hepatitis-C treatment, and later to withdraw the plea. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and twenty-year sentence, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in any of the challenged rulings. The court reasoned that joinder was not unduly prejudicial because evidence of each offense would have been admissible in a severed trial under KRE 404(b) to prove identity and intent, that the plea was knowing and voluntary based on the Boykin colloquy and the appellant's understanding of the consequences, and that concerns about trial strategy or health did not render the plea invalid or require a continuance.
criminal lawprocedure
Commonwealth v. Walther
Kentucky Supreme Court · 2006-04-20 · cited 23×
In this case, a Kentucky deputy jailer was charged with DUI and careless driving after a traffic stop revealed a blood-alcohol level of 0.124. The trial court suppressed certified maintenance and calibration records for the Intoxilyzer machine used in the test, ruling them inadmissible under Crawford v. Washington as testimonial hearsay and also untrustworthy due to apparent inconsistencies in the records. The Kentucky Supreme Court certified the question of whether such records could be admitted without live testimony from the technician and answered in the affirmative. The court reasoned that the records were routine ministerial documents created to verify machine accuracy under state regulations, not statements prepared for the purpose of prosecuting a specific defendant, and thus fell outside Crawford's definition of testimonial evidence.
criminal lawprocedure
Krahwinkel v. Commonwealth Aluminum Corp.
Kentucky Supreme Court · 2006-02-23 · cited 11×
The case involved Lewis Krahwinkel, an employee of contractor Intech, who slipped on oil and grease at Commonwealth Aluminum's plant and fell through an uncovered floor hole while guiding equipment installation, sustaining knee and ankle injuries. After recovering workers' compensation benefits from Intech, including temporary total disability payments, permanent partial disability benefits, and medical expenses, Krahwinkel sued Commonwealth in tort for negligence based on premises conditions and safety violations. A jury found Commonwealth 75% at fault and awarded damages for impairment, pain, medical costs, and lost wages, which the trial court reduced for comparative fault. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Kentucky considered premises liability and whether Commonwealth was entitled to credits against the judgment to offset the workers' compensation payments already received, ultimately allowing credits for certain benefits like TTD and PPD while remanding for possible adjustment on remaining medical expenses to avoid double recovery.
torts & liabilitylabor & employmentprocedure
Brown v. Indiana Insurance Co.
Kentucky Supreme Court · 2005-12-22 · cited 37×
This case involved wrongful death claims brought by the estates of two employees killed in a work-related vehicle accident against their employer, Willowbank, and a co-employee driver. Because Willowbank had failed to obtain required workers' compensation insurance, Kentucky law permitted the estates to pursue tort actions instead of being limited to workers' compensation benefits. The issue was whether Willowbank's commercial automobile liability policy with Indiana Insurance covered the claims or required the insurer to defend them. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that the policy provided no coverage and imposed no duty to defend, reasoning that the policy's terms and exclusions did not extend to liability arising from the employer's violation of the Workers' Compensation Act or to the underlying employment relationship. The decision turned on the interplay between the exclusive remedy provisions of workers' compensation law and the specific language of the auto policy.
labor & employmenttorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory