William S. Cooper

The case consolidated appeals from two defendants, Moore and Hawkins, whose RCr 11.42 motions collaterally attacking their criminal convictions and sentences were denied by trial courts. Moore, proceeding pro se, filed an untimely notice of appeal and sought a belated appeal after missing the 30-day deadline under RCr 12.04; Hawkins's appointed counsel mailed the notice to the wrong circuit clerk, causing it to be untimely. The Kentucky Supreme Court addressed whether appellate courts may grant belated appeals from denials of collateral post-conviction relief and under what circumstances, including the impact of counsel ineffectiveness or docket errors. The court held that pro se litigants must strictly comply with filing deadlines and affirmed the dismissal of Moore's appeal, but permitted a belated appeal for Hawkins due to counsel's error and reinstated his right to appeal. The core reasoning centered on enforcing CR 73.02(2)'s requirement of strict compliance with timeliness rules while recognizing limited exceptions tied to the right to effective assistance of counsel in post-conviction matters of right.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Joseph Michael Schrimsher's convictions by a McCracken Circuit Court jury on three counts of first-degree wanton assault, one count of second-degree wanton assault, and one count of first-degree criminal abuse for injuries inflicted on his six-month-old daughter, including multiple skull fractures, rib fractures, leg fractures, a lacerated liver, and severe malnutrition. Schrimsher was sentenced to a total of thirty years in prison, with the assault sentences concurrent and the abuse sentence consecutive. On appeal, he raised issues including denial of severance from his co-defendant's trial, improper redaction of statements, insufficiency of evidence, denial of full use of his interrogation video, and refusal to instruct on extreme emotional disturbance. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the redacted statements did not violate confrontation rights, the evidence was sufficient, the jury instructions were proper, and no extreme emotional disturbance instruction was warranted based on the facts presented.

criminal law

In Edmonds v. Commonwealth, the appellant entered a conditional Alford guilty plea to multiple felony counts including rape, sodomy, burglary, kidnapping, and robbery arising from attacks on two separate victims, after the trial court denied his motions to sever the counts by victim, to continue the trial due to his hepatitis-C treatment, and later to withdraw the plea. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and twenty-year sentence, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in any of the challenged rulings. The court reasoned that joinder was not unduly prejudicial because evidence of each offense would have been admissible in a severed trial under KRE 404(b) to prove identity and intent, that the plea was knowing and voluntary based on the Boykin colloquy and the appellant's understanding of the consequences, and that concerns about trial strategy or health did not render the plea invalid or require a continuance.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, a Kentucky deputy jailer was charged with DUI and careless driving after a traffic stop revealed a blood-alcohol level of 0.124. The trial court suppressed certified maintenance and calibration records for the Intoxilyzer machine used in the test, ruling them inadmissible under Crawford v. Washington as testimonial hearsay and also untrustworthy due to apparent inconsistencies in the records. The Kentucky Supreme Court certified the question of whether such records could be admitted without live testimony from the technician and answered in the affirmative. The court reasoned that the records were routine ministerial documents created to verify machine accuracy under state regulations, not statements prepared for the purpose of prosecuting a specific defendant, and thus fell outside Crawford's definition of testimonial evidence.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Lewis Krahwinkel, an employee of contractor Intech, who slipped on oil and grease at Commonwealth Aluminum's plant and fell through an uncovered floor hole while guiding equipment installation, sustaining knee and ankle injuries. After recovering workers' compensation benefits from Intech, including temporary total disability payments, permanent partial disability benefits, and medical expenses, Krahwinkel sued Commonwealth in tort for negligence based on premises conditions and safety violations. A jury found Commonwealth 75% at fault and awarded damages for impairment, pain, medical costs, and lost wages, which the trial court reduced for comparative fault. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Kentucky considered premises liability and whether Commonwealth was entitled to credits against the judgment to offset the workers' compensation payments already received, ultimately allowing credits for certain benefits like TTD and PPD while remanding for possible adjustment on remaining medical expenses to avoid double recovery.

torts & liabilitylabor & employmentprocedure

This case involved wrongful death claims brought by the estates of two employees killed in a work-related vehicle accident against their employer, Willowbank, and a co-employee driver. Because Willowbank had failed to obtain required workers' compensation insurance, Kentucky law permitted the estates to pursue tort actions instead of being limited to workers' compensation benefits. The issue was whether Willowbank's commercial automobile liability policy with Indiana Insurance covered the claims or required the insurer to defend them. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that the policy provided no coverage and imposed no duty to defend, reasoning that the policy's terms and exclusions did not extend to liability arising from the employer's violation of the Workers' Compensation Act or to the underlying employment relationship. The decision turned on the interplay between the exclusive remedy provisions of workers' compensation law and the specific language of the auto policy.

labor & employmenttorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

The case involved an eighteen-year-old customer who tripped and injured his wrist on a concrete parking barrier at a car dealership while examining a vehicle with a salesperson; the barrier was partially concealed because another employee had parked the car at an angle. The trial court granted summary judgment to the dealership, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the barrier was an open and obvious hazard for which the dealership owed no duty to warn or protect invitees. The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the barrier was not known or obvious to the plaintiff due to its concealment and that, even if it were, the dealership could reasonably anticipate customers being distracted while inspecting vehicles. The court remanded the case for a jury trial on the negligence claims under Restatement (Second) of Torts sections 343 and 343A.

torts & liability

The case involved David Leroy Skaggs, who was convicted in 1982 of two murders, robbery, and burglary and sentenced to death; after a federal habeas ruling led to a new penalty-phase trial in 2002, Skaggs moved for an evidentiary hearing to establish that he was mentally retarded and thus ineligible for the death penalty under KRS 532.130 et seq. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing, and Skaggs appealed, arguing that the retrial triggered the statutory exemption and that he had presented some evidence of mental retardation (including an IQ score of 73 and expert testimony). The Kentucky Supreme Court held that the 2002 penalty retrial constituted a new trial commenced after the statute's effective date, that Skaggs had not procedurally defaulted the issue, and that the evidence created sufficient doubt to require an evidentiary hearing before imposition of the death penalty; the court rejected the Commonwealth's argument that the retrial was merely a continuation of the original 1982 proceeding.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Thomas Edwin Jones challenging his dismissal from his position as a Bell County pretrial services officer by the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC). After exhausting internal grievance procedures, Jones sought review in the Franklin Circuit Court, which transferred the case to the Kentucky Supreme Court on the grounds that the AOC is an arm of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that, by extending comity to KRS 13B.140, appeals from AOC personnel actions should be filed in circuit court rather than directly with the Supreme Court, and therefore vacated the transfer order and remanded the case to the Franklin Circuit Court for review limited to the administrative record.

procedurelabor & employment

In Brown v. Commonwealth, appellant Demond Brown was convicted by a jury of two counts of wanton murder and two counts of first-degree wanton endangerment after driving through a red light at high speed in Hopkinsville, Kentucky, colliding with another vehicle and killing two occupants while injuring his own passengers. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and twenty-year sentence, rejecting Brown's claims that the evidence was insufficient for the murder charges, that alleged juror misconduct required a new trial, and that the prosecutor engaged in improper redirect examination and closing argument. The court held that evidence of Brown's speed five to fifteen miles per hour over the limit, use of in-car television monitors, failure to brake or slow despite seeing the red light, and lack of skid marks permitted the jury to find wanton conduct manifesting extreme indifference to human life under KRS 507.020(1)(b). It further concluded there was no showing of actual prejudice from any juror discussions and no reversible error in the prosecutor's conduct.

criminal law

In Partin v. Commonwealth, Stacy Lynn Partin was convicted by a McCracken Circuit Court jury of kidnapping, two counts of first-degree unlawful imprisonment, first- and second-degree wanton endangerment, fourth-degree assault, and being a second-degree persistent felony offender after an incident in which he threatened his wife and her son with a gun, held them and others hostage, and was sentenced to life in prison. On appeal to the Kentucky Supreme Court, Partin argued that the trial court violated his right to self-representation by denying him the ability to personally cross-examine the victims while allowing him to prepare questions for counsel, participate in voir dire, make opening and closing statements, and cross-examine other witnesses. The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the limitation was justified by safety concerns for the victims and did not deny Partin a meaningful opportunity to present his defense or control the case, consistent with Sixth Amendment precedents such as Faretta v. California and McKaskle v. Wiggins. The opinion addressed additional claims regarding the indictment, evidentiary rulings on letters, and prosecutorial conduct but found no reversible error in any of them.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

In Bowling v. Commonwealth, a death-row inmate convicted in 1990 of two murders and one assault sought to vacate his death sentences through a separate civil action in Fayette Circuit Court, claiming he was exempt from execution due to mental retardation under Atkins v. Virginia. The inmate filed the action under CR 60.02(d) and (f) without naming the Commonwealth as a party and requested funds for an expert, after exhausting all direct appeals, state post-conviction motions, and federal habeas proceedings. The trial court dismissed the petition and funding motion, and the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed, holding that CR 60.02 cannot be used for this type of collateral attack on a final criminal judgment via an independent civil suit, that the mental retardation claim was untimely and not supported by the IQ evidence in the record, and that the proper avenues for such claims had already been foreclosed.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Kevin Ray Hillard, who was convicted in Ohio Circuit Court of first-degree unlawful transaction with a minor for inducing a 15-year-old to engage in sexual activity and third-degree unlawful transaction with a minor for providing alcohol to a 17-year-old, resulting in a 20-year prison sentence for the felony. The Kentucky Supreme Court vacated the misdemeanor conviction and sentence because the evidence was insufficient, as conceded by the Commonwealth, but affirmed the felony conviction and sentence. The court reasoned that the described conduct met the elements of sexual abuse in the third degree under KRS 510.130, satisfying the "illegal sexual activity" requirement of KRS 530.064, and found no reversible error in the exclusion of the victim's sexual history, claims of juror misconduct, or prosecutorial actions despite some procedural violations.

criminal law

The case involved the convictions of Kevin Wayne Metcalf for first-degree sodomy and first-degree sexual abuse of his stepdaughter C.I., based on allegations that he had fondled and licked her genitals. The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the convictions and remanded for a new trial. The court held that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of uncharged acts involving two other stepdaughters, including videotaping one while undressing and an indecent exposure to the other, because such evidence violated KRE 404(b) and was not admissible under any exception such as background or inextricably intertwined facts. The opinion addressed several other issues likely to recur on retrial, including the denial of a motion to suppress the defendant's confession and the destruction of potential evidence.

criminal law

The case involved Shawn William Ernst's convictions by a Boone Circuit Court jury for the kidnapping and murder of Sandra Kay Roberts, resulting in sentences of life imprisonment for the murder and life without parole for the kidnapping. Ernst appealed on eight grounds, including challenges to the indictment for capital kidnapping, admission of hearsay and other evidence, victim impact statements, cross-examination, and jury instructions on aggravating circumstances. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding that the indictment was sufficient, the challenged evidence was properly admitted or not prejudicial, and there was no reversible error in the trial proceedings or instructions.

criminal lawprocedure

In Gerlaugh v. Commonwealth, Steven Gerlaugh was convicted by a Montgomery Circuit Court jury of first-degree robbery after evidence showed two intruders robbed a couple at gunpoint in their home. On appeal to the Kentucky Supreme Court, Gerlaugh raised claims including denial of a speedy trial, improper eyewitness identification, admission of hearsay evidence from an intercepted letter, and admission of a firearm not proven connected to the crime. The court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial, determining that the hearsay evidence was improperly admitted under evidentiary rules and that the pistol lacked sufficient connection to the robbery. The court rejected the remaining claims, including that the nine-month pretrial delay was not presumptively prejudicial under speedy trial standards and that the eyewitness identification was admissible.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, Ronnie Lee Bowling, convicted in 1992 of two murders and related charges with death sentences imposed, sought a new trial in 2002 under RCr 10.02 and CR 60.02 based on newly discovered evidence from juror interviews regarding alleged jury bias, false voir dire answers, and ex parte contacts by the trial judge. The Laurel Circuit Court denied the motion, and the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the motion was untimely under RCr 10.06(1) and CR 60.02 because it was filed nearly a decade after the judgment and more than one year after the relevant decision in Cape Publications lifted barriers to juror contact, without any extension of time having been sought or granted. The court reasoned that the no-contact order provided grounds for a timeliness extension request but did not automatically toll the deadline, and the claims of newly discovered evidence did not overcome the procedural bars.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute between neighboring landowners in Fleming County, Kentucky, over whether the Meades held an easement to use a fifty-foot roadway on the Ginns' 78-acre tract to reach the southern part of the Meades' 131-acre property. The Meades sued after the Ginns blocked the road with a gate, claiming an easement by reservation and agreement from 1977-1978 deeds and contracts when the tracts were divided from a larger farm; the Ginns denied any such right and argued any easement had merged and extinguished. The trial court ruled for the Ginns on deed language grounds, and the Court of Appeals affirmed on merger grounds, but the Kentucky Supreme Court held that an easement appurtenant was created in 1978, that the Meades' property remained the dominant tenement, and that merger could not occur because the Ginns never acquired ownership of both the dominant and servient estates.

property

In Sherroan v. Commonwealth, the defendant was convicted by a Fayette Circuit Court jury of two intentional murders after fatally shooting two acquaintances with a revolver, though he was acquitted of killing his stepfather; he claimed the killings occurred under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance as his sole defense and received two concurrent life sentences without parole. On appeal, the defendant raised multiple claims of trial error, including restrictions on voir dire questions about penalties and mitigation, failure to strike jurors for cause, admission of probation and threat evidence, exclusion of certain character testimony, jury instructions on extreme emotional disturbance, and the submission of multiple victim impact statements. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding that the trial court committed no reversible error in any of its challenged rulings on jury selection, evidentiary matters, instructions, or sentencing procedures.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a challenge to the constitutionality of KRS 311.631, a provision of the Kentucky Living Will Directive Act permitting a judicially appointed guardian to authorize withdrawal of artificial life-prolonging treatment from a ward in a state of permanent unconsciousness. Matthew Woods, a partially disabled adult under state guardianship, suffered irreversible brain damage after a cardiopulmonary arrest and was kept alive by mechanical ventilation and feeding tubes with no prospect of recovery. The court examined the statute's validity under the Fourteenth Amendment, the appropriate decision-making standard for the guardian (such as substituted judgment or best interests), and the procedural requirements for implementing such a decision.

healthcarecivil rights