Martin E. Johnstone

In Bowling v. Commonwealth, Thomas C. Bowling appealed the Fayette Circuit Court’s denial of his motion for relief under CR 60.02 and CR 60.03, arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Roper v. Simmons and the Eighth Amendment prohibit the execution of individuals with the mental age of a juvenile, and seeking a new sentencing hearing. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the denial of relief. The court reasoned that Kentucky already had a statute, KRS 640.040, prohibiting the execution of offenders under sixteen at the time of Bowling’s trial, so Roper created no new protection that Bowling could not have asserted earlier, and he had procedurally defaulted the claim by not raising it at trial or in prior proceedings. Additionally, the court found that Bowling was not entitled to a new sentencing hearing because arguments regarding the mitigating value of juvenile mental age could have been made at his original trial in 1990.

criminal lawprocedure

This case arose from the 2004 election for Kentucky State Senator in the 37th District, where Dana Seum Stephenson defeated Virginia L. Woodward but faced a challenge alleging she failed to meet the six-year residency requirement under Section 32 of the Kentucky Constitution. After the Jefferson Circuit Court disqualified Stephenson and the Franklin Circuit Court addressed related injunctions and certification issues, the Kentucky Supreme Court reviewed the lower courts' authority. The Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that Section 38 of the Kentucky Constitution grants each legislative house exclusive power to judge the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members, so the judiciary lacked jurisdiction to disqualify Stephenson or dictate Senate seating. The decision emphasized constitutional separation of powers and precedents supporting legislative authority over incoming members' qualifications.

electionsprocedure

In Wood v. Commonwealth, Nathaniel Wood was convicted by a jury in Barren Circuit Court of capital murder, capital kidnapping, kidnapping, first-degree criminal trespass, second-degree assault, and violation of a protective order after an incident in which he assaulted his ex-girlfriend, shot her and her companion during a confrontation, abducted her, and barricaded himself in a home during a police standoff. The trial court sentenced him to life without parole on the capital charges, along with additional prison terms and jail time on the other counts. Wood appealed as of right, raising nine issues including challenges to the sufficiency of evidence for aggravating circumstances found by the jury (such as a substantial history of assaultive convictions and the existence of a protective order), alleged errors in jury selection regarding prospective jurors' ability to consider mitigation, and other trial rulings. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences in full, holding that the evidence supported the aggravators, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying challenges for cause to five jurors, and that Wood's remaining claims lacked merit.

criminal law

This case involved a negligence lawsuit filed by Samuel Wilkey against Office, Inc. d/b/a Club Olympic, a health club, after Wilkey slipped and fell while entering the club's swimming pool, allegedly due to unsafe pool steps, resulting in shoulder injuries. A jury in Warren Circuit Court found in favor of the club using standard "bare bones" jury instructions on the duty of ordinary care. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment, holding that the instructions failed to adequately convey a business owner's specific affirmative duties to business invitees, such as reasonable inspection and warning of discoverable dangers. The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court's judgment, reasoning that Kentucky law permits bare bones instructions focused on duties, with details to be addressed in closing arguments, and that the given instructions did not misstate the law.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved Joyce Ann Lewis challenging the Kentucky Retirement Systems' (KERS) procedure for reviewing her second application for disability retirement benefits after her initial application was denied, claiming the agency's use of a single medical examiner violated statutory requirements for up to three examiners. Lewis sought a declaratory judgment in circuit court without completing the administrative hearing process. The Kentucky Supreme Court ruled that Lewis was required to exhaust all administrative remedies before seeking judicial review, as no final agency order had been issued and no exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine applied. The court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the circuit court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction due to failure to exhaust remedies.

procedurelabor & employment

This case concerned whether the Fayette County Board of Education provided M.R.D., a student with a learning disability, a free appropriate public education (FAPE) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and related Kentucky law, and whether his parents were entitled to reimbursement for his private school tuition. After administrative hearings and lower court proceedings denied reimbursement, the Court of Appeals reversed and ordered reimbursement following a modified de novo review. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals applied the incorrect standard of review and that the administrative decisions were supported by substantial evidence showing the school district had complied with FAPE requirements through annual IEPs and related services. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the Fayette Circuit Court judgment affirming the denial of reimbursement.

civil rights